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This thesis challenges the constitutive and taken-for-granted assumptions of the current 
dominant administrative rationalist discourse of wild dog management and control 
(WMDC) in New South Wales (NSW), Australia. It asks: To what extent can conflicts 
over WDMC in NSW be understood in terms of contending discourses and what does 
that imply for policy legitimacy? It isolates the storylines that emerged from substantial 
empirical research and examines, if and how, these storylines contributed to the 
dominant discourse of administrative rationalism.
From the beginning of white settlement of NSW, the State and farm families worked in 
concert to achieve the eradication of wild dogs and dingoes. From the 1960s, however, a 
significant discursive turn occurred in WDMC. This occurred as a result of the 
contending discourses of environmentalism, ecological science, animal welfare and 
biosecurity. These discourses collectively afforded new meanings to dingoes, wild dogs 
and WDMC. Concurrently, the State drove this discursive turn through a discourse of 
administrative rationalism.
From 1995 until 2011, a period of successive NSW Labor Governments, the State 
further consolidated this discursive approach. It reified ‘experts’ and legislatively 
empowered public land managers to inform, shape and promulgate the dominant 
discourse of WDMC through the promotion of a ‘best practice’ model. Within this 
model the individual knowledges and experiences of farm families of WDMC were 
subject to empirical measurement, the interpretations of public land managers and the 
corroboration of continuing ecological studies. The entry of new social actors closely 
linked to Government who actively promoted ‘new’ innovations and technologies in 
WDMC further distilled the dominance of the administrative rationalist discourse.
However, the legitimacy of this approach was forcefully challenged by a growing sense 
of crisis in the ‘Bush.’ This was driven by farm families who were directly affected by 
the lack of WDMC on public lands, the increasing numbers of wild dogs and the 
devastating effect this was having on the lives of farm families. This reality was
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exploited mercilessly for its political capital by all political parties. Successive NSW 
Labor Governments consistently reiterated in storylines its financial largesse in WDMC 
to give legitimacy to its discursive approach. These storylines of financial expenditures 
in real terms however are difficult to substantiate.
Ironically, the success of the administrative rationalist discourse was dependent on the 
continued involvement of farm families in a public planning process which pivoted on 
their acquiescence to a discourse that subordinated their concerns and, at the same time, 
relied on the widespread adoption of this model by farm families across NSW. This has 
proved deeply problematic. Overwhelmingly, at public WDMC meetings farm families 
rejected the State’s reliance on administrative rationalism and a chorus of voices 
reflected the significant gap that existed between the political and policy rhetoric of 
WDMC and the lived reality. Nevertheless, successive attempts by farm families have 
so far failed to dislodge the dominant discourse of WDMC.
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Chapter One: Introduction
‘Eye of newt and toe of frog, Wool of bat and tongue of dog, Adder's 
fork and blind-worm's sting, Lizard's leg and owlet's wing, For a 
charm of powerful trouble, Like a hell-broth boil and bubble’ 
Macbeth (IV, 1, 14-15).
The storyline of the ‘dog tree’
In New South Wales (NSW) wild dogs are killed; trapped; shot; or poisoned. Every so 
often they are hung dead from ‘dog trees’ across the Australian landscape by some 
farmers and dog trappers.
While this is perceived by some as evocative of a ‘dark, grizzly and grotesque past’ 
(Matchett 2008 25 June:50) or ‘confronting’ for city dwellers, (Doherty 2008 2 August: 
B3) the ‘dog tree’ functions as a sign warning other neighbouring farmers that ‘the dogs 
are in’; that the farmer has ‘got the dog’ and that hopefully, this marks an end to the 
misery and the stress to the farm family. As Mick Hedger, reportedly a third generation 
Snowy Mountains’ trapper stated ‘the only dogs in those trees are killing dogs’ 
(Doherty 2008 2 August: B3).
The ‘dog tree’ also serves as evidence for the dog trapper or farm family; not simply 
just for payment (Lower North Coast & Tablelands Dingo Destruction Board 1947- 
1983, Davies 2009, Jopson 2009, 26 October, Inman 2010 9 May). It evokes century old 
normative expectations of what it means to be a ‘good neighbour.’
From early European settlement a community meeting was called in rural communities 
when the ‘dogs were in.’ In South East NSW pounds were ‘put on the table’ to pay for a 
trapper to catch and destroy a problem dog(s) (Franklin, N. pers. comm. 2008).
The terms ‘trapper’ and ‘dogger’ connotes an historical meaning of a person who earned 
their living trapping and destroying wild dogs. At times these people were employed on 
contracts, full time and at other times they were paid only on production of a ‘dog scalp’ 
by the NSW Dingo Destruction Board system, Wild Dog Associations (WDAs) and the 
NSW Pasture Protection Board system (NSW PPB). The term, ‘pest animal controller’ 
is a more recent term and connotes a highly skilled and trained person employed 
through the then RLPB system and/or its successor, the LHPA system in NSW.
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Farm families hold the bush knowledge, skills and experience of ‘trappers, ‘doggers’ 
and ‘pest animal controllers’ in high esteem. For example, in South East Australia 
individuals Bill Coman, Bill Morris, Mick Davis, Andrew McDougall, ‘Boots,’ Warren 
Schofield, Murray Schofield and the RLBP Ranger, Andrew Miners are all respected 
for these skills. In contrast, the term ‘Ranger’ usually connotes a person working for a 
Government Department or Agency or a person working for the LHPA who may be 
involved in a range of tasks associated with feral animal control and the functions of the 
LHPA system more generally.
Historically, many Wild Dog Associations (WDAs) across NSW collected voluntary 
levies on a regular basis from their members to employ a ‘dogger’ full time -  some still 
do - although not all members contributed financially (Lower North Coast & Tablelands 
Dingo Destruction Board 1947-1983, Fennessy and Bromell undated: circa 1958). Some 
farming families employed ‘doggers’ privately for particularly ‘problem’ dogs (Bean 
1945, Barnard River Wild Dog Association 1956-1968, Rolls 1969, Rolls 1981, Van 
Eyk 2001 17 December). These practices were widespread from the time of White 
colonisation of Australia and were undertaken with the full imprimatur of the State (The 
Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser 1864 23 February, Bean 1945, 
Rolls 1969).
Institutional reports, records and correspondence garnered by farming families, RLPBs 
and WDAs across NSW reveal that over the past fifty years the meaning of ‘good 
neighbour’ has been appropriated for a range of different purposes by a suite of 
Government Departments across Australia (NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 
2002). As late as the 1980s, the principal function of WDMC policy was promulgated -  
at least publicly -  as safeguarding the national flock. Mitchell (1986), for example, 
stated:
The Department’s Wild Dog Control Program should be seen in the context of 
providing resource protection (under the good neighbour principle) to sheep 
graziers in the Eastern Highlands region of Victoria (Mitchell 1986).
However, the meanings associated with ‘dog trees’ and ‘good neighbour’ changed.
From the 1960s, the meaning of ‘dog trees’ is no longer ‘just’ a warning to other farm 
families that the ‘dogs are in.’ The dog tree functions as a public rebuke and a powerful
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Statement of protest to public land managers who are perceived to have failed in their 
responsibilities as a ‘good neighbour’ in controlling wild dogs on public lands.
Overall, the meanings attached to ‘dog trees’ by farm families gleaned from the 
empirical research of this thesis are clear: Wild dogs cause harm to the social, economic 
and environmental fabric of the lives of Australian farm families; wild dogs kill, maim, 
maul and inflict terrific injuries on agricultural stock in Australia; public land managers 
do not meet their obligations as ‘good neighbours’ in controlling wild dogs; farm 
families have a moral right to productively farm private land free of wild dogs; a ‘good’ 
neighbour -  irrespective of whether they are a public or private landholder - has a duty 
to keep the increasing numbers of wild dogs off farms.
The function of storylines within discourse
Thus, the ‘dog tree’ functions as a storyline. A storyline is: ‘a generative sort of 
narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning 
to specific or social phenomena’ (Hajer 1995: 56).
Dramaturgically, the ‘dog tree’ highlights the importance of meaning within WDMC 
wherein it maps ‘...an architecture of meaning’ (Yanow 2003: 235). That is, it speaks of 
local and situated knowledges -  ‘the very mundane, but still expert, understanding of 
and practical reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience’ (Yanow 
2003 : 236).
As a storyline, the ‘dog tree’ draws attention to the pivotal role that ‘story lines’ have 
within a particular discourse and how they contribute to it. Yet, storylines are also often 
subverted performing different functions within other discourses (Hajer 1995). As 
Hajer writes:
Ideas may make perfect sense within the discourse in which they were 
constituted, but then subsequently become an element in a debate that is 
conducted by a far more diverse group of actors and in the context of acts and 
practices that do not function according to the discursive logic of that original 
discourse (Hajer 1995 : 46).
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For example, the storyline of the ‘dog tree’ is understood by farm families as a symbolic 
statement of protest and proof of the cruelty meted out by wild dogs on agricultural 
livestock. Visceral photographic images of dead or dying, disembowelled and savaged 
sheep and of calves and cattle with their teats and ears chewed off or back legs badly 
bitten are common.
Yet, within a discourse of animal rights the storyline of the ‘dog tree’ is subverted and 
appears as evidence of the alleged cruelty meted out to specific ‘non-human’ animals, 
wild dogs -  a storyline in itself - which animal rights activists mobilise politically to 
prevent: Wild dogs are not ‘pests,’ ‘vermin’ or ferals’ but simply ‘mislocated,’ 
overabundant and ‘simply bom in the wrong place at the wrong time’ (Oogjes G. 1999 
26-27 May, Oogjes 2003 25 February). However, to some public land managers and 
scientists the ‘dog tree’ appears to serve as ‘further’ evidence of ‘backward’ farming 
traditions and even ignorance which works to cement their privileging of a scientifically 
informed and bureaucratically controlled discourse of WDMC.
The Research Gap
This thesis examines the policy and practice of WDMC in NSW over the years of 
successive NSW Labor governments from 1995 until 2011. It argues that the dominant 
discourse of WDMC in NSW was an ‘administrative rationalist’ one. This thesis 
understands administrative rationalism as a discourse that seeks: ‘to organise scientific 
and technical expertise into bureaucratic hierarchy in the service of the state’ (Dryzek 
1997: 73).
Methodologically, this thesis responds to John Dryzek’s call that:
the search for administrative rationalism in environmental affairs should begin 
not with the writings of theorists and the proclamations of activists, but with an 
examination of actual policy practice’ (Dryzek 1997 :75).
This thesis does just that. Based on empirical findings about ‘actual’ WDMC policy and 
practice this thesis presents a different ‘story’ of WDMC from that which is publically 
disseminated through the administrative, scientific and technological public policy 
literature.
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Firstly, this thesis examines the dominant discourse of WDMC policy and practice and 
the storylines that contribute to it as they are articulated in the public domain. This has 
not been done previously and represents a significant contribution to the academic 
literature.
It makes this contribution in three ways. First, it provides a short history of WDMC in 
NSW. It then draws on 153 parliamentary speeches of the NSW Parliament over 
successive terms of the NSW Labor Government from 1995 until 2011; second, it draws 
on the Annual Reports and Financial Statements of the six State actors involved in 
WDMC over the life of successive NSW Labor Governments; and, third, it draws on the 
prevailing WDMC public policy literature, scientific and technological literature as well 
as relevant economic and Government reports.
It then compares and contrasts the findings that emerge from an analysis of publicly 
available NSW WDMC plans and from attendance at sixty three public WDMC 
meetings. It supplements this comparison throughout with publicly available, historical 
WDMC literatures. This Triangulation’ (Sarantakos 1998:168-170; 469) of data sources 
and the analysis which flows from it has not been done previously.
Throughout this thesis, the storylines that emerge from these literatures are presented to 
see how -  and if - they contribute to the dominant administrative rationalist discourse 
and to see how they position the ‘voice’ of farm families. It also identifies competing 
discourses in WDMC as they emerge from these literatures. As a consequence of this 
empirical research, this thesis argues that there is a significant gap between what is said 
to happen in WDMC in NSW and what happens in ‘actual’ policy practice. It asks: 
‘Why?’
The Interpretative ‘turn’ and Discourse
To answer the question of: ‘Why?’ this thesis embraces an interpretative ‘turn.’ This 
thesis is located within the growing field of critical policy studies and, more 
specifically, interpretative policy analysis. It embraces theoretically-grounded 
approaches that challenge the idea that public policy is mainly a matter of devising 
means to clarified ends. It presupposes in ontological terms that there is not an 
‘objective’ reality to be discovered ‘out there’ and that there are different ‘ways of
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knowing’ (Andrew 2003, Yanow 2006). It rejects the myth of ‘value-free empirical 
inquiry’ (Hawkesworth 2006: 48). As Yanow explains:
All ideas -  including those of the natural and physical sciences - have “a history 
and a tradition of thought, images, and vocabulary that have given [them] reality 
and presence”...In this sense, then, social scientific texts do not merely present 
their subjects through the lenses of their data, but represent and re-present- 
constitute, construct-them (Yanow 2006: 7).
Further as Hendriks (2007) explains:
Inspired by post-positivism, interpretive researchers reject the idea that the goal 
of policy analysis is to settle debates by conducting a value-free, objective 
assessment of the policy situation (Fischer, 2003: 120; Yanow, 200: 5-6). In 
contrast, they seek to appreciate and improve policy practice by studying its 
paradoxes and ambiguities (Stone, 2002), and exploring various meanings 
embedded in language, action and artefacts (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hajer 
1995; Rein and Schon, 1993) (Hendriks 2007: 280).
This thesis explores the ‘paradoxes,’ ‘ambiguities’ and ‘various meanings’ inherent in 
NSW WDMC and in doing so argues that the policy and practices of NSW WDMC 
represent an intense socio-political struggle wherein ‘in addition to the dominant 
discourses, competing discourses struggle to gain recognition and power’ (Fischer 2003: 
76). In this thesis a discourse is understood as:
a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those 
who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into 
coherent stories or accounts. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments, 
and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, agreements, and 
disagreements, in the environmental area no less than elsewhere (Dryzek 1997: 
6).
This conceptualisation of discourse within an interpretative ‘turn’ rests on 
constructivism (Parsons 2010) which is underpinned by two philosophical traditions: It 
understands ‘there is meaning in the underlying frames and assumptions through which
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people live their experiences (phenonomenology)’ and equally that ‘there is meaning 
embedded in actions, text or artefacts (hermeneutics) (Yanow, 2006; Dryzek 1982)’ 
(Hendriks 2007: 280). Discourse ascribes meaning because it actively excludes, ‘other 
possible sets of articulations or meanings’ (Epstein 2008: 9). It links: ‘together other 
elements in a logic that modifies each particular element in an explanation that consists 
in a “synthesis of many determinations” (Marx 1973)’ (Howarth and Griggs 2012: 324).
In this light the current reliance on ‘experts’ in NSW WDMC policy is hegemonic [See 
(Howarth 2010) for detailed discussion]. Thus the ‘problem’ of wdmc in NSW ‘has 
nothing at all to do with the broad concept of “nature”’ (Latour 2004: 5). The policy 
and practices of NSW WDMC can be seen as an exercise in power which is currently 
shaped and affected epistemologically by the ‘nature centrism’ of a scientific rationalist 
discourse. Overall, the strength of an interpretative ‘turn’ is that it:
extends the analytic goal beyond the technical efficiency of the governing 
institutions to include an assessment of the political interests and needs of the 
larger political community. From this perspective, the political community is 
inhabited by citizens who ‘live in a web of interdependencies, loyalties and 
associations’ in which ‘they envision and fight for the public interest as well as 
their individual interests’ (Stone 1988: vii)’ (Fischer 2003: 223).
However, of note, ‘discourse is not only about representations and systems of meaning’ 
(Howarth 2010-4). Drawing on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Howarth argues 
persuasively that ‘a discursive structure is not a merely “cognitive” or “contemplatory” 
entity; it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social structures’ 
(Howarth 2010: 312 citing Laclau and Mouffe 1995:96). Importantly, discourses can be 
seen as ‘relational configurations of elements that comprise agents (or subjects), words, 
actions and things’ which are ‘intelligible within the context of a particular practice’ 
(Howarth 2010: 311-312).
For example, the ‘dog tree’ has meaning for farming families and is intelligible within 
the context of WDMC and it is also an intensely social phenomenon. At the same time, 
WDMC meetings are also the sites where NSW WDMC policy is both ‘performed’ and 
enacted by institutional actors such as public servants from NSW NPWS, State Forests 
and NSW DPI. However, as Howarth (2010) explains:
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institutions like states, markets or governance networks can be conceptualised as 
more or less sedimented systems of discourse, that is, partially fixed systems of 
rules, norms, resources, practices and subjectivities that are linked together in 
particular ways (Howarth 2000: 123).
As a result, this thesis views discourses and discursive structures as relational and 
intertwined; they do not have an existence separate to agents. However, at the same 
time, and importantly, discourses and discursive structures are marked both by their 
contingency and undecidability (Howarth 2010). Thus, discourses are ‘inherently social 
phenomena’ (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, Epstein 2008). They involve people, 
institutions and ideas. They are powerful. They also change (Adams 2001).
For example, many dog trappers and farmers now hang wild dogs well away from main 
roads and on fence lines on private property out of public view. Since the late 1960s 
neither the State nor its agents enforce the systematic eradication of ‘dingoes’ which it 
had done extensively since European colonialisation (Rolls 1969, Rolls 1981, Marshall 
2006). The issue of animal rights is a pervasive presence and informs WDMC policy 
and practice (Jones 2002 31 October, Sharp and Saunders 2008). Prominent political 
ecologists now call for the removal of sheep from the Australian landscape altogether 
and advocate reintroducing dingoes to Targe tracts of Australian sheep grazing country 
as a means of preserving native animal species’ (Milbum 2007 September, Smith 2009 
13 August)
Hence, the policy and practices of NSW WDMC are as much about the discourses and 
the storylines which inform them as they are about the exercise of power, the social 
actors, the institutions and the ideas involved at a particular time. The history and the 
socio-political context of WDMC and how each has contributed to NSW WDMC policy 
NSW over time must be understood. This thesis addresses these issues.
Collectively, these changes point to a significant discursive ‘turn’ that has occurred 
since the 1960s which is reflected within the policy and practice of WDMC as Australia 
moved from a nation that ‘Rode on the sheep’s back’ to one where farm families are 




From the 1960s onwards, a discursive ‘turn’ occurred in WDMC. Several ‘intervening 
variables’ contributed to this ‘turn.’ As Fischer & Gottweis (2012) explain:
Communication interaction can (and often does) exert a causal influence on 
political change, although the influence tends to be that of an intervening rather 
than an independent variable. For this reason discourse and argumentation based 
on it cannot be the cause, but it is often a cause of political change (Fischer and 
Gottweis 2012:17).
During this time, fewer and fewer Australians swore allegiance to ‘Queen, Country and 
the Merino.’ The world-wide rise o f ‘new’ environmentalism, the decline of the ‘power’ 
of the wool discourse to the Australian economy; the global rise of synthetics; the 
‘minerals boom;’ Australia’s growing acceptance of the policy of multiculturalism; and, 
the decline in the explanatory purchase of an Anglo Saxon discourse in defining 
Australian culture (Bolton 1999). The collapse of the Australian Reserve Price Scheme 
(RPS) for wool in 1989 further challenged the power of the ‘wool’ discourse (See 
Massey 2011 for lengthy discussion).
Together these factors hollowed out a space for the entry of powerful and competing 
discourses to take hold -  most notably, the competing discourse of ‘new’ 
environmentalism’ (Meyer 2006). Environmentalism is a discourse, like others, that is 
replete with its own storylines: ‘sustainable development,’ ‘the risk society,’ the 
‘precautionary principle,’ ‘ecological modernisation,’ ‘biodiversity,’ ‘intrinsic value’ 
and ‘animal rights’ are but a few.
The rise of ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck 1992, Beck 2006) as a consequence of 
modernity is a feature of the Twentieth Century. Importantly, from the 1950s the effects 
of ‘reflexive modernization’ were particularly felt through the adoption of the 
‘precautionary principle’ in WDMC policy in NSW (Vertebrate Pests Commitee 2003 
November).
However, as Smith (2003) notes ‘the ecology movement, when viewed as a whole, 
draws it force from a range of arguments whose ethical underpinnings are really quite
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divergent and difficult to reconcile' (Smith 2003: 2 citing Soper 1995: 254). In other 
words, the discourse of environmentalism, ‘new’ or ‘old,’ encompasses a broad church. 
Like all storylines, the ‘environmental’ storylines of WDMC contribute to and/or are 
subverted within competing discourses. Notwithstanding this, taken as a whole, the 
discourse of ‘environmentalism’ has proved to be a powerful, competing discourse 
within the issue of WDMC. Through its reliance on scientific rationalism it draws on 
the distinction between ‘wild dogs’ and ‘dingoes.’ The significance of this distinction in 
WDMC cannot be understated.
The distinction between ‘wild dogs’ and ‘dingoes’
The current storyline of WDMC legislatively charges public land managers with the 
twin objectives of conservation and control that is, to conserve the ‘dingo’ and to 
control ‘wild dogs’ to the extent necessary (Department of Primary Industries, Official 
Notices, 6 October 2006). Under NSW Labor, the meaning afforded to ‘wild dogs’ was 
muddied by the adoption of a nomenclature that distinguished ‘wild dogs’ (Canis lupus 
familiaris) from ‘dingos’ (Canis lupus dingo) and from other dogs. However, the extent 
of the hybridisation of dingoes with wild dogs made this distinction, without genetic 
testing, difficult -  if not impossible. Nevertheless, this scientific distinction was 
enshrined in legislation. Technical incongruities between conflicting pieces of 
legislation were overcome by regulation and administrative fiat (See Fleming, Corbett 
et al. 2001, for a discussion, New South Wales Gazette 2006).
These changes represented significant discursive shifts in WDMC, not least because 
power moved from individual farm families to the State, where the meaning of ‘wild 
dog,’ WDMC, and the extent of WDMC, if at all, would be determined by ‘experts’ and 
bureaucrats. The involvement of farm families and the meanings of ‘wild dog’ and 
‘dingo’ were now legally proscribed which resulted in a sharp delineation between 
public and private actions. This distinction occurred progressively from the 1950s and 
by virtue of the distinction it draws, it has forced significant changes on the public 
policy of WDMC. This policy has directly affected the lives and material wellbeing of 
Australian farm families who have experienced and are continuing to experience wild 
dog predation on agricultural stock (Fazio 2002 31 October, House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005, Kenny 2008, Agforce 
Queensland 2009).
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However, this discursive ‘turn’ also marked the entry of ‘new’ players in WDMC. In 
2006, the Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre was formed, the strategic aims 
of which were:
to counteract the impact of invasive animals through the application of new 
technologies and by integrating approaches across agencies and jurisdictions’ 
(Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2005/2011:1).
Inherent within these ‘new technologies’ and ‘approaches across agencies and 
jurisdictions’ is the privileging o f ‘scientific expertise,’ measurement and quantification 
in WDMC (Braysher 1993, Fleming, Corbett et al. 2001, Ballard 2012). Overall, the 
‘coupling’ of some parts of industry, ecological interests and government through 
commercial partnerships has further cemented the reliance on scientific understandings 
of ‘wild dogs’ as well as fostered an exponential rise in and commitment to 
technological ‘innovations’ in WDMC. This has significantly redefined what was a 
personal issue into a public ‘problem’(Mills 2000).
Delimitations
This thesis is delimited in two ways:
First, this thesis views the management of agro biodiversity - of which WDMC is a part 
- as:
an active anthropogenic enterprise that cannot be divorced from the rich cultural 
diversity and local knowledge embodied in livelihood systems (Lockie and 
Carpenter 2009 citing Prain et al 1999; Thrupp, 2000: 5).
It looks at WDMC in both in its historical and current context. Principally, WDMC 
must be understood firstly as a socio-cultural activity occurring in specific contexts. It is 
not simply and/or predominantly a scientific and technological ‘growth industry’ 
wherein: ‘through industry collaboration on the registration, marketing, export and 
community uptake of new products...’ WDMC is afforded its raison d’etre (Invasive 
Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2006: Purpose).
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Second, this thesis does not explore the meanings of ‘dingoes’ in the Aboriginal 
Dreaming or their significance in Aboriginal culture. This omission does lessen their 
significance. A study of this type is simply outside the ability and cultural competence 
of the writer. [See (Rose 2000) for discussion].
Research Question:
The research question of this thesis is: ‘To what extent can conflicts over wild dog 
management and control in New South Wales be understood in terms of contending 
discourses and what does that imply for policy legitimacy?
Substantiated by extensive research across NSW, this thesis argues that the ‘problem’ of 
WDMC is socially constructed. Currently it is framed within the dominant discourse of 
administrative rationalism which is perpetuated through storylines in WDMC policy 
and practice literatures.
This thesis argues that there has been a discursive shift in WDMC from which the 
knowledge and experiences of farm families have been largely excised. This shift has 
resulted in a consultation process which, despite political and institutional rhetoric to the 
contrary, institutionalises inequalities in power relations and negates the ‘situated and 
embodied knowledges’ of farm families through the privileging of a ‘partial 
perspective’ (Haraway 1991: 91).
Overwhelmingly, the consultation process represents, at best, a fragile, if not a thin 
veneer of ‘negotiated participation in governance’ wherein ‘governments consult 
because they have to (either because the interests concerned are powerful or ministers 
insist on it)’ (Stewart 2009: 5) and because it is enshrined in legislation.
The importance of understanding epistemology
Thus on one level the ‘problem’ of WDMC in NSW has little to do with nature as the 
practice of WDMC is an exercise in power. Current WDMC policy and practice in 
NSW instead is shaped and affected epistemologically by the dominant discourse of 
administrative rationalism. The reliance has methodological consequences as ‘literally 
an epistemology is a theory of knowledge’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19) and because
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the reliance on a particular epistemology excludes ‘other possible sets of articulations or 
meanings’ (Epstein 2008: 9). In turn, an epistemology links:
together other elements in a logic that modifies each particular element in an 
explanation that consists in a “synthesis of many determinations” (Marx 1973) 
(Howarth and Griggs 2012: 324).
Within the dominant discourse of WDMC, ‘nature’ and ‘wild dogs’ are understood and 
afforded meaning within the prevailing scientific ‘paradigm.’ Kuhn (1996) describes a 
scientific ‘paradigm’ as sharing two characteristics: First, it attracts an ‘...enduring 
group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity,’ and, second, it is 
‘...sufficiently open ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of 
practitioners’ (Kuhn 1996: 10). Further, Kuhn writes:
When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for granted, he [sic] need no 
longer, in his major works, attempt to build his field anew, start from first 
principles and justifying the use of each concept introduced (Kuhn 1996: 18-19).
The Challenge
Based on extensive empirical research across NSW, the challenge to the current 
dominant discourse of WDMC that this thesis presents is threefold:
First, it contends that current WDMC policy and practice has everything to do with the 
maintenance of and the administrative delivery of State power (Fukes 2005, Paehlke 
and Torgerson 2005). This is affected through the dominant discourse of administrative 
rationalism which is underscored by a reliance on scientific ‘knowledge’ and 
technological innovations which are promulgated within the storylines of ‘best practice’ 
that promulgates ideas of ‘expertise’ and ‘engagement’ in WDMC policy literature.
Second, and fundamentally, this thesis challenges the unilateral claims of scientific and 
policy ‘objectivity’ which are inherent within WDMC public policy. This thesis argues 
that:
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Although scientific experts continue to maintain that their research is value- 
neutral, the limits of such neutrality become apparent once the experts introduce 
their technical findings into the socio-political world of competing interests 
(Fischer 2005: 71).
While the writer accepts that there is a material reality, it also draws on Hajer’s work in 
understanding the concept of ‘nature’ and the meanings of ‘wild dogs’ and WDMC 
within discourse as:
not something ‘out there’ but a culturally appropriated concept, a norm, a 
counter-image, a memory, a Utopia. When someone talks about nature, the 
question is ‘which nature?’ (Beck, 1995 pp 36-38) -  and, it might be added, 
‘whose nature?’(Hajer 1995: 178).
As such, this thesis argues that the current discourse of WDMC in NSW is wedged 
between the managerial ‘logic of appropriateness’ -  that is, ‘the ‘fit’ between 
circumstances and objectives’ that are imposed on public servants and the managerial 
‘logic of obligation’ which reflects ‘the degree of compulsion or pressure to consult’ 
(Stewart 2009: 4) that is imposed on public servants by government in affecting 
WDMC.
Third, this thesis re-presents the ‘knowledges’ and experiences of farm families’ who 
are actively involved in the regular performance of ‘engagement’ through public 
WDMC meetings across NSW. It demonstrates that this is the place where the rejection 
of the dominant discourse is most apparent, where alternative meanings are articulated 
and where storylines are re-affirmed and subverted. The empirical research of this thesis 
reveals that in everyday life the legitimacy of the dominant administrative discourse is 
contested by competing discourses. It is apparent that significant antagonism (Mouffe 
1999, Mouffe 2000, Mouffe 2005) exists among the social actors involved in WDMC. 




This thesis in turn asks some specific questions: What are the storylines in WDMC? 
How are storylines subverted? What discourses are evident? Is there evidence of a 
discursive tum(s)? How are meanings constructed and changed? (Edelman, p. 194) It 
asks these questions because it understands hegemony as “...an unstable equilibrium 
that always remains partial and temporary’ (Fischer 2003: 78); the discourses and the 
storylines that contribute to WDMC change.
It understands the concept of ‘hegemony’ in WDMC as sharing two characteristics: 
Firstly, as a:
‘type of rule or governance that captures how a regime, practice or policy holds 
sway over a set of subjects with a particular entwining of consent, compliance, 
and coercion,’ and, secondly, as ‘a practice of politics that involves the linking 
together of disparate demands to forge projects or “discourse coalitions,” which 
can contest a particular form of rule, practice or policy’ (Howarth: 2009: 317).
Crucially, this thesis asks questions regarding the extent to which ‘local knowledge’ 
(Andrew and Robottom 2005) is important to the policy analysis relative to a policy 
issue and how policies are modes for the expression of human meaning (Yanow 2003: 
228). This in turn has broader implications for the notions of democracy as it is played 
out at the grassroots because as Dryzek (2006) argues:
The democratic question then becomes how dispersed, critical, and competent 
influence over this contestation can be promoted, bearing in mind that 
decentralization does not necessarily equal democracy, that particular discourses 
can take oppressive and constraining form, and that interventions in the world of 
discourses can be designed to manipulate and control them (Dryzek 2006: 75).
Method
This thesis applies the method of discourse analysis as developed in interpretative 
policy analysis. Drawing on extensive empirical research, it isolates particular storylines 
that emerge and then looks at ‘if  and ‘how’ they contribute to, and are reflected in, the 
current dominant discourse of WDMC. It is necessarily concerned therefore with the 
‘performance’ and the ‘everyday’ practices of WDMC policy and practice and how this
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plays out at the ‘grassroots.’ Throughout this thesis, the ‘voices’ of farm families and 
their experiences of WDMC are explored. The research on which it is based reveals that 
there is a significant disconnect between what is said in the policy literature about what 
happens in WDMC in New South Wales (NSW), Australia and what actually happens. 
The task of this thesis has been to discover, ‘Why?’
To do this it has been necessary to understand methodologically as Charlotte Epstein 
puts it: ‘the current ‘hegemonic articulation’ as it applies to WDMC and to discover and 
explore other: ‘sets of articulations or meanings’ (Chambers 2003, Epstein 2008 citing 
Sopher 1995: 254). The method of this thesis challenges the constitutive and ‘taken for 
granted’ assumptions of the current discourse of WDMC by capturing an alternative 
‘way of seeing’ -  looking at WDMC from the ‘grassroots.’ It suggests instead that: ‘the 
relation between what we see and what we know is never settled’(Berger 1972: 7). It 
consistently sheds light on how farm families are positioned in the literature, how they 
‘see’ and experience the current dominant discourse of NSW WDMC.
The empirical research on which this thesis relied is substantial. It emanated from 
sources only in the public domain: one hundred and fifty three (153) Hansard speeches; 
WDMC policy, scientific and technological literatures; publicly available WDMC plans 
from New South Wales Rural Lands Protection Boards (NSW RLPBs); attendance at 
sixty three public WDMC meetings held across NSW in 2007, 2008 and 2009; and, 
publicly available historical WDMC literature.
Attendance at public WDMC meetings was largely at the invitation of farm families 
over almost three years -  2007, 2008 and 2009 - and occurred in a ‘snowball’ fashion 
across NSW. Meetings were often held in geographically isolated rural and remote 
areas of NSW. Travel to these meetings was by plane, by hire car and often by four- 
wheel drive vehicles travelling with farming families and/or with Rangers from various 
RLPBs. Attendance at many of the sixty three WDMC meetings would have proved 
extremely difficult without this assistance and certainly beyond the financial resources 
of this thesis for which the writer is extremely grateful. The research question and 
method of this thesis have undergone significant revision. There are reasons for these 
changes:
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The original research involved an ex-post social impact assessment (SIA) of the effect 
on farming families of wild dog predation on agricultural stock and relied on semi 
structured interviews in an area called ‘The Northern Demonstration Site.’ This was an 
area ‘created’ in Northern NSW by the IACRC in which ecological trials involving wild 
dogs and experimental technologies were to be conducted by staff of the IACRC, 
working in conjunction with the then NSW Department of Primary Industries (NSW 
DPI). It was also a site where a NSW DPI staff member had been appointed to facilitate 
and expedite the ‘signing off of two WDMC plans by two prominent WDAs -  Barnard 
River and Niangla Wild Dog Associations respectively.
In 2007, the NSW Government called for submissions to what became known as the 
‘Schedule Two Review’. Schedule 2 lands, of which there were 248 in NSW, are lands 
comprising of National Parks, Nature Reserves, State Recreation Areas, State Forest, 
Crown land and Reserves and Sydney Catchment Authority Land. The purpose of the 
review was to ensure: ‘that the lands currently listed in Schedule 2 remain relevant to 
the management objectives of the Pest Control Order’ (PCO). The PCO for wild dogs 
issued under the NSW Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 requires all land managers to 
control wild dogs. The potential to impinge directly on the workings of WDMC 
working groups and WDAs throughout NSW added uncertainty. An air of ‘fragility’ 
pervaded public WDMC meetings and many were delayed.
In January 2008, the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority 
(APVMA) publicly released the Sodium Fluoro Acetate (1080) Final Review Report 
and Regulatory Decision. This report was long-awaited having been first commissioned 
in 2002. The timing of its release again had significant implications on the field work 
for this thesis. This report was of particular significance to WDAs and Wild Dog 
Working Groups across NSW. A ‘wait and see’ approach developed in 2007 and 2008 
as the implications of the report were realised.
Significantly, in January 2009, the NSW Rural Lands Protection Board (NSW RLPB) 
was restructured from 47 autonomous boards across NSW to 14 boards and abolished 
by the then NSW Labor Government. Its replacement was named the Livestock Health 
and Pest Authority (LHPA). In the preceding six months of 2008 a sense of inertia 
developed as the 47 Boards adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude to the unfolding events. 
This resulted in a slowing in the number of WDMC meetings held across NSW. In
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December 2008, the new governance structure was proclaimed by the Minister for the 
then NSW Department of Primary Industries (NSW DPI). This announcement had 
significant implications for the completion of field work. There was a drop in the 
number of meetings held in 2008 and then a spike from early to mid-2009.
Significantly, there was a perception perpetuated in the public policy literature that 
WDMC plans existed across NSW. This was not the case. After visiting the then Pest 
Animals Officer for the then State Council of the Rural Lands Protection Board to 
collect the ‘missing’ plans, it became apparent, that at that time there was not and never 
had been a full set of completed and/or current WDMC plans across NSW.
Towards the end of 2009, just over a third of the possible 70 WDMC plans existed. Of 
these, many were incomplete and in what could generally be described as a ‘parlous’ 
state. Of these, very few plans were available as electronic copies; some were out-dated 
and/or replaced by or were only ever simple ‘contracts for work.’ In contrast, the 
research for this thesis revealed that a number of communities were only marginally 
involved, while some had publicly ‘walked away,’ yet a ‘signed’ plan was still in 
existence. Management plans that did exist were mostly available only when physically 
located across NSW and many were ‘unsigned’ by authorised representatives. In some 
locations, Rangers had difficulty in locating the plan when requested; the WDMC ‘plan’ 
was clearly not a priority in some locations and Rangers emphatically said so. WDMC 
plans were something that was imposed on farmers and RLPBs as ‘yet another’ 
administrative task by bureaucrats and research scientists within Government 
Departments. This discovery was unanticipated -  and, a time-consuming delay.
Initial scoping inquiries of ‘potential’ farming families revealed a perception by many 
that they may be penalised by public land managers if their individual concerns were 
revealed, no matter how carefully participants, stock and geographic details were de- 
identified. This perception was voiced consistently across a number of NSW geographic 
locations. This was acknowledged and carefully considered. As a result all meetings 
were coded and individual sentiments or statements articulated by participants were de- 
identified and coded.
WDMC is an emotive and very controversial issue in Australia. The farming 
community especially is not immune to these deep concerns. Very often issues
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concerning WDMC touch farm families very deeply (Russell 2006 26-27 July). To 
facilitate these emotions as they arose would have required professional skills in the 
context of intensive and private semi-structured interviews.
In contrast, farming families positively encouraged attendance at public WDMC 
meetings. These invitations snowballed as the thesis developed. Public WDMC 
meetings very often occur in geographically isolated and mostly closed rural 
communities. WDMC on public lands is also funded by public money administered 
through a number of government agencies and authorities as well as through 
compulsory general rates levied on farm families by individual LHPAs. This in-kind 
and financial contribution from farming families is significant.
As a result, this thesis is not limited to one particular geographical area in NSW such as 
‘The Northern Demonstration Site’ as first envisaged by the IACRC. A case study with 
a particular focus on individual participants located in one site could not guarantee 
anonymity for any of the participants or for the members of WDAs involved and any 
findings may have been artificially skewed, or, worse still, may have been held to be 
indicative of WDMC across the whole of NSW -  a common complaint directed by 
many farming families towards ecological studies into wild dogs.
As a consequence, this thesis focuses only on material available in the public domain. 
The scope of the materials of this thesis is necessarily broad and also includes 
geographic locations from across NSW. This decision necessitated additional, 
substantial and lengthy field work across NSW which was further complicated by 
frequent and sudden delays in meeting dates and generally very short notice of public 
WDMC meetings across NSW. However, the approach taken to the publicly available 
but little explored ‘materials’ and ‘artefacts’ of WDMC in NSW offers a significant 
contribution to what hopefully will become a continuing line of social science inquiry 
into WDMC in NSW as it offers a rich insight into understanding the public policy of 
WDMC in NSW.
Chapter Outlines
This thesis is divided into six substantive chapters:
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Chapter Two examines the historical context of WDMC in NSW. It examines some of 
the ways in which ecological storylines mostly overlook the history of institutional 
responses to farm families’ concerns over WDMC in NSW; the State’s early 
dependence on the economic and cultural contributions of the wool and sheep industry 
to the nascent Australian nation; the changed role of the State in WDMC policy; and, 
the continuing contributions of family farming to Australian agriculture. This Chapter 
explores these anomalies and argues that, from the 1960s, the State acted progressively 
to control farm families who participated in WDMC and the methods of WDMC. This 
was achieved in part through a series of administrative and legislative changes which 
had significant impacts on the ‘voices’ of farm families and the grassroots practices of 
WDMC and, at the same time, heralded the entry of powerful new State actors in 
WDMC. Taken together, this represented a discursive turn in WDMC in NSW.
Chapter Three examines the political context of WDMC in NSW. It examines 
storylines of WDMC that emerge from the Parliament of NSW during the years 1995 to 
2011 -  a period of unbroken NSW Australian Labor Party Government in NSW. Using 
the search term ‘wild dogs’ as the unit of its analysis it draws on a sample of 153 
parliamentary speeches sourced from the Parliament of NSW Hansard. It argues that the 
storylines that emerge demonstrate successive parliamentary attempts to forge as 
‘obvious,’ ‘true’ and even ‘necessary’ (Epstein 2008:10) ‘natural’ relationships between 
WDMC and party political affiliation.
Successive attempts to effect this ‘naturalisation’ served three functions: First, to 
enhance the political capital of NSW parliamentary parties -  especially Country Labor; 
second, to affect the administrative control of WDMC; and, third, to secure the 
scientific and technological voice as the ‘expert’ voice on WDMC. The cumulative 
effect of this ‘naturalisation’ was to contain and conduit farm families’ concerns within 
and through an administrative rationalist discourse and to position the alternative 
‘voices’ of farm families as self-serving and subordinate to the over-arching political 
contest.
Chapter Four examines the financial expenditures on WDMC. It is particularly, 
concerned with two recurring storylines that were voiced by farm families in public 
WDMC meetings during this time: First, ‘How much money was spent on WDMC in 
real terms?’ and, second, ‘Where did the money go? It compares the storylines of
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successive NSW Labor Governments against the financial expenditures on WDMC as 
reported in a survey of the Annual Reports, Financial Statements and allied Reports of 
six institutional actors charged with affecting WDMC on public lands over this period. 
Taken together, the Annual Reports, Financial Statements and allied Reports reveal that 
successive NSW Labor Governments used these Reports to legitimise its claims of 
financial expenditures to WDMC and to promulgate WDMC policy across NSW.
As a result of this analysis, it argues that these Annual Reports and Financial Statements 
are best understood not as ‘fact.’ Rather, they are rational instruments which contribute 
collectively to the process of ‘fact building’ and to the construction of ‘expertise’ within 
the dominant discourse of WDMC in NSW. The storylines that emanate from the 
minutia of these Reports reify the administrative rationalist discourse, and over time, 
reveal more about the production of ‘knowledge’ and ‘taken for granted’ assumptions, 
the networks, and, relations of power inherent in WDMC than they do about financial 
expenditures in real terms on WDMC across NSW.
Additionally, while the Audit Reports of the NSW Auditor General temper the 
storylines of NSW Labor by pointing increasingly to disparities between the dominant 
storylines of NSW Labor on WDMC and the material reality of WDMC as reported, 
these observations did not prove sufficient to unseat the administrative rationalist 
discourse. To the contrary, the process of the Audit Reports contributed to the re­
embedding of WDMC within the dominant discourse.
Chapter Five examines the dominant discourse coalition within WDMC in NSW 
during the period of successive NSW Labor Governments. It argues that the storylines 
of this discourse coalition pivoted around scientific rationalism, ‘good science’ and ‘the 
strategic approach.’ It then argues that the ‘strategic approach’ is a deeply problematic 
approach to the management of people. It argues that the dominant discourse coalition 
in turn facilitated the entry of new commercial actors in WDMC and the rise of the self- 
proclaimed ‘growth industry’ as an area of expanding employment in the necessity of 
further ecological research in WDMC. This ‘growth industry’ privileged a scientific and 
technological understanding of the ‘problem’ of WDMC wherein the storylines of the 
marginalised discourse coalition which pivoted on the ‘anecdotal’, the lived experiences 
and ‘situated knowledges’ of farm families were held subordinate to ‘fact’ and ‘truth.’
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Chapter Six examines four contending discourses in turn: ‘new’ environmentalism; 
agrarianism; animal welfare; and, biosecurity. It argues that the function of the 
storylines within these competing discourses was threefold: to create meaning and 
validate action, to mobilise action, and to define alternatives (Hannigan 2006: citing 
Gelcich et al. 2005: 379). Overall, the Chapter reveals that while the NSW Labor 
Government privileged ecological science as the authorial voice in WDMC the 
legitimacy of this authority was strongly contested. This added further complexity to the 
understanding of the issue of WDMC and, in turn, impacted dramatically on its 
implementation in NSW.
Chapter Seven
This Chapter examines how the conundrum of WDMC, that is, the twin obligations of 
the management and control of wild dogs, and, the conservation of the dingo ‘plays out’ 
in the process of public consultation with farm families across NSW. It examines this 
declared NSW Government policy objective in light of the findings of extensive field 
work across NSW completed over the years 2007 -  2009. In all, sixty three public 
WDMC meetings were attended and all ‘signed off plans up to August 2009 were 
collected and examined. As a result, three key points emerge:
First, the public policy of WDMC is delivered ‘top down.’ Second, during the period of 
successive NSW Labor Governments, farming families consistently challenged both the 
authority of ‘experts’ and public land managers and the legitimacy of NSW WDMC 
policy. Public WDMC meetings became the site of this discursive struggle. Third, this 
Chapter challenges the explicit assumption in WDMC policy that wild dog predation on 
agricultural stock has decreased as a result of State intervention. It reveals a significant 
disconnect between what the policy literature says happens in WDMC in NSW and 
what actually happens as it is experienced by farm families in public WDMC meetings 
and through WDMC plans.
This approach varied markedly from that evidenced in substantive bodies of historical 




‘Fleecing the lamb’ - Policy adhockery and amnesia in wild dog management and
control
As Dovers (1990) notes, there is a great deal of ‘policy adhockery and amnesia’ in 
‘modem policy and institutional responses in regards to the unsustainable use of 
Australian environments and natural resources’ (Dovers 2000: vii). In this sense, it is 
possible to see the ways in which ecological storylines mostly overlook the history of 
institutional responses to farm families’ concerns over WDMC in NSW, the State’s 
early dependence on the economic and cultural contributions of the wool and sheep 
industry to the nascent Australian nation, the changed role of the State in WDMC policy 
and the continuing contributions of family farming to Australian agriculture.
This Chapter explores these anomalies and argues that the State acted progressively to 
control farm families who participated in WDMC and the methods that were used. This 
was achieved in part through a series of administrative and legislative changes which 
had significant impacts on the ‘voices’ of farm families and the grassroots practices of 
WDMC and, at the same time, heralded the entry of powerful new State actors in 
WDMC. This Chapter, at times, draws on historical literatures, often quite lengthy in 
order to represent the full sense of their frustration.
The ‘Golden Fleece’
Punitively, any threats to the nascent State’s ‘golden fleece’ were dealt with harshly. In 
1834, for example, in the ‘colony’ of NSW the Scab in Sheep Act was passed. This Act 
was progressively introduced into all Australian colonies. It imposed penalties on any 
person who ‘turned out’ any sheep infected with the ‘Scab.’ The penalties were:
in every case he or she shall be liable to forfeit and pay for every such offence a 
penalty or sum not exceeding ten pounds nor less than twenty shillings together 
with all reasonable costs and charges to be ascertained by the Justice or Justices 
before whom the conviction shall take place or if such person so offending shall 
be a convict under sentence then and in every such case such convict shall if a 
male be liable to be worked in irons on the roads for any time not exceeding six
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months or if a female to be confined in the penitentiary class of the factory or 
other place duly appointed for the custody of female offenders for any time not 
exceeding six months or to be kept in solitary confinement on bread and water 
for any time not exceeding one month (Colony of New South Wales 1832 31 
August).
Likewise, Glen and Short (2000), albeit in an ecological study designed to measure the 
distribution and abundance of dingoes across NSW from 1883 until 1930, collated 
historical data on bounty payments for dingo scalps across NSW. This study concluded 
that:
The control of dingoes in New South Wales appears to have been a prerequisite 
for the success of the sheep industry, and it is likely that the protection of 
livestock was the major incentive for the eradication of the species from much of 
the State (Glen and Short 2000: 441).
However, it is also apparent that in most current WDMC public policy literatures there 
is a notable elision of the historical and instrumental role that the State played in 
actively encouraging WDMC from the time of colonial settlement wherein it was 
considered a social and legal ‘duty’ to eradicate dingoes and wild dogs (Bean 1945, 
Rolls 1969, Rolls 1981, Clendinnen 2003, Grattan 2004).
In NSW, as Glen and Short (2000) found:
The payment of bounties began in 1852 with the introduction of “An Act to 
Facilitate and Encourage the Destruction of Native Dogs” (Breckwoldt 1988). In 
1880, the payment of bounties on noxious species became the responsibility of 
the Pastures and Stock Protection Boards (later shortened to Pastures Protection 
Boards) (Glen and Short 2000: 433).
For example, the Armidale Pastures Protection Board in a Statement of Receipts and 
Expenditure for Year Ended 31 December 1926, reported:
353 Native Dogs and 43 Pups at 20s and 5 s per scalp 308 Pounds 7 shillings 
and 4 pence (Anon. 1927 8 March).
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The cultural representation of ‘risk’
In an historic sense, early and pervasive attitudes to dingoes -  the terms ‘dingo’ cum 
‘wild dog’ were used synonymously -  were symptomatic of Australia’s cultural 
circumstance and reflected ‘white,’ ‘Eurocentric’ and ‘settler’ values. Clendinnen 
(2004), the renowned Australian historian, wrote:
The Australian’s alert, handsome dingos especially caught the dog-loving 
British eye. In flagrant defiance of an ‘all dogs ashore’ order Phillip had given in 
Portsmouth, a number of officers had brought their dogs with them on the 
voyage...Soon after they landed the dog-deprived British were searching the 
countryside or bartering with dog-rich Australians for dingo puppies...
What happened next could have served as an early warning of deep 
incompatibilities. John Hunter, studying the dingos as carefully as he studied all 
the creatures of the new continent, discovered them to be fatally flawed. Despite 
their noble good looks, they had an ineradicable propensity to kill all and any 
small animals. Some could even drag down kangaroos...
These nomad dogs knew nothing of the pastoralisf s distinction between ‘stock’ 
and ‘game’ (Clendinnen 2003: 71 - 72).
This ontology gained increasing currency in Australian literary contributions over time. 
Henry Kendall’s poetry in the 1850s and 1860s mirrors the contradictions inherent in 
the binary of dingo-wild dog in the Australian imaginary in poems such as ‘The 
Warrigal’ (1839), his ode to the concept o f ‘The Noble Savage.’ In contrast, in the poem 
‘The Hut by the Black Swamp’ Kendall describes the wild dog’s behaviour as outcast 
avoiding both Aboriginal and Settler:
But rather here the wild-dog halts,
And lifts the paw, and looks and howls (Kendall 2006)
Kendall’s lament, albeit about the ‘native dog,’ serves as an allegory to civilisation. The 
‘wild dog,’ because of its innate wildness, is anathema to civilised ‘Man’ and must be 
conquered.
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By the late nineteenth century, the notion of the settler state was firmly entrenched. 
Australia, as most Australian school children learn by rote, was a pastoral nation 
‘Riding on the sheep’s back.’ The wool and sheep industry formed the backdrop of a 
national identity and the fledgling nation’s national accounts in which graziers and 
farmers were venerated for their stoicism, conservatism and fierce independence in the 
face of adversity and hardship.
For example, in a collection of short stories, Barbara Baynton retells the chilling story 
of the rape and murder of an isolated farmer against the backdrop of a dingo attack on 
sheep:
“By God!” said the boundary rider, “it’s been a dingo right enough? Eight killed 
up here and there’s more down there in the creek -  a ewe and a lamb, I’ll bet 
(Baynton 1902: 137).
The acceptance of the dingo’s status as feral and the creation of the iconic ‘dingo fence’ 
-  which was first established in 1914 and ran originally for 8,650 kilometres -  as a tool 
of exclusion, not only entered the Australian lexicon, but also became a representation 
of fanners’ and settlers’ lived experiences in the Australian ‘Bush.’
The eradication and exclusion of the dingo as ‘canus lupus dingo’ was not surprisingly 
material when compared to the greater calls of nation building. The survival and future 
prosperity of the nation depended on the success of the agricultural industry. This 
pervasive representation entered into the wider Australian cultural psyche. Famous 
Australian bush storytellers and poets, Henry Lawson and ‘Banjo’ Patterson 
immortalised ‘the dingo,’ the ‘drover’s dog,’ the ‘mongrel’ or the ‘native’ dog in short 
stories such as ‘Joe Wilson and his Mates at Dead Dingo’ and poems like ‘The Dying 
Stockman’ and ‘High Explosive.’
The consolidation of the State’s management of ‘risk’
This period also saw a dramatic rise in the numbers of wild dogs. Reportedly, between 
1889 and 1930, 1,232, 644 sheep valued at 44,898 pounds, were killed by dingoes 
across NSW (Franklin 2008). Glen and Short (2000) reported:
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Between 1883 and 1930, 286,398 bounties were paid for dingoes in New South 
Wales; an average of approximately 6,000 per year (Glen and Short 2000: 434).
In 1902, in NSW, immediately after the creation of a newly federated Australia:
Various Acts (including those with provisions pertaining to pest control) were 
consolidated into the Pastures Protection Act. This Act created Pastures 
Protection Districts and Pastures Protection Boards. As a result of amendments 
through the years, there was further consolidation in 1912 and 1934.
The Pastures Protection Act 1934 operated until 1990. Under the Act noxious 
animals included rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus), wild dogs (including dingoes) 
(Canus familiaris), feral pigs (Sus scrofa) and, until circa 1995, foxes (Vulpes 
vulpes). Under that Act the Boards were responsible for, inter alia, the 
administration of noxious animal control. The Act required occupiers of land 
(not necessarily the owner) to “fully and continuously suppress and destroy” 
noxious animals on the land (State Council of Rural Lands Protection Boards 
2004 29 June: 2).
It is apparent nonetheless -  and the case remains the same today - that there is a lack of 
a national ‘wild dog’ policy across Australia and that the ‘...management of pest 
animals such as wild dogs is primarily the responsibility of state and territory 
governments and individual landholders’ -  this is the view of the current 
Commonwealth Government (Lauder 2011 August).
In 1901, in the newly federated nation, the lack of a uniform national policy was 
perhaps more a function of the difficulties States faced in achieving uniformity on many 
issues. Conversely, and speculatively, it could also reflect the acculturation of the 
discourse so completely into the national consciousness that it did not warrant attention: 
wild dog control was effectively being handled by the States and its agents: farmers and 
graziers and their respective organisations.
This relationship was pervasive and is evidenced by a wealth of correspondence 
carefully preserved since the 1900s by farm families and a number of the remaining 
WDAs in the North East of NSW, especially the Barnard River Wild Dog Association,
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the Niangla Wild Dog Association, the then Armidale Pastures Protection Board and the 
Armidale RLPB. Cumulatively, these organisations have significant holdings relating to 
wild dog control dating back to 1868 (The Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General 
Advertiser 1864 23 February, Armidale Pastures Protection Board 1937 - 1941, Lower 
North Coast & Tablelands Dingo Destruction Board 1947-1983, Barnard River Wild 
Dog Association 1956-1968, Barnard River Dog Association 1959 16 September, 
Barnard River Dingo Destruction Association 1969 28 October).
These records collectively bear witness to a common purpose: the management of the 
wild dog predation on agricultural stock. This understanding was pervasive across 
NSW. For example, in South East NSW, in 1929, the newly formed Brindabella Dingo 
Association held a Conference in Canberra. The then, NSW Minister for Lands presided 
over the meeting and the then Federal Minister of Home Affairs was one of the 
delegates attending. Discussions revolved around the means of instituting ‘...a united 
and vigorous campaign of dingo destruction in the Monaro and Southern Tableland’ 
(Green 2006: 3) region prompted by increased wild dog predation on sheep.
In 1934 at the seventeenth Annual Conference of the Graziers’ Association of New 
South Wales, a motion was passed:
That the Chief Secretary be asked to rigorously enforce the provisions of the 
Dog and Goat Act in towns and villages, with a view to minimising the straying 
dog nuisance (The Graziers' Association of New South Wales 1934).
Though the hybridisation of dingoes was acknowledged across NSW during this time, 
the distinction between ‘dingo,’ ‘feral,’ ‘hybrid,’ ‘native’ and mongrel was immaterial. 
The terms were used largely interchangeably in common parlance until the second half 
of the Twentieth Century.
Intrinsic to the discourse of land management at this time was a robust and well 
developed land ethic. To be a ‘good’ farmer and a ‘good neighbour’ meant fulfilling the 
obligation of active wild dog control. Hospitality was expected and extended to the 
‘dogger’ in the South East by farm families when ‘he came in from the Bush’ and his 
knowledge of the land and ‘the dingo’ was, and still is, revered. ‘Bounty payment 
books,’ ‘scalp record books,’ financial entries in leather bound ledgers of bonuses paid
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to fanners tell this story, although they still languish in many LHPA records across 
NSW. Similarly, the records of many Native Dog Destruction Boards and WDAs 
scattered throughout NSW and Australia, many in a poor state of repair, tell of the tasks 
undertaken in managing the ‘risk’ of wild dogs within small rural communities 
(Rodgers 1984).
In South East NSW ‘doggers,’ ‘trappers’ and ‘dogmen’ were instrumental in this task. 
‘Doggers’ were considered valuable assets to local rural communities and were highly 
valued for their ‘Bush’ skills and cunning and because they ‘knew’ the dog innately. 
Bush poets in the South East of NSW still venerate the bush skills of John Coman, a 
‘dogger’ in highly treasured poetry. Interviews with ‘doggers’ and collections of 
photographs are carefully preserved in the National Library of Australia today.
Traditional cultural practices also cemented this discourse of land management. The 
sense of community is palpable among the representatives of many farm families who 
attend the annual ‘cut up’ and ‘bait days’ that have been held since the late 1960s 
throughout North East of NSW in preparation for the aerial bait drop days, initially 
using fixed wing aircraft. Wild Dog Associations have met annually for over fifty years 
in North East NSW at ‘cut up’ and ‘bait days.’ At these gatherings, the respective 
Presidents update and inform the communities of their concerns regarding WDMC. In 
this way, not only does the community act to manage the ‘risk’ of wild dogs but it is a 
place where leaders receive legitimacy for the practical task at hand as well as 
reaffirming their mandate to continue representing their community in public forums. In 
this way, as Parkinson (2006) writes more generally of legitimacy:
Legitimation depends not just on consent processes, but on having claims made 
in public speech acts or on the unspoken, symbolic acts which leaders use to 
establish legitimacy’ (Parkinson 2006: 25).
The rise of ecological science
In contrast, the historical practices of farm families are often positioned in the 
ecological literature as contributing to the increase in wild dog predation across NSW 
through the ‘interference’ of farm families in the Australian ‘ecosystem’(Purcell 2010). 
From the 1960s, this represented a significant discursive shift.
29
In 1954, the Honorary Secretary of the Barnard River Native Dog Destruction 
Association wrote to the Graziers Association of NSW offering assistance with a 
questionnaire. He wrote:
The General Secretary
NSW Graziers Association of NSW
Dear Sir,
The reference to Science to Help Kill Off Dingo Muster of Sept 8th 1953
I have been requested by the 40 odd members of the our Dingo Destruction 
Assn, to write you, requesting that you post to me at the earliest opportunity, 3 
copies of the Questionnaires, as prepared by Dr N.W. G. Macintosh, Reader in 
Anatomy at the Sydney University.
Many of our members have had a wide practical experience with dingoes over 
many years and feel it possible they might be able to help the learned Doctor, by 
endeavouring to fill in some of the gaps (sic) in his present knowledge on the 
subject (Barnard River Native Dog Destruction Association 1954 27 January).
It is not apparent if this offer was in response to concerns regarding mooted restrictions 
on WDMC. Macintosh, an anatomist and anthropologist, was interested in the scientific 
study of dingoes and reportedly bred a colony of forty two dingoes in the animal house 
of the Anderson Stuart Building of the University of Sydney while his wife, Ann, was 
tasked with exercising them daily in the grounds of the University (Witton 2013 12 
March).
However, from this time, it is apparent that the historical ‘voices’ of farm families in 
WDMC in NSW are frequently subject to erasure or subversion in the policy literature 
and that the relationship with the ‘learned Doctors’ o f ‘science’ rapidly deteriorated.
In juxtaposition, there is a substantial body of literature -  letters, newspaper articles, 
official correspondence, statistical records, reports, minutes of WDAs, Wild Dog 
Control Boards, Pastures Protection Boards, farming organisations across NSW - that is 
held by farm families and by farm organisations from this time that evidences
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significant concerns regarding the increases in the numbers of wild dogs, concerns over 
the State led bans on various methods of control such as the removal of fixed wing 
aeroplanes and, in the late 1960s, the ban on the use of 1080. Allied to these concerns, 
were the ongoing concerns of farm families regarding the absence of wildlife which 
they attributed directly to wild dogs and the management of wild dogs cum dingoes in 
National Parks.
This substantial body of correspondence and the replies from Government Departments 
and Ministers of the Crown, bear testament both to the entry of new State actors in 
WDMC and to the significant powers these Government Departments and Agencies 
now exercised in determining not only when, where and how WDMC should occur, but, 
if. In this way, it is apparent that public land managers now held significant sway over 
the material wellbeing and the daily lives of farm families. This was an anathema to 
farm families and was strongly resisted.
At the same time, this literature also witnesses the progressive gazettal of National 
Parks, Wilderness Areas and Reserves and the concerns individual farm families held 
over the lack of wild dog control and the increasing reluctance of public land managers 
to aerially bait areas previously baited. Meetings of Wild Dog Destruction Boards were 
held across NSW to discuss these unfolding events (North Coast and Tablelands, 
Central Tablelands et al. 1972 28 July). This change in land use resulted in significant 
animosity and a further deterioration in the relationships between farm families, their 
representative organisations and public land managers; the feeling of antagonism is 
almost palpable through the pages.
There is a pervasive sense in the replies to the letters sent, particular throughout the 
1970s, and 1980s that the new public land managers ‘knew best’ and in particular that 
they were not adverse to threatening to exercise their new legislative powers to refuse 
WDMC and to prosecute individual farm families. NSW NPWS and State Forests are 
the two organisations which feature most commonly in this regard.
However, more significantly, this correspondence evidences changes in the ways 
Government Departments and Agents viewed the concerns of farm families as 
subordinate to the conservation of the dingo. Allied to this, Government Departments 
and agents now viewed anecdotal evidence and the experiences of farm families of
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surrounding lands - in many cases the same lands public land managers now 
administered - as anecdotal and hence not ‘factual.’ ‘Fact’ could now only be 
ascertained by ‘science’ and, in particular, by ecological studies.
Allied to this rejection of local knowledge, there are significant holdings of documents 
that bear testament to proactive, community based attempts to lobby politically relevant 
NSW Ministers about the establishment of National Parks and the effect of this on 
WDMC. These campaigns were orchestrated by farm families, Wild Dog Associations, 
Pastures Protection Boards and Native Dog Destruction Boards and local Councils 
along the Great Diving Range -  a range that divides the east coast from the inland - in 
order to affect the control of wild dogs.
In 1972, for example, the North Coast and Tablelands Dingo Destruction Board wrote 
to the then Minister for Lands stating:
Reference is made to your letter of 14 March, 1972, concerning a proposed 
meeting of all Dingo Boards in the State to discuss the establishment of National 
Parks and the problem of dingo destruction therein.
In December, 1969, the Board wrote letters to five State Members whose 
electorates or parts thereof are embraced within this Dingo district, and to the 
Minister for Agriculture, expressing concern that dingoes are to be allowed to 
roam at large in areas such as National Parks, and requesting that each took the 
matter up with the appropriate Minister.
A total of six replies were received from the Minister for Lands through the 
various Parliamentary representatives approached. The six such replies were all 
worded exactly the same.
The Board also directed a protest to the Council of Advice last year and the 
Council advised that it had already written to the Minister taking objection to 
what appears to be the policy of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, and 
intends to pursue the matter. To date nothing further has been heard (Fryer 1972 
5 April: 1).
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From the 1970s until today, there is also significant evidence of legal advice being 
sought, the challenge to and the rejection of the authority of NSW NPWS and State 
Forests and a growing lack of trust in ‘science’ and, in particular, a rejection of the 
ecological science of wild dogs which was now viewed as being a highly politicised 
instrument of Government and one that was resulted in material harm to the lives of 
farming families. Equally, this political agenda was felt to emanate from within the 
Parliamentary corridors of the then NSW Labor Government. There are significant 
reasons for this.
In 1976, the then Premier, Neville Wran held a Seminar on Dingoes in Sydney. This 
aim of this Seminar was reported to Dingo Destruction Boards as being:
to present a forum to discuss the use of poison for controlling dingoes...Papers 
will be delivered on the scientific and legal aspects of poisoning dingoes and this 
will be followed by a panel discussion involving representatives of dingo 
destruction boards, pastures protection boards, stockowners and relevant 
conservation bodies (Watts 1976 21 July: 1).
At this seminar, the then Chief Scientific Officer of National Parks and Wildlife Service 
made the position of National Parks clear.
The National Parks and Wildlife Service regards the dingo as an integral part of 
the Australian native ecosystem and has not made any attempt to eradicate these 
dogs from any National Park or Nature Reserve...
Wild dogs (including dingoes) are declared noxious animals under the Pastures 
Protection Act (1972). Under this Act, the owner or occupier of land is required 
to continuously supress and destroy all noxious animals on his property...
The National Parks and Wildlife Service is not an owner or occupier under the 
terms of this Act. However, since some areas of the Service estate can harbour 
wild dogs which feed on nearby flocks, the Service is considered to have a moral 
obligation to assist landholders to reduce stock losses due to predation by dogs 
from within Parks and Reserves, providing that this assistance does not 
significantly prejudice the values of the Park or Reserve. This has one obvious
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implication: if the Service will not assist landholders in this area, then the rural 
community will become prejudiced against attempts by the Service to acquire 
further lands which harbour dogs. This could seriously in turn prejudice the 
acquisition of further lands for National Parks and Nature Reserves...
Dog baiting within National Parks and Nature Reserves has always been 
restricted to low density strip baiting on park perimeters, with baits placed, 
where possible, by hand. The baiting from fixed wing aircraft has never been 
practiced. Within a few days of the distribution of baits, the areas were 
inspected, dog carcasses and untaken baits were taken and destroyed...
It is considered that the poison 1080 is the best available tool in control of wild 
dogs in these situations, and that the evidence indicates that the poison, as used 
against dogs within National Parks is specific, humane, effective and non 
polluting (stet)... (Giles 1976: 1 -4).
In 1977, the Premier of NSW, Neville Wran and NSW Labor Senator Mulvihill became 
the patron and co-patron of the Australian Native Dog Training Society of NSW Ltd 
(Maguire 1977). This confirmed the perception held by many farming families that the 
Premier was ‘pro-dingo’ and ‘anti-farming families’ and was a complete anathema to 
the farm families who participated in good faith in the ‘Seminar on the Dingo’ in the 
belief that the process would be ‘fair.’ From this point on, the relationship between the 
then NSW Labor Government and farm families and their representatives deteriorated 
rapidly.
Later in 1977, this situation was further exacerbated when Premier Neville Wran failed 
to intervene in a case to prevent the breeding of dingoes in captivity in direct 
contravention of NSW law (Moss Vale Pastures Protection Board 1977 8 August). 
Much to the consternation of the Pastures Protection Boards it was felt that any attempt 
to intervene directly with the NSW Department of Agriculture in this case would result 
in intervention by the Premier. This further incensed Pastures Protection Boards, WDAs 
and Dingo Destruction Boards across NSW (Young 1977 8 August).
In 1986, the Chairman of the then Lower North Coast and Tablelands Wild Dog Control 
Board in a response to the Review of Wild Dog Control in Eastern NSW, whose terms
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of reference at the time did not include the abolition of Wild Dog Control Boards, wrote 
a long response to suggested changes. The correspondence is worthy of repetition as it 
indicates the concerns held. The Chairman wrote:
The Abolition of the Wild Dog Control Board to be replaced, with 
suitable changes to the Act, by a Wild Dog Control Council under the 
guidance of other Government Departments (sic) -  Pastures Protection 
Boards who we will still have to finance with levies (as we do now) and 
the Government subsidies distributed to Associations for use in Wild 
Dog Control, to my mind, is no more than what we have at present 
except that Departments have, or would, increase their control without 
being interfered by one body of Ratepayer/Landholder Representatives...
.. .This really says loud and clear that there is something definitely wrong 
with policies and methods used, and for the same advisers, (sic) more or 
less, to recommend that Wild Dog Control Board’s be abolished really 
takes the cake and, in my view, calls for every effort for the retention of 
Boards to endeavour to put the Dog Problem back to where it was before 
all this rot began.
The Review Committee, to my mind, was a very unbalanced and one 
sided affair and points to the beginning to moves to abolish, as much as 
possible, grower representative bodies (sic). The whole exercise really 
collected some very interesting poets and figures (sic). However the facts 
which we are really only interested in are the results of success of Wild 
Dog Control and clearly this is not happening as I have already pointed 
out.
I can see great problems with increases in Wilderness and National Park 
areas and unless Departments who are responsible can control build up’s 
and escapes of wild dogs, which I feel is impossible, as always the main 
breeding grounds have been along the Dividing Range and such 
unoccupied lands.
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A divide and conquer situation does exist here in which landholders, 
without legislative power, will be denied a voice in their efforts to 
control wild dogs and protect their livelihood.
The Directors and myself request you to reconsider the legislation 
currently being processed in order that the abolition of Wild Dog Control 
Boards is not enacted, and, in particular, the retention of this Wild Dog 
Control Board (Landers 1986: 2).
In 1986, the Unsworth led NSW Labor Government abolished most Wild Dog Control 
Boards across NSW. Farm families and their organisations from this time lacked a 
direct voice in WDMC other than through farm organisations that had carriage of a 
much larger and broader set of farming issues. This decision robbed farm families of a 
representative organisation entirely devoted to dingo cum wild dog control, with the 
exception of the Dingo Destruction Board in the Western Division of NSW which was 
retained.
In 1989, the NSW Labor Government abolished the Pastures Protection Board system 
across NSW. It was replaced by the NSW Rural Lands Protection Board Act 1989.
In 2010, the Rural Lands Protection Boards were abolished. This was replaced by the 
Livestock Health and Pest Authority. The effect of this change in small rural 
communities was immediate. Significantly, the number of Boards declined from 47 to 
14 across NSW. Pastures Protection Boards, known commonly as ‘PP Boards’ had 
existed across NSW since 1934. Rural Lands Protection Boards were responsible for, 
inter alia, the administration of noxious animal control (State Council of Rural Lands 
Protection Boards 2004 29 June: 2). The task on WDMC fell now to the LHPA.
The pervasive and progressive influence of the State in WDMC over the Twentieth 
Century is also apparent in other ways. For example, the State-driven incentives for the 
scalping, and/or removal of backbones, tails and/or hind legs as the only acceptable 
‘proof for payment was driven by and at the behest of Government Departments and its 
agents (Pastures Protection Board 1934, Bean 1945, Barnard River Dingo Destruction 
Association 1969 28 October, Elder 2000).
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In 1945, for example, C.W. Bean, Australia’s First World War historian, wrote:
There are dogs, though it is not generally known, on the hills thick enough to­
day not one hundred miles from Sydney. There are dogs by the hundred across 
the border in South Australia. In almost all far Western runs there is a dingo or 
two in the back paddocks. But a man is generally kept dogging, and the 
boundary rider gets a few pounds out of occasional scalps. There was a time 
when a scalp meant the two ears of a dog and the forehead between. They paid a 
pound for each scalp. In those days a Chinaman came to a certain run outback. 
Fie asked to be taken on as a dogger. They engaged him, and he disappeared for 
the time being, out into one of the far paddocks. Presently he brought in a scalp; 
and then another and another, and then scalps every week. Nobody knew there 
were many dogs about; nobody else saw the dogs. But the Chinaman was 
bringing in whole mobs of scalps. In the end someone examined the scalps. 
They found that when he killed one dog he manufactured about twenty scalps 
out of him -  ears and all. They were fine art. But after that they altered the rule. 
A scalp since that date has meant a strip of skin cut from the tip of the nose right 
down the back to the tail. You cannot manufacture two backbones out of one 
dog (Bean 1945: 31).
Likewise, the ‘capture and release’ of wild dogs for ecological research, the large 
expense involved (Allen 2006, Honan 2008 8 January) and the potential ‘risk’ this 
practice creates to confirm what farm families and particularly, trappers, already ‘knew’ 
-  that wild dogs were not confined to ‘home’ runs - was a cause of much angst among 
farming communities and represented hard fought campaigns.
The uneven NSW NPWS allocation of ‘electric’ or ‘dog’ fencing along the boundaries 
of public lands for which farm families were expected - and still are - to bear the 
prohibitive maintenance costs as well as the public opprobrium over its disrepair are 
still methods of WDMC promoted by Government Departments (2001 17 December). 
However, the selective allocation of ‘electric’ fences is the source of considerable 
dissention and cynicism in farming communities.
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For example, in 2006, after a documented letter writing campaign to NSW NPWS over 
many years requesting material for the extension of an electric fence, one farmer 
reported that:
The following week, after becoming a State Councillor, we received a letter
from........., congratulating me on my appointment and also to inform us that we
had been successful in our fencing application. So it is a coincidence? Like I 
say, you don’t like to think the world works like that (Marshall 2006: 61).
The ‘off again/on again’ ban on the use of 1080, the reduction in bait quantities and 
rates and the active promotion of the chemical toxin PAPP, a product which is not 
available and is under review by the APVMA in Australia, are further examples of the 
long reach of Government, science, public land managers and industry (Invasive 
Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2010, Meat & Livestock Australia 2012) in 
affecting control over the farm families and practices involved in WDMC in NSW.
Yet, these practices are often contained within storylines that pivot around assumptions 
of farm family ignorance and the ‘risk’ this poses to ‘the’ environment. The ‘problem’ 
of WDMC is implicitly presented as the ‘problem’ of dealing with alternatively the 
greed, ignorance and apathy of farm families. In this storyline farm families are 
implicitly situated as ‘profit maximisers’ in the face of the ‘common good.’ In this way, 
ecological storylines often implicitly position farm families, who engage in WDMC and 
who may hold different values, as the outsiders by virtue of the fact that still engage in 
WDMC at all. In these storylines farming family values are often held to be 
synonymous with agrarian ideals.
However, as Botterill (2009) points out, agrarianism is often held by rural sociologists 
to be ‘both nebulous and malleable’ and ‘can be used rhetorically for apparently 
contradictory purposes (Beus and Dunlap 1994; see, for example, Halpin and Martin 
1996:21)’ (Botterill 2009: 60). Botterill (2009) concedes citing Stehlik (1996):
To many of us ‘the bush’ evokes a natural, pristine essentially good place which 
may be less than the city we live in, but somehow it is still morally our national 
conscience. We respond emotionally to the ideology of the pioneering spirit, the
38
challenge against the unknown, the concept o f ‘the rural’ (Botterill 2009: 63).
Overall, the more recent critiques of agrarianism often miss comments made in the latter 
half of the original critique of agrarianism by Flinn and Johnson (1974) wherein they 
conceded:
Our analysis has spoken of the agrarian creed without much quantification, but 
there is certainly no implication that agrarian ideology is monolithic. Farmers 
disagree among themselves on many matters and their disagreements find public 
expression. In addition, agrarianism may be held with varying degrees of 
specificity and intensity (Flinn and Johnson 1974: 200).
It is easy to stereotype the issue of WDMC as simply an example of an agrarian 
storyline writ large which is ‘still’ perpetuated by farm families unnecessarily. 
However, this critique misses the point: there is a material reality of wild dog predation 
-  wild dogs are predatory animals that maim, maul, harass and kill sheep, cattle and 
goats and this has enormous repercussions on the lives of farm families.
Importantly, this critique also misses the point, that WDMC is an activity which is 
intensely political and one which has enormous social ramifications on the lives of farm 
families and their communities.
Consecutively, NSW Government and Commonwealth Reports found that:
Rural communities bear the immediate, and often horrific, impact of feral 
animals. However, this does not mean that feral animal control can be seen 
simply as a rural problem. Indeed, the presence in urban areas of feral animals 
that are traditionally linked with the bush is becoming an increasing occurrence 
(General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 2002: x).
As well as the financial impact, feral animals can have a debilitating social 
impact on farming families and communities that have to deal with the 
consequences of feral animal attacks on farming stock (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 
2005: xii).
39
From the 1960s, farm families across NSW reported dramatic increases in the numbers 
of wild dog attacks on agricultural stock. In a privately commissioned survey, the 
Monaro Landholders Wild Dog Committee found:
that in the past 12 months, 62 landholders lost 2892 sheep, total costs in stock 
and production loss, time and associated items being $238,305 -  an average 
farm loss of $6,621. Losses prior to the last 12 months, $1.3 million ($36,000 
per farm). 23,000 ha are no longer used for sheep production. The above 
statistics were tabled at a meeting held with NPWS in Cooma on 25 June 2001 
(Litchfield, Gamock et al. 2001 10 October: 1).
In the Adaminaby and Yaouk Valley, between 1993 and 2003, the number of sheep 
killed and injured reported by NSW NPWS was as follows:
Table 2.1 Adaminaby/Yaouk Sheep Losses 1993 -  2003*
S h e e p  k ille d
S h e e p
in ju r e d
N u m b e r s  o f  
d o g s
tr a p p e d /s h o t
1 9 9 3 128 15
1 9 9 4 399 76
1 9 9 5 124 53
1 9 9 6 175 31
1 9 9 7 276 51
1 9 9 8 156 12
1 9 9 9 182 71
2 0 0 0 113 49 44
2 0 0 1 136 22 33
2 0 0 2 42 18 85
2 0 0 3 233 9 101
2 0 0 4 376 84
2 0 0 5 784 48
2 0 0 6 124 34
2 0 0 7 25 31
*Source: Figures compiled using figures tabled in Adaminaby/Yaouk Wild Dog 
Meeting Group Meeting 30/04/08 Minutes by NSW NPWS.
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Notably, however, these figures were far from complete as they represent figures from 
only one agency, NSW NPWS (Adaminaby/Yaouk Cooperative Wild Dog Management 
Plan October 2007 - October 2013 (Version 2)) and are at best indicative.
In 2004, a farmer from the Yaouk Valley reported:
Trying to make a living out of sheep in the Yaouk Valley has nearly become 
impossible. Over the last six months I have lost to wild dogs 110 ewes and 
lambs and...678 sheep over the years. Since aerial baiting was stopped in the 
late nineties a large build up of dogs have occurred in the Parks surround the 
Yaouk Valley. Seven dogs have been seen this last week and quite a few heard 
howling. It’s not a pretty sight to go into your paddocks each morning to find 
lambs, dead, tom about, half eaten, still staggering about and you have to 
destroy them and as often as it happens to you it’s a sight you can never get use 
(stet) to. Many tears are shed and a sick feeling in the gut knowing its going to 
happen again and again (Kennedy 2004, 10 May: 1, House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 41).
During this time, farm families complained consistently that stock losses as well as 
‘destocked’ land as a direct result of wild dog predation, were not recorded or not 
recorded accurately in Departmental and Agency statistics, that GIS mapping was 
consistently incomplete and that information disappeared into a ‘black hole’ within 
either the NSW NPWS, NSW DPI or State Forests bureaucracy. Complaints were 
repeatedly voiced, that these concerns were not recorded in wild dog meeting minutes 
despite repeated requests to amend written records; some farm families claimed that 
even getting their concerns onto the agendas of public meetings was difficult and that 
information from ‘FeralBase’ -  a NSW NPWS recording system -  was not released, 
released selectively and were incorrect (Marshall 2006).
In 2002, the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry heard consistent evidence from farm families 
across NSW of difficulties in the reporting of attacks even to their own RLPBs and 
continuing difficulties in accessing assistance from Government Departments and Agent 
Additionally, farm families reported intense levels of personal and family stress (House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 
211 -215).
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Subsequently, the House of Representatives Standing Committee found:
That the economic impacts of pest animals can be assessed at two levels. The 
first is the level of scientific research, which seeks to quantify the economic cost 
of pest animals across Australia.
The second level is the experience of individual farmers, families and 
communities experiencing problems with pest animals. Many of the submissions 
received by the committee discussed the enormous economic, physical and 
psychological cost of having to deal with pest animal problems. The committee 
notes that these individual accounts are equally as important as scientific 
research in attempting to understand the cost to Australia of the pest animal 
problem (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture 
Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 36).
However, the Terms of Reference of both Inquiries -  the NSW and Commonwealth -  
technically precluded the reporting of the social impacts on farm families of wild dog 
predation on agricultural stock. Each Committee ‘stretched’ its Terms of Reference to 
include these impacts. For example, the NSW Inquiry’s Tenns of Reference were:
1) the damage caused by feral animals to the environment across all land 
tenures;
2) the current and future threat of feral animals to native flora and fauna across 
all land tenures, including national parks, private land holdings, other 
publicly owned land etc;
3) the adequacy of current practices and resources for feral animal control;
4) improvements for current practices, and alternative solutions for feral animal 
control; and
5) any other relevant matters (General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5
2002: 1).
In contrast, the Terms of Reference of the House of Representatives Inquiry, perhaps 
now cognizant of the growing angst and political imbroglio that defined WDMC across 
Australia as a result of consistent and persistent lobbying by farm families, were a little 
broader.
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However, even here the Terms of Reference focused primarily on the management of 
the State/Federal relationship in WDMC. The Terms of Reference were:
1. To identify nationally significant pest animal issues and consider how 
existing Australian and State government processes can be better linked for 
more coordinated management of these issues across State boundaries.
2. To consider the approaches to pest animal issues across all relevant 
jurisdictions, including:
• Prevention of new pest animals becoming established;
• Detection and reporting systems for new and established pest 
animals;
• Eradication of infestations (particularly newly established species 
or ‘sleeper’ populations of species which are considered to be 
high risk) where feasible and appropriate; and
• Reduction of the impact of established pest animal populations
3. Consider the adequacy of State Government expenditure on pest animal 
control in the context of other conservation and natural resource 
management priorities, with particular reference to National Parks.
4. Consider the scope to promote community understanding of and 
involvement in pest animals and their management (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 
2005).
Yet, despite the limitations of the Terms of Reference, separately, each Report remarked 
on the enormous toll that wild dog predation was having on farm families and rural 
communities:
The committee notes with concern the terrible social impact that pest animals are 
having on rural families and communities. This is manifested in a number of 
ways: through the physical and psychological stress of having to deal with pest
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problems, distress caused by constantly witnessing attacks on livestock and 
family pets, and in some cases the heartbreak of having to leave family 
properties due to a combination of drought, pest animals and weeds, and other 
problems (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture 
Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 35).
Allied to this, in 2006, in a small purposive sample of farmers affected by wild dog 
predation, Marshall (2006) reported:
In order to gain some point of reference of the degree of the personal impact of 
wild dog predation I asked participants to rate it against another significant event 
in their lives, for them to assign it a value of between 0 to ten; ten being the 
highest. I was aware that all participants were in a seven year drought period and 
several had been burnt out by bushfires. In each case wild dog predation rated at 
either a ‘nine’ or a ‘ten:’ ‘...You couldn’t get anyone to help...The dog situation 
is by far the most difficult. Everybody could see the fire -  the damage. Not 
everybody has got a trained eye to see the significance of the dog, the impact of 
the dog’ (Marshall 2006: 43).
In direct contrast to claims from NSW NPWS that improvements were being made in 
WDMC in the Brindabella Wee Jasper Valley of NSW, many farm families and RLPBs 
presented systematic evidence of intense and continuing wild dog predation across 
many other parts of NSW. These losses were far from insignificant.
In 2008, Kempsey RLPB reported the following stock losses:
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2000 1170 96 146
2001 548 261 280
2002 1343 455 604
2003 740 362 466
2004 793 374 626
2005 952 421 836
2006 934 417 892
2007 934 465 853
2008 911 426 1015
Total 8325 3280 5718
^Source: Figures Compiled from Kempsey RLPB reports
Notably, these figures represent only officially reported losses. They do not include 
sheep, goats and deer. Of the cattle numbers officially reported eighty to ninety per cent 
were calves. These figures indicate the significant and continuing wild dog predation 
across parts of NSW.
It is also apparent that there is too, a notable ‘amnesia’ or elision evident in the 
government WDMC policy literature regarding the interactions between farm families, 
government agents and the formulation of WDMC policy and its implementation during 
the time of successive NSW Governments. These interactions were bitter and intensely 
fought contests that pitched government agents and farm families as antagonists in a 
‘bloody’ battle.
In 2007, at the NSW Wild Dog Summit held in Orange NSW one farmer publicly 
recalled her experiences:
I am a sixth generation farmer. We farmed in South Gippsland, Monaro and the 
Bega Valley. Our main enterprise has always been sheep and wool. I come from 
a strong, supportive, rural community which has a deep sense of connection with 
the land of which little is understood outside this community. This rural 
community has a culture of which little reaches the public domain and of which 
even less is understood in terms of the management of wild dogs. My husband’s
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people controlled the wild dogs of this region since the 1820’s. Historically, the 
Green family controlled wild dogs by taking a horse into the bush and strychnine 
baiting it once a year in a strategic and specific area at a specific time of the 
year. That was referred to as wild dog control. When I married I moved to the 
Bemboka area and I lived on that property with my husband for ten years before 
we were affected by wild dogs. By 1986 we had experienced a progressive 
dismantling of the Dingo Destruction Board and the removal of fixed wing 
aerial baiting...Wild dog control moved from traditional hands into the hands of 
agency staff and scientists, all of whom discredited our experience and 
knowledge. Suddenly farmers knew nothing and were nothing. Between 1986 
and 1996 we lost 2,000 sheep to wild dog predation. We ran 1,000 wethers in 
our back county. One year we ran 800 ewes and lost the lot to wild dogs. And, 
for those who don’t realise already, it’s not just about the money. Over that 
period it was a very stressful time... Wild dog control was peripheral control on 
public land. The dogs just kept coming. In 1996 we decided to sell what sheep 
we had and it’s still a very vivid memory seeing the last truck go out to the 
abattoirs. And so ended several generations of fine wool breeding. So then we 
turned our hand to cattle production believing we’d fare a better chance with 
cattle. But the dog trapper told us the dogs would keep coming and they did. We 
had cows attacked and calves eaten and the hopelessness of it became very 
apparent. No one listened and no one cared (Green 2007).
However, in highly ‘sanitised’ paragraphs in much of the WDMC policy literature and 
particularly across wild dog plans that exist, the collective and frequently bitter 
memories of farm families regarding institutional responses to the reporting of wild dog 
predation and unfulfilled requests for assistance are omitted completely or relegated to 
‘history.’
The public policy literature in this sense excises the historical institutional policies and 
practices from the official storylines of WDMC. This in turn downplays any enduring 
legacy and masks any WDMC conflicts as ‘new’ and/or as being managed successfully 
by the State. In this way, the purchase of the storyline of agrarianism in explaining the 
issue of WDMC is by itself limited.
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Rather, the power of any critique of WDMC lies in the juxtaposition of storylines of 
agrarianism with other storylines; that is, how the agrarian storylines are contested. For 
example, how the storylines of ecological science are subverted within an agrarian 
storyline and then how the agrarian storylines are then subverted or silenced within 
ecological storylines. In this way, storylines serve different purposes from that which 
was intended by the original discourse. Overwhelmingly, many of the ecological 
storylines of WDMC downplay, if not, omit the actual horror of the experience of wild 
dog predation and the effects this has on the social fabric of the lives of farm families. 
Yet, this is a pivotal agrarian storyline of WDMC. In 2006, Russell found:
Actual dog attacks are described in horrific terms and as highly sensual and 
perceptual events. The detailed telling of the experience is mutually created and 
fashioned anew at every telling and hearing. Yet few want to hear the actual 
story. Government agencies seek to dismiss the events as hysterical 
exaggerations; industry bureaucrats see the socio-economic impact as minimal; 
and neighbouring landholders don’t want to be confronted with detailed 
descriptions for fear o f ‘infection’ (Russell 2006 26-27 July: 1).
In this way, ecological storylines that do not acknowledge the social impacts on farm 
families of wild dog predation on agricultural stock rob farm families of a voice and a 
language with which to speak and subordinate the power of alternative discourses that 
pivot on different ‘ways of knowing,’ understanding, and experiencing WDMC. As 
Russell (2006) writes:
The ambiguous, contradictory, and mythic qualities of the experience challenge 
the taken-for-granted managerial style and question the rational understanding of 
both problem and proposed solution (Russell 2006 26-27 July: 4).
Thus, the focus on ‘new’ innovations in a science and technology discourse, a ‘tools-in 
the-toolbox’ approach, is misplaced -  WDMC in NSW is about people. It is little 
surprise that in public forums and WDMC meetings that the rejections of personal 
accounts of WDMC are so keenly felt and so fiercely contested by farm families. This is 
synonymous with a rejection of their ontological existence, that is, the multiple ways 
farm families personally experience WDMC, their knowledge’s of it, their cumulative 
suffering, losses and stressors.
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The rejection of ‘new’ technologies is far more easily explained -  many farm families 
and trappers report they do not work. For example, in 2011, the National Farmers’ 
Federation (NFF) commented:
National Parks and Wildlife Service news release of 5 October 2010 titled 
‘New tool in battle against feral dogs and foxes’ highlights the success of M44 
ejectors technique on the basis of some field trials. While the introduction and 
use of any new technique that will effectively control the wild dog attacks is 
welcome, it may be premature to claim a high success rate in controlling wild 
dogs by the use of M44 ejectors, as they have been proven ineffective by 
experienced pest animal controllers (National Farmers' Federation 2011 11 
February: 10 - 11).
Irrespective of the answers to these questions, the ‘conservation’ focus of NSW Labor 
through NSW NPWS proceeded. This resulted in an exponential increase in the number 
of ecological studies on dingoes which appear to have been funded by the NSW NPWS 
and various academic institutions whose mandate was ‘conservation;’ albeit that some 
of these studies were not conducted in NSW. These studies were not concerned with the 
eradication of wild dogs per se yet in a policy sense were broadly ‘lumped’ under the 
rubric of ‘natural resource management’ of which WDMC was now considered 
officially at least a part.
Overall, the period of successive NSW Labor Governments reinforced the storyline that 
the policy and the implementation of WDMC had changed. The issue was now defined 
differently by the State which vested authority in ecological science and looked to ‘new’ 
technological innovations for ‘solutions’ in a ‘tools in the toolbox’ approach to the 
management of people. The task of implementing WDMC was now delegated to public 
land managers and while ostensibly this was conveniently devolved to the ‘local’ it was 
circumscribed and directed from the ‘top’ down. Yet, publicly at least, the myth of best 
practice particularly through the promotion of the Brindabella Wee Jasper Valley Wild 
Fox and Dog Plan dominated the policy literature. However, the reality of how this 




‘So what’s political about wild dogs?’ - The political ‘warp and woof of wild dog
management and control in NSW
This Chapter examines the storylines of WDMC that emerge from the Parliament of 
NSW during the years 1995 to 2011 -  a period of unbroken NSW Australian Labor 
Party (NSW ALP) Government in NSW. Using the search term ‘wild dogs’ as the unit 
of its analysis this Chapter draws on a sample of 153 parliamentary speeches drawn 
from the Parliament of NSW Hansard during the years 1995-2011 -  the 16 years of 
successive NSW Labor Government.
The purposive sample drew on 153 ‘wild dog’ speeches out of a population of 306 ‘wild 
dog’ speeches. These speeches were made by Members of successive NSW Parliaments 
from both the major and minor parties in both the Legislative Council and the 
Legislative Assembly in NSW delivered across the period of 1995-2011. All 306 
speeches were examined. The criterion used for inclusion in the purposive sample was 
that the content of the speeches must relate specifically to NSW WDMC. For example, 
speeches relating to ‘performance circus animals bans,’ interstate veterinary 
practitioners’ and ‘companion animals welfare’ were excluded using this criteria. The 
sample of ‘wild dog’ speeches were delivered during Questions without Notice, 
Questions on Notice, Second and Third Readings of various Bills, Matters of Public 
Importance, Private Members Statements, House Business Papers, Committee Reports, 
Notices of Motions and Orders of the Day, and Adjournment Debates. Speeches were 
analysed across each year of NSW Labor Government and then across the entire period 
of 1995-2011. The sample contains speeches from members of all the significant 
parties. These parties included the Australian Labor Party, the Liberals, The Nationals, 
the Greens, the Shooters Party (renamed the Shooters and Fishers Party in 2011), the 
Christian Democratic Party, the Australian Democrats (although this period also 
represented the demise of the Australian Democrats in the NSW Parliament) and the 
Outdoor Recreation Party. During this period, as Clune and Smith (2012) write:
the Independents and minor parties shared a parliamentary division of labour,
with Independents winning seats in the Legislative Assembly and minor parties
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claiming seats exclusively in the Legislative Council’ (Clune and Smith 2012: 
45 - 46).
The importance of the minor parties acting in coalition with NSW Labor and the 
Liberals and The Nationals, or acting in coalition with other minor parties, and 
particularly the ability of the minor parties in the Legislative Council to block the 
legislative agenda of NSW Labor, provides another insight into the meaning of NSW 
WDMC. For example, in 2002, a number of the minor parties acting in concert with the 
Liberals and Nationals -  the Shooters Party; the Outdoor Recreation Party and the 
Christian Democratic Party -  ‘forced’ the introduction of the Game Bill by holding 
NSW Labor to ransom in the Legislative Council over the introduction of the 
Appropriation Bills (Rhiannon 2002 27 June: 3958). This legislation then allowed 
licenced hunters to shoot feral animals on public lands; a right previously largely 
denied.
It is noteworthy therefore that the storylines that emerged from the parliamentary 
speeches demonstrated successive parliamentary attempts to forge as ‘obvious,’ ‘true’ 
and even ‘necessary’ (Epstein 2008:10) ‘natural’ relationships between WDMC and 
party political affdiation. Successive attempts to effect this ‘naturalisation’ served three 
functions: First, to enhance the political capital of NSW parliamentary parties -  
especially ‘Country Labor;’ second, to affect the administrative control of WDMC; and, 
third, to secure the scientific and technological voice as the ‘expert’ voice on WDMC.
Administrative Rationalism
Overall this naturalisation was predicated on a discourse of administrative rationalism 
which as a ‘problem-solving discourse’ (Dryzek 1997:74) attempts to ‘render its 
subject-matter homogeneous, hence manageable’ (Paehlke and Torgerson 2005:15). 
According to Dryzek (1997), administrative rationalism comprises four central tenets: 
liberal capitalism and the administrative State are unchallenged as the ‘rightful’ basis of 
the State; individuals are subordinate to ‘experts’ and managers; the State is a benign 
power which acts in the common interest -  people have agency although technical 
experts and managers have more; and the ‘administrative mind’ manages risk and enacts 
policy on a ‘needs’ basis with certain knowledge and authority -  although its response 
may be piecemeal (Dryzek 1997:74-75).
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This thesis argues that within the dominant discourse in NSW WDMC of administrative 
rationalism that ‘nature’ and ‘wild dogs’ are currently understood and afforded meaning 
within a prevailing scientific ‘paradigm’ (Kuhn 1996). Kuhn describes a scientific 
‘paradigm’ as sharing two characteristics: First, it attracts an ‘...enduring group of 
adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity.’ Second, it is 
‘...sufficiently open ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of 
practitioners’ (Kuhn 1996: 10). Further, as Kuhn writes:
When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for granted, he [sic] need no 
longer, in his major works, attempt to build his field anew, start from first 
principles and justifying the use of each concept introduced (Kuhn 1996: 18-19).
Importantly, this current reliance in NSW WDMC policy on scientific ‘experts’ and 
‘new technologies’ within the dominant administrative rationalist discourse has 
methodological consequences because ‘literally an epistemology is a theory of 
knowledge’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19). However, as Fischer (1993) writes:
'The theory of technocracy, a variant of elite theory, refers to a governance 
process dominated by technically trained knowledge elites. The function of the 
technocratic elite is to replace or control democratic deliberation and decision­
making processes (based on conflicting interests) with a more technocratically 
informed discourse (based on scientific decision-making techniques). The result 
is the transformation of political issues into technically defined ends that can be 
pursued through administrative means (Fischer 1993: 22).
This methodological dependence had real consequences for farming families who were 
experiencing wild dog predation on their agricultural stock. These consequences are 
explored at length in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.
The role of the State
The concepts of articulation and interpellation are useful heuristics in this interpretative 
analysis. Articulation refers to the functioning of a discourse, how it perpetuates itself, 
how it operates as ‘common sense.’ Interpellation, on the other hand, refers to: ‘the
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ways in which discourses carve out subject-positions 'that ‘hail’ actors in such a 
manner that they become the “subject” -  the “I” -  of that discourse’ (Epstein 2008: 94).
Parliamentary attempts by NSW Labor to secure this ‘naturalisation’ relied on an 
articulation of WDMC which was interpolated in turn by the sets of meaning afforded 
to it progressively by the State. As Epstein suggests:
‘First, the subject recognises the discourse as its own -  that is, it relates to, 
appropriates, and endorses it. Second the subject recognizes itself as the 
subject -  the one who says “I” in this discourse’ (Epstein 2008:94).
Over the years of NSW Labor Government, the State became the “I” -  the subject in the 
discourse of WDMC. This strategy was gradual and iterative.
The issue of WDMC was constructed as a ‘problem’ within the space created by the 
narratives of parliamentary storylines and the policy process (Bacchi 1999: 2). This 
created a discourse coalition in which the State and its agents were said publicly to act 
in concert and in which the ‘problem’ of WDMC was predicated on shared meanings. 
Hajer (1993) suggests that:
A discourse coalition is the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utters 
these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all 
organized around a discourse (Hajer 1993: 47)
Farm families in turn were rendered the ‘object’ whose knowledge and experience 
would be harnessed in the service of the State. Thus what counted as an object of 
inquiry, how results were to be interpreted and which results were to be regarded as true 
or false’ (Howarth 2000) were in keeping with its underpinning theory of ‘scientific 
rationalism’ which posits notions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth,’ on whose claims to 
‘expertise’ the State relied.
This reliance on ‘scientific knowledge’ produced new ‘expert’ elites who were closely 
linked and acting in concert with economic and political powers. This challenged beliefs 
about the historical distance science was thought to have -  and farm families believed it 
‘should’ have - maintained from politics in WDMC. This in turn raised questions
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regarding, what Jasanoff (2005) calls the: ‘distance between the governors and the 
governed’ (Jasanoff 2005:5). Hence, the extent to which scientific research is 
considered ‘value-neutral’ becomes a matter of contestation between the State and 
farming families. Notwithstanding this, the issue of WDMC remained a social 
construct with a material reality whose meaning was contested in the public sphere. 
Thus, this project, as a discourse was both historically contingent and precarious.
This Chapter demonstrates how political parties subverted the storylines of farming 
families and how each storyline drew on different discursive categories to give meaning 
to the phenomenon of ‘wild dogs.’ These narratives created a social construction of 
WDMC which was dependent on the exclusion of other meanings of WDMC as 
‘common sense’ and in which the State was preeminent -  the T.’ These attempts relied 
on pre-existing associations which: ‘when proffered summon” one another implicitly 
and automatically’ (Epstein 2008: 94). The power of the parliamentary storylines of 
WDMC is that they contributed to the dominant discourse to reinforce how the State 
and its agents framed the ‘problem of WDMC.’ In this way, as Bacchi (1999) suggests, 
framing reveals how issues come about and what is needed to be done about them 
(Bacchi 1999). Within this empiricist setting, frames are the synonym of discourses 
which function as mainly instrumental devices intended to: ‘foster common perceptions 
and understandings for specific purposes’ (Howarth 2000: 3).
Over its period in government, successive NSW Labor Governments represented the 
‘solution’ to WDMC as being in the ‘common good.’ The narratives of its storylines 
reveal the articulation of an overarching administrative rationalist discourse. This rested 
on ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions about ‘natural’ relationships in which the State was 
pre-eminent, the ‘natural’ world was viewed anthropocentrically and in which relations 
of power were unequal. The discourse reveals itself as exclusive and excluding thereby 
creating a binary of insiders/outsiders -  an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ (Mouffe 2005, Mouffe 
2005).
Notwithstanding this, the parliamentary speeches also reveal that the antagonism 
between traditional enemies on the issue of WDMC was on two occasions momentarily 
transformed in the Parliament into an issue of conflict between adversaries. The 
unanimity between political antagonists that the Cooperative Wild Dog/Fox Plan for the 
Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys - commonly known as the Brindabella Plan -
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temporarily achieved was largely in response to a powerful catalyst - the crisis in the 
‘Bush.’ [See Chapter Seven for explanation of the Brindabella Plan]
However, as Grindle and Thomas (1991) argue a crisis:
is an often-invoked reason in explanations of the adoption and pursuit of major 
changes in public policy...it does not necessarily result in either predictable or 
recommended policy changes (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 73).
Nevertheless, this crisis provided the window of opportunity through which an 
administrative rationalist response could, and did, proceed to lay claim to legitimacy in 
WDMC policy. However, this attempt at administrative capture of the voices of farm 
families relied on legislative sanction.
The Chapter is divided into two parts: The first compares the central storylines that 
emerge from the parliamentary contest that occurred between NSW Labor, the NSW 
Liberal/National Coalition and the minor parties over WDMC. The second demonstrates 
how this rationality was interpreted instrumentally. It explains briefly the legislative and 
administrative interpretations of four ‘agreed’ core concepts in WDMC: wild dogs, 
Schedule Two Lands, the Management Plan and, the Guideline issued to RLPB through 
whose interpretation WDMC during this period was affected. These words became the 
language of WDMC. Inherent within their meaning were the mechanisms and processes 
which contributed to the social reconstruction of WDMC in which the State had centre 
place.
The political capital of wild dog management and control
During the time of successive NSW Labor Governments, all political parties - NSW 
Labor, the Liberal National Coalition, the Fishers and Shooters Party of NSW, (The 
Shooters Party) and the Greens NSW, among other minor parties -  all competed for the 
authorial voice on the issue of WDMC. This was done as a way of establishing their 
legitimacy in the ‘Bush.’ This resulted in a sustained jockeying for the ‘prize’ of the 
authorial voice on WDMC in the NSW Parliament from members of both the 
Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council over successive Parliaments (Debus 
1996 23 May: 1496, Della Bosca 2000 17 November: 10235, Debus 2001 7
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November: 18203, Colless 2002 9 April: 1078, Armstrong 2003 14 October: 3779, Kelly 
2003 18 September: 3457, Stoner 2005 1 December: 20507).
This understanding propelled the issue of WDMC in to a much broader debate that 
oscillated around two questions: Firstly, who was ‘the true voice of country and 
regional New South Wales?’(Cansdell 2005 13 October: 18580): Secondly, who held 
the mandate to speak for rural and regional issues?
Both questions received significant ‘airplay’ in the Parliament after the 1999 NSW 
election when Labor won five rural seats spread across all regions of the State (Wear 
2000). After the 1999 election, the answers to these questions were further complicated 
by competing claims from the minor parties which held the balance of power in the 
Upper House, the Legislative Council (Clune and Griffith 2006: 675).
Thus, the ‘performance,’ that is ‘all the activity of a given participant on a given 
occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants’ (Goffman 
1959:26) and the ‘venue’ - the existing set of political institutions (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991) - are both vital considerations for all parliamentary parties. This was no 
less true for WDMC in the NSW Parliament.
NSW Labor and Country Labor and the colonisation of wild dog management and 
control
The colonialisation of the issue of WDMC by NSW Labor between 1995 and 2011 was 
strategic and progressive. NSW Labor linked WDMC successively and integrally to the 
phenomena of Country Labor.
On 15 October 1995 Premier Bob Carr announced in Question Time that:
Recently 1 had the pleasure of addressing a great forum in New South Wales, the 
annual conference of the New South Wales branch of the Australian Labor 
Party. I was able to report to the conference my Government's program for 
seeing that the people of regional and rural New South Wales are treated fairly 
(Carr 1996 15 October: 4776).
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Further to this, in 1996 he issued Memorandum Number 1996-17. Prepared by the 
Office of Rural Communities within NSW Agriculture, it issued instructions to 
departments and agencies when submitting proposals that could impact on rural 
communities (Carr 1997). The promise to rural and regional electorates was that in all 
Cabinet documents the social, economic and environmental effects of any decision on 
rural communities would be outlined. However, to what extent this was done is unclear. 
Subsequent claims by The Nationals that ‘Such documents are never seen by the people 
who are affected by the Cabinet decisions and subsequent legislation. They are kept 
secret’ were discounted (Maguire 2005 13 October: 18580).
Under the banner of Country Labor, NSW Labor and Bob Carr were now - at least 
publicly - ‘championing’ the ‘Bush.’ The irony was not missed -  at least by some. 
Clune (2005) noted NSW Labor was: ‘an almost semi rural party for the first half of the 
twentieth century’ (Clune 2005:48). Paul Davey (2006) argued that the nomenclature of 
Country Labor was bom out o f ‘grassroots’ dissatisfaction with NSW Labor.
Country Labor, was in the first instance, the legacy of an initial push in 1941 and 1942 
by: ‘a small group of breakaway Labor candidates protesting over the ALP State 
Executive taking over preselections’ (Davey 2006:396). Nevertheless, the opportunity 
to resurrect Country Labor was considered important strategically to NSW Labor. As 
Paul Davey writes: ‘Labor decided to pull the name Country Labor out of the drawer 
and give it official blessing for candidates in regional electorates (Davey 2006:396). 
Suddenly it was a case of ‘everything old is new again.’
In contrast, periodic attempts during the years 1995 to 2011 by the Liberal National 
Coalition, particularly The Nationals, to pass the Rural Communities Impacts Bill, the 
Wilderness Amendment (Private Property Rights) Bill and the Protection of 
Agricultural Production (Right to Farm) Bill were fmstrated and ultimately defeated by 
NSW Labor. Andrew Stoner, the then Leader of the Nationals argued particularly that 
the purpose of the Rural Communities Impacts Bill was: ‘to force the Labor 
Government to honour a promise made in 1995 by former Premier Bob Carr -  a 
promise that was never honoured’ (Stoner 2005 1 December: 20507).
The issue of WDMC featured in and was debated across all pieces of legislation. 
Nevertheless, NSW Labor branded each piece of legislation a political ‘stunt.’ The 
Honourable Steve Whan, a sustained and vocal Country Labor advocate and a prolific
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performer on the issue of WDMC in Question Time, argued particularly that the Rural 
Communities Impacts Bill was ‘a very long-running stunt, but stunt it is’ (Whan 2005 
22 September). Further he suggested it was: ‘simply a smokescreen for the Nationals’ 
failure to stand up for regional New South Wales’ (Whan 2005 22 September). It would 
seem, at least from the standpoint of NSW Labor that Carr’s 1995 Memorandum and 
the rebirth of Country Labor were not stunts.
However, if ever there was a moment of amnesia about the political utility of ‘Country 
Labor’ within NSW it was temporary. Country Labor had served NSW Labor well. 
Country Labor was registered as a political party for the second time in 1999 in NSW 
and for the third time in 2003 (Australian Electoral Commission 2011). From 1995 until 
2011 successive NSW Labor Premiers, Bob Carr, Morris lemma, Nathan Rees and 
Kristina Keneally invested in the nomenclature and the ‘branding’ exercise. Premier 
Rees at the 2008 Country Labor Conference, for example, reminded delegates that at 
least ten delegates were from the country at NSW Labor’s first Annual Conference held 
in 1882 at Temperance Hall in Sydney. Rees insisted that ‘the voice of country people 
has been heard in our Party’ (Rees 2008 1 November: 1-18).
In contrast to this enthusiasm, The Greens branded Country Labor simply as ‘ impotent 
and irrelevant’ and ‘nothing more than a bunch of spin doctors’ (Rhiannon 1999). The 
Honourable George Souris, the then Leader of The Nationals agreed. To The Nationals, 
Country Labor was: ‘a slick marketing exercise’ and ‘has been shown up for nothing 
but Bob Carr’s Labor’ (Souris 2000 24 May: 5705).
Regardless, Country Labor and NSW NPWS were now working publicly in concert and 
in command of WDMC policy across NSW - at least the Honourable Bob Debus, 
Minister for the Environment, said so:
Today I am in a position to announce an all-out assault on feral animals and 
weeds by the National Parks and Wildlife Service. Since coming to office the 
Carr Government has increased funding for pest species management from 
$1.5 million in 1994-95 - the coalition's last year in power to almost $5 
million. This represents a massive 330 per cent increase to fund the attack on 
feral animals and weeds since the Government took office 
(Debus 1996 23 May: 1496).
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In 2003, the Honourable Steve Whan reiterated the claims of NSW Labor and NSW 
NPWS declaring:
I am pleased to say that the budget delivered last week by the Government put 
up an additional $800,000 for the National Parks and Wildlife Service to 
combat wild dogs and other feral animal species. That $800,000, the bulk of 
which is going to the Monaro area, is the first part of a $6.7 million increase 
in funds over the next four years to combat wild dogs and other feral animal 
species in the Monaro and the rest of New South Wales 
(Whan 2003 3 July: 597).
However, over time the critics of Country Labor became increasingly shrill. By March 
2011, with the defeat of NSW Labor looming there were increasing calls in the media 
that the ‘bush cousin’ of NSW Labor was ‘almost extinct’ as a ‘breed’ and that ‘Brand 
Labor’ was: ‘an image that now associates Labor with all that is indecisive, incompetent 
and irrelevant’ (Fitzgerald 2011 15 January).
‘True Believers’1 2aside, the narrative of NSW Labor’s storyline of WDMC reiterated 
repeatedly Country Labor’s connection to the ‘Bush’ and the extra-ordinary amount of 
money it had allocated to WDMC across NSW over and above the Liberal National 
Coalition. This became one of the central narratives of the Country Labor storyline and 
a regular staple of Dorothy Dixer questions in Question Time (Tebbutt 2002 9 April: 
1078, Burke 2003 18 September: 3547, Kelly 2003 18 September: 3547, Debus 2004 11 
March:7169, MacDonald 2004 27 October: 12030, Debus 2005 12 October: 18474, 
Whan 2006 28 February: 20696, Kelly 2010 24 November: 27998).
Yet, the nuances of the issue of WDMC were initially unfamiliar to The Nationals so- 
called ‘city centric’ members of the NSW Labor Party (Stoner 2004 23 June: 9969). For 
example, John Della Bosca (Labor -  Special Minister of State) admitted candidly in 
Question Time, that he had never heard of the poison ‘sodium monofluoroacetate,’
1 Former Prime Minister of Australia, Paul Keating, coined this phrase on 13 March 1993 when claiming 
victory after the 1993 election result; an election which many political commentators predicted the 
Australian Labor Party would lose: ‘Thank you ladies and gentlemen. Well, this is the sweetest victory of 
all. This is a victory for the true believers: the people who, in difficult times, have kept the faith.’
2 A ‘Dorothy Dixer’ is a rehearsed or planted question asked of a government Minister by a backbencher 
of his/her own political party during Parliamentary Question Time.
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commonly known as ‘1080’ (Della Bosca 2001 12 December: 20020). This was a 
considerable public faux pas.
The temporary prohibition on the use of 1080 across most geographic areas of NSW 
and the accompanying suspension of aerial baiting pending the outcome of a much- 
debated scientific study into the effects of 1080 on native quolls resulted in significant 
opprobrium being directed at NSW Labor by the Opposition and minority party 
members (Webb 2001 6 December: 3969, Tingle 2001 12 December: 5465, Richardson 
2005 22 September:5465). This was especially poignant after studies refuted: ‘the 
assumption that dog baits are fatal for most quolls that may eat them’ (Kortner, Gresser 
et al. 2003, Kortner and Watson 2005).
By 2006 NSW NPWS reinstated aerial baiting and the use of 1080 reversing the 
previous ban declaring:
Recent NPWS research has shown that aerial baiting with the toxin 1080 is 
unlikely to have a significant impact on populations of the spotted-tailed quoll, 
the native carnivore most at risk of being poisoned...This is a very significant 
finding and NPWS will now use aerial baiting in areas where rugged terrain 
makes the use of other control techniques extremely difficult or where stock 
losses are continuing at unacceptably high levels 
(Department of Environment and Conservation 2006: 36).
In the intervening period, many NSW parliamentary speeches attested repeatedly to a 
significant escalation in wild dog attacks on agricultural stock on private land across 
NSW, a significant decline in native wildlife and the: ‘severe social, financial and 
environmental problem’ this ban had caused farm families (Hodgkinson 2001 6 
September: 16486, Webb 2001 7 November: 18203, MacDonald 2002 27 June: 3958). 
In 2005 the issue of the impacts of wild dogs was escalated to the Commonwealth level 
and was further affirmed by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Report, Taking Control: A national approach to pest 
animals (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and 
Forestry 2005).
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The continued use and availability of 1080 was the subject of another contentious 
inquiry and much delayed report by the Australian Veterinary Pesticides Management 
Authority (AVPMA), which also generated fierce representations to local members by 
concerned farm families across NSW. The poison, 1080, is widely used in WDMC and 
was administered through the then forty seven RLPBs and its predecessor, the NSW 
Pastures Protection Boards (NSWPPBs). The continued use of ‘1080’ as the preferred, 
cheapest and most efficacious poison in geographically difficult terrains went to the 
heart of the WDMC issue for farm families -  and still does.
Minister Della Bosca, however, while admitting his ignorance of ‘1080’ resolved to 
provide an answer, declaring the importance of feral animal control to rural 
communities. This commitment was not altruistic but opportunistic - an understanding 
of and a public commitment to WDMC was integral to the acceptance of the ‘brand’ 
Country Labor. However, there were some large blowflies in the Country Labor 
ointment.
The implications of NSW Labor strategy and the expansion of the National Estate 
on wild dog management and control
In 1987, Bob Carr introduced the Wilderness Act, which increased the number of 
national parks across NSW. In the period from 1995 until 2010, successive NSW Labor 
Governments added 472 reserves, totalling 2.7 million hectares to the NSW National 
Parks and Reserve system (Park 2010 July).
These acquisitions were framed as achievements of national significance within the 
central storyline of NSW Labor’s successes. NSW Labor framed national parks as 
‘protected area categories’ in line with the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature [IUCN], within which NSW Labor defined the function of nationals parks as 
being: ‘mainly for conservation and recreation’ (Tebbutt 2001 12 December: 20028). 
However, the resumption of leasehold land, the declaration of national parks and 
wilderness areas and the extension of the reserve system altered significantly both the 
existing spatial geography of NSW and relations of power.
The language of wild dog management and control
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Under NSW Labor the language of WDMC policy and the meanings within it became 
enshrined in law. It presupposed a set of values and norms which foreclosed other 
articulations and interpellations. [See Discussion: The Four Concepts] In this new 
context, the administrative rationalist discourse, of which the new legal discourse of 
WDMC was a part and in which the State had centre place, came into being.
The legal discourse which informs WDMC in NSW expresses the values of the NSW 
Parliament that wild dogs are pests. It achieves this through prescriptive linguistic rules 
and regulations known as Pest Control Orders (PCOs), which are intended to produce 
meaningful statements or knowledge about specific cultural practices. The umbrella 
legislation under which these PCOs sit is the Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 as 
Amended.
This legal discourse serves as a form of rationality in which the ‘conservation and 
control’ of dingoes’ and ‘wild dogs’ is married to broader concepts of risk and 
uncertainty. The policy of WDMC is predicated on the precautionary principle which 
the State interprets as central to the conservation of the dingo (Feral Animal Inquiry 
2008).
Critically, the Act lacks specificity. It provides an interstitial space which allows for the 
intrusions and the interplay of the contending discourses such as agrarianism, 
environmentalism, animal welfare, and biosecurity. This was intended to allow for the 
conservation of the dingo and the eradication of wild dogs to the extent necessary. This 
became the language around which WDMC policy in NSW was built.
In New South Wales (NSW), the 1998 Act and the accompanying PCOs (1) to (8) set 
out the definitions of ‘wild dog’ as well as ‘pest’, ‘controlled land’ and ‘management 
plans’. They establish the legal framework and obligations of the parties and the 
relationship between public land managers and private land owners through the 
management plan as a method of wild dog control.
The Four Concepts:
What is a wild dog?
61
Over the period of NSW Labor Government the language of WDMC was progressively 
circumscribed -  both administratively and legislatively; the effect of which was to 
exclude other sets of meanings afforded to WDMC. The Act and the accompanying 
PCOs firmly entrenched WDMC within an administrative rationalist frame and drew 
heavily on the distinction between different kinds of ‘dogs.’
In NSW, ‘wild dogs’ are ‘pest’ animals. This nomenclature o f ‘wild dogs’ and ‘pests’ is 
the legislative position of all Federal, State and local jurisdictions within Australia. A 
‘wild dog’ means any dog, including a dingo, is a ‘pest’ on ‘controlled land’. There are 
only three exclusions: exhibited dogs, dogs used in research, and, domestic dogs which 
are covered under separate legislation. A ‘pest’ is any member of the animal kingdom 
declared by a pest control order to be a pest. The interpretation of ‘pest’ is subject to 
ministerial prerogative.
What are Schedule 2 lands?
In NSW ‘Controlled lands’ are referred to as Schedule 2 lands. These lands comprise 
National Parks, Nature Reserves, State Recreation Areas, State Forests, Crown Lands 
and Reserves and Sydney Catchment Authority Land. Currently, in NSW there are 248 
Schedule 2 or ‘controlled lands’. All land that is not Schedule 2 land in NSW is deemed 
to be Schedule 1. A review of Schedule 2 lands commenced in 2004 with its findings 
reported publicly for the first time in September 2009.
What is a management plan?
A ‘management plan’ serves a specific function within the meaning of the Act and 
within the context of WDMC. There is an important distinction explicit here.
In the first instance, Section 156 (1) in conjunction with Section 155 (4), establishes 
public land managers’ legal obligation to be a general destruction obligation to destroy 
‘pests’. This obligation is qualified in that public land managers must:
...to the extent necessary to minimise the risk [my emphasis] of the pest causing 
damage on any land) eradicate any pest on the land by any lawful method.
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Secondly, the Act establishes that the method or methods of wild dog control used must 
be legal and approved by the board of the district. There is a raft of accompanying and 
intersecting legislation -  sixteen at last count - pertaining to control methods at both a 
Federal and State level to which all parties must submit.
Thirdly, it establishes a relationship in law between the respective parties. Public land 
managers of Schedule 2 land are deemed to have fulfilled their general destruction 
obligation if they have entered into a wild dog management plan with the local board 
and, crucially, the content has been agreed. This obligation and the implementation of 
the management plan were devolved in the Act from the State Council of the RLPB 
through the instrument of a Guideline to the local boards of the NSW RLPB.
However, this Guideline was not issued until 2005, a gap of some four years. (State 
Council Document 05/094/G, 4 July 2005).
In contrast to public land managers, under Section 155 (1) and (2), the obligations on 
owners or occupiers of private land under a limited destruction obligation must:
.. .eradicate any pest on the land by any lawful method... ’ and/or ‘.. .during the 
stages of its development or life cycle specified in the order by any lawful 
method (or, if the order specifies a method to be used, by the method specified) 
(New South Wales Gazette 2006).
Under Section 141, "control" of a pest includes the eradication of the pest. ‘Eradicate,’ 
in contrast, means to “fully and continuously suppress and destroy”.
Lastly, the Act states that any management plan will address the twin objectives of 
control and conservation, on which any management plan is contingent. That is, to 
control wild dogs and to conserve the dingo.
The Guideline
The State Council Guideline to local Boards required under the Act was not issued until 
4 July, 2005. While the Guideline stated that all areas listed in Schedule 2 lands must be 
covered by a wild dog management plan this was further qualified:
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All wild dog management plans for areas listed in Schedule 2 of the Wild Dog 
Pest Control Order must be in at least draft form by 31 March 2006.
This revised date extended the date by a further year. Five years had elapsed since the 
legislation was enacted and the directive given to issue a Guideline to local boards.
In essence, the Guideline prescribes as part of State Council Policy that it is the local 
board’s responsibility to call and facilitate, with the assistance of NSW Department of 
Primary Industries (DPI) staff, if necessary, stakeholder wild dog management and 
control meetings to determine the need for a management plan.
While this appears to be contrary to the Act, this is overcome by Guideline Policy 2.1, 
where it states that the Board will call a wild dog meeting: ‘to discuss the development 
of a wild dog management plan to satisfy the general obligation under the RLP Act’ 
(Guideline Policy 2.1). It also establishes that if there is no need for a management 
plan: ‘...then this decision should be documented and signed off by the relevant parties, 
including the Board.’ (Guideline Policy 2.3).
Further, the Guideline prescribes that the appointed co-ordinator of the plan, appointed 
from an elected committee/working group of stakeholders should, if needed, draft the 
plan according to:
the “Guidelines for Preparing a Working Plan to Manage Wild Dogs” (Two 
booklet guides attached to this Guideline) and in consultation with stakeholders. 
The plan should be put through a critical review process to ensure it meets 
national, state and regional strategic goals and legislative requirements.
Once completed all relevant stakeholders must ‘sign off on the plan after agreement 
and this includes the local RLPB.
In summary, the Act establishes different legal obligations on the parties; Schedule 2 
land managers must, to the extent necessary minimise the risk of wild dogs; occupiers 
and owners of private land must eradicate wild dogs. This difference is controversial, 
not least because the interpretation of: ‘to the extent necessary minimise the risk of wild
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dogs’ ultimately rests on the interpretation by public land managers. Crucially, there 
must be agreement between the respective parties on the content of a management plan 
which is deemed in law to be a method of control.
The Consequence
Specifically, at the behest of NSW Labor, NSW NPWS prohibited entry by surrounding 
neighbours, a significant portion of whom were farm families, from places previously 
and regularly ‘trapped.’ Many landholders were ‘locked out’ -  sometimes literally. 
NSW Labor subverted the narrative of ‘lock out’ within the Liberal/National Coalition 
storyline (Hoggett 2005) by developing a storyline of ‘conservation’ This was in 
contradistinction to the Nationals’ storyline o f ‘throwing away the key,’ in which NSW 
Labor’s management of the public estate was described as negligent and under whose 
management farm families would suffer significant social, environmental as well as 
economic costs (Hodgkinson 2002 21 November: 7380, Cansdell 2005 13 October: 
18580).
Ian Armstrong, the then Leader of the Nationals, reminded NSW Labor that the 
‘problem’ was in large part of their own making. The Nationals saw the NSW Labor 
Government’s acquisition of National Parks and the management of the fauna and flora 
within them differently:
But one owner of animals, probably the largest owner of animals in this State, 
has a problem that has been exacerbated by acquiring many more animals over 
the past ten years or so (Armstrong 2003 14 October: 3779).
In turn, NSW Labor rejected the Coalition’s claim that wild dogs emanated from public 
lands as patently false:
The claim of some of those opposite that feral animals somehow originate in 
national parks trivialises an important issue and is, of course, demonstrably 
ridiculous (Debus 2005 12 October: 18474).
In a contradictory response, the then Minister for the Environment, Bob Debus stated:
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Australia's introduced animals date from the very first days of European 
settlement. Ever since that time animals not indigenous to this country have 
been brought from other places and released into the Australian environment, 
sometimes with good intentions and sometimes not. When our first national 
parks were formally created from the late 1960s onward, pest animals were 
already well established across the whole landscape. Of course, people dump 
thousands of unwanted cats and dogs every year and many of them end up in 
national parks, as they end up in other bushland. Pig shooters, illegally hunting 
in the bush—sometimes in national parks—sometimes intentionally release 
dogs or pigs, without caring at all about what will happen next. After just a 
few years in the wild, these released animals become feral cats, wild dogs and 
feral pigs. They kill our wildlife and also savage livestock on neighbouring 
farms (Debus 2005 12 October: 18474).
In representing the issue of ‘introduced species’ in this way Minister Debus broadened 
the responsibility for the management of the problem -  and any ‘blame.’ ‘Introduced 
species’ were now part of a discourse of a global ‘ecological crisis’ which was not 
limited to NSW. This discourse ‘cut across spatial boundaries and borders’ and relied 
on ‘...particular forms...of communication which are specialized for trans-national and 
interregional interaction’ (Fairclough 2006: 3) thereby reinforcing the need for 
‘experts.’ The State through its ‘experts’ was now the custodians of specialised 
communication and had become the medium through which knowledge of ‘wild dogs’ 
would be disseminated.
Through this narrative, NSW Labor attempted to deflect criticism away from its 
stewardship of the public estate into a binary of ‘us/them.’ NSW Labor was acting in 
the ‘common good’ and was the “I”’ of the discourse concerned about native animals. 
Farm families, by default, were the ‘profit maximisers’ on ‘neighbouring farms’ who 
were experiencing ‘savage’ attacks on livestock. However, NSW Labor invoked feral 
animals and the conservation of the ‘dingo’ as a national and global ecological risk for 
biodiversity conservation which it claimed - unlike the Commonwealth Government 
under the Leadership of the then Liberal Prime Minister, the Honourable John Howard 
-  did not abrogate its responsibility (Debus 1996 23 May: 1496).
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However, to the Coalition, and to The Nationals particularly, this was obfuscation. A 
central narrative in The Nationals storyline was NSW Labor’s mismanagement of the 
public estate. To the Nationals, wild dogs were a scourge, farm families were concerned 
about native fauna and flora and they had been saying so to NSW Labor for decades. It 
was not enough to know what had happened -  farm families knew this too well -  and by 
extension, ‘naturally,’ so too did The Nationals. To The Nationals the NSW Labor 
storyline of Australia’s environmental history was an ‘old chestnut’ used 
opportunistically to blame farm families for environmental degradation and 
mismanagement and to excise the role of the State which had actively encouraged and 
punitively enforced it. This was a ‘blame game’ with which farm families were already 
all too familiar. The ‘real’ question to be answered was: ‘What was being done - now?’
The extent of the eradication and control of wild dogs in national parks and those wild 
dogs exiting public lands was more than a moot point. Landholders were threatened 
with prosecution proceedings should ‘illegal’ WDMC occur within boundaries decided 
arbitrarily by NSW NPWS and State Forest public land managers. Additionally, the 
‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ of farm families was now subject to administrative 
review, the legitimacy of which was established through a process of ‘scientific’ study 
and peer review.
NSW NPWS positioned the ‘scientific method’ as paramount. For example, in a letter to 
one farm family, NSW NPWS wrote:
I also intend to have dog scats from the National Park collected and analysed. 
This should prove whether dogs living in the Park are preying on your stock 
and will assist in justifying any future control program. This analysis is 
expensive and involves expertise presently unavailable within the Service. I 
hope this commitment of time and money to improve the Service’s response to 
your stock losses shows our continued intention to give you assistance with 
your dog problems (New South Wales Government 1987 14 August).
Wadbilliga -  the park in question - was declared as a national park in 1979. It is 
described as consisting of a ‘wild and rugged landscape,’ encompassing a land mass of 
98,530 hectares. The study conducted in Wadbilliga National Park was not released 
publicly.
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Notwithstanding the increasing choruses of complaint from the Liberal/National 
Coalition, by 1996-97 the Honourable Pam Allen, the then Minister for the 
Environment, stated:
It is with a great sense of achievement that I applaud the declaration of 13 new 
parks and reserves bringing to a total of 39 new parks and reserves declared 
since this Government took office 
(NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 1996-997: 5).
This sense of achievement was matched by self-congratulation. In 1996 the then 
Minister for the Environment, Bob Debus, in a Consideration of an Urgent Motion 
moved:
That this House congratulates the New South Wales Government on its record 
support for feral animals and weed eradication programs (Debus 1996 23 May: 
20696).
This congratulatory spirit was not shared by many farming families.
In 2001, a survey of 142 Monaro landholders -  commissioned by farm families on the 
Monaro in an attempt to demonstrate to NSW NPWS and State Forests the extent of 
agricultural losses -  reported that, collectively, farm families had lost 2,892 sheep to 
wild dog predation, at a cost of $1.3 million or $36,000 per farm in the preceding twelve 
months. Further the survey reported that 23,000 hectares of land on the Monaro was no 
longer used for sheep production as a direct result of wild dog predation (Litchfield, 
Gamock et al. 2001 10 October). The parliamentary speeches reveal that these losses 
were replicated across NSW.
Commensurate with the expansion of the public estate, NSW Labor expanded the 
functions and the budget of NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW NPWS), a 
Department first created in 1967. Between 1994 and 2001, NSW Labor reportedly 
increased the land managed by NSW NPWS by 35 per cent and the total initial budget 
allocation by 138 per cent (General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 2002).
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In 1997, NSW NPWS issued a ‘Wild Dog Policy’ which was reaffirmed by the 
Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC), its successor, in May 2005 and 
then again in May 2009 by the Department of Environment and Climate Change NSW 
(DECC) (NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 2005 May). NSW NPWS also 
stated its intention to be a ‘good neighbour’ and suggested that:
wild dogs from lands acquired or reserved under the NPW Act sometimes 
impact on livestock on adjacent areas’ (Department of Environment and 
Conservation 2005 May: 3).
To farming families the word ‘sometimes’ was a misnomer -  if not an insult.
Reported public expenditures
In 2001-2002, NSW Agriculture reported to the NSW Parliamentary General Standing 
Committee No 5 Inquiry that it spent $2.24 million. In contrast, in 2001-02 the NSW 
NPWS pest budget was reportedly $15,738 million, with over $2.5 million ‘expected’ to 
be spent on ‘on-ground,’ feral animal programs (General Purpose Standing Committee 
No. 5 2002).
In 2001-2002 the Department of Water, Land and Conservation (DWLC) reported that 
it managed approximately 5 per cent of NSW public lands under its direct control - 
some 4 million hectares - and reportedly ‘budgeted up to’ $300,000 for all feral animal 
control. State Forests reportedly spent $430,203, of which $166,812 was contributed by 
the State Government (General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 2002). This level of 
financial support is salutary as State Forests at this time was a ‘for profit’ government 
trading enterprise of the Government of NSW (State Forests of New South Wales 2002- 
2003). Pest animal control overall was reported as being funded through the profits that 
it derived from its trading activities.
In contrast, in 2000-2001 the 48 RLPBs reportedly contributed over $6 million to feral 
animal control on private lands which came entirely from rate payers’ levies 
mandatorily collected -  that is, from farm families with private land holdings in NSW 
of more than the minimum rateable land of ten acres (General Purpose Standing 
Committee No. 5 2002).
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However, herein lays a cautionary tale.
NSW Labor’s ‘Green Legacy’ and NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service
The reported financial expenditure by NSW Labor on WDMC played out within an 
already complex social and political relationship. Complexity here: ‘refers to the 
number and variety o f elements and interactions in the environment o f a decision 
system’ (Dryzek 1997:8).
Specifically, the relationship between the NSW NPWS, State Forests and grassroots 
farm families regarding land management, feral animal control broadly, and WDMC 
specifically, was fraught with emotion and highly fragmented. The Nationals were more 
pointed when it came to describing NSW NPWS: ‘They have a record o f incompetency, 
mismanagement and misuse’ (Hodgkinson 2004 18 February: 6221, Maguire 2007, 26 
October:3469, Stoner 2008 31 August: 397).
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In 2001, NSW NPWS authorised the shooting of over 600 brumbies in Guy Fawkes 
National Park. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) 
subsequently brought a Supreme Court case against NSW NPWS over claims of alleged 
cruelty. Shortly afterwards, in 2003, a Royal Commission was established to inquire 
into the role of NSW NPWS in the 2003 bushfires in the Kosciuszko National Park. The 
level of broad community vitriol directed towards NSW NPWS increased dramatically. 
NSW NPWS and State Forests were accused of not acting as ‘frank and fearless’ public 
land managers. NSW NPWS, particularly, was represented as working politically in 
concert with NSW Labor, as an inept public lands manager and, as a captive of a highly 
politicised ‘science’ (Latour 2004). Latour argues more generally that the politicisation 
of ‘science’ is achieved ‘...through epistemology in order to render ordinary political 
life impotent through the threat of an incontestable nature’ (Latour 2004: 10). 
Notwithstanding this, the level of enmity directed at NSW NPWS was also rooted in a 
bitter history.
In the 1940s and 1950s the grazing of cattle in the high country of South East New 
South Wales and North East Victoria and the issuing of ‘snow leases’ were 
progressively restricted especially in and around Kosciuszko National Park (Merritt 
2007) effectively ended most grazing in these areas from 1980. This was a fierce and 
bitter political battle waged by enemies which was ultimately lost by farm families. 
However, sustained campaigns to reverse or mitigate this position continue to this day 
(ABC News 24 Online 2010 14 December, ABC News 24 Online 2011 24 October, 
Luke 2012, Thursday November 15).
Nevertheless, the collective memory of farm families surrounding this struggle - not 
simply just the physical landscape - but rather the elision and or the appropriation and 
commodification of their stories of stock, ‘dogmen’, and mountain people caused great 
rancour. NSW NPWS was seen as an unwanted intruder -  not a ‘good neighbour’ but 
rather ‘the neighbour from hell’ -  which increasingly marginalised -  if not ridiculed - 
the voice and the values of farm families.
However, until the 1960s, Australia, as a nation ‘Rode on the Sheep’s back’ politically, 
economically and culturally (Bean 1945, Bolton 1999, Grattan 2004, Brett 2011:26, 
Massey 2011). The ‘merino’ particularly served as an iconic symbol of Australia’s
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national and international identity and economic importance and had a: ‘talismanic 
value as an index of Australian distinctiveness’ (Bolton 1999:160).
The power of ‘wool’ as a discursive formation was pervasive. From 1957 until 1959, 
under the direction of Sir Keith Hancock the Research School of Social Sciences, at the 
Australian National University (ANU) hosted the Wool Seminar on a fortnightly basis. 
The Australian Dictionary of Biography, the Noel Butlin Archive and the School of 
Political Science within the ANU were direct beneficiaries of the wool industry’s 
largesse (Bolton 1999).
Hansard speeches over this period reveal that many farm families had trapped wild dogs 
regularly across the Australian landscape. This was part of a robust and culturally 
inscribed belief in being a ‘good neighbour’ and served as a function in proactively and 
reactively protecting agricultural stock. This was carried out with the full imprimatur of 
the State, which acted punitively against farm families in the event that WDMC was not 
carried out.
As with any discourse ‘the permanent interest’ in wool as a discourse was: ‘always 
contingent and precarious’ (Fairclough 2006: 36). From the 1960s: ‘new economic and 
cultural forces were demoting the simple fleece from its golden pre-eminence’ (Bolton 
1999:167). The rise of synthetics, the increased dominance of the mineral boom, the 
challenge to Anglo-Australian monoculturalism, and the growth of ‘environmentalism’ 
as a social movement gradually undermined ‘wool’s’ pre-eminence until ‘the barbarians 
were inside the walls’ and the discursive power of the ‘wool’ discourse declined.
Many farm families, in turn, felt their cultural contribution, their cumulative 
contribution to nation building -  once revered - and the settler society values they 
espoused were now belittled and ridiculed publicly as a result of what was referred to as 
Carr’s ‘Green Legacy.’ At the ‘grassroots, public servants from NSW NPWS or State 
Forests - many of whom emboldened by the rise of ‘new environmentalism’ - became 
the ‘public face’ (Webb 2002 19 September: 5069) and the physical embodiment of the 
discursive change and incurred the full wrath of farm families.
J Bolton (1999: 161) states ‘A few days ahead of the meeting [the Wool Seminar] Hancock circulated a 
paper which he entitled: ‘First very rough Proposals for a Seminar on Wool (from 1850 to the present 
day). He thought a possible title for the seminar might be ‘The Permanent Interest’, W C Wentworth’s 
label for the wool industry. Privately he thought of it as ‘The Selfish Seminar’ because he intended to use 
it to re-educate himself about Australian matters.’
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Farm families, in turn, felt typecast as the ‘enemy’ of the State; the social actors 
complicit in the ‘ecological crisis’ who now had to be ‘managed’ by the State and its 
‘experts.’ The role and power of NSW NPWS, as the agent and intermediary charged 
with the delivery of NSW Labor’s conservation discourse at the grassroots, increased 
exponentially. In contrast, farm families experienced a diminution in their power and 
status (Maguire 2007, 26 October: 3469).
From the 1970s onwards, NSW Labor and NSW NPWS espoused and advocated a 
different land ethic - one in which dingoes were considered a ‘native’ species and in 
which increasingly public land managers assumed ‘wild dogs’ to have functional utility 
in an ecosystem in eradicating other unwanted species from the landscape. NSW Labor 
judged that it was a: ‘broad community expectation’ that dingoes would be conserved 
(MacDonald 2005 8 June: 16554). This marked a significant discursive shift in 
WDMC.
This discursive shift brought with it direct repercussions on the material lives of farm 
families through increased wild dog predation. The public venting of the anger and 
desperation farm families felt increased. More recently, as Judith Brett writes, this broad 
discursive shift to ‘environmentalism’ had cultural and social implications for rural 
communities:
City reactions to these sporadic eruptions of rural anger range from sympathy 
through to indifference, bemusement, condescension and contemptuous 
dismissal (Brett 2011:10).
Farm families felt they were unjustly typecast as ‘rednecks,’ ‘rural idiots,’ 
‘environmental vandals’ and ‘whingers’ when raising their concerns at the ‘grassroots’ 
with public servants from NSW NPWS and State Forests (Maguire 2007, 26 October: 
3469).
In 1972, soon after hosting a Wild Dog Summit in Sydney, the then NSW Labor 
Premier, Nevile Wran, became the Patron of the Australian Dingo Society. This was an 
anathema to farm families, as it was felt that the hope that NSW Labor’s commitment to 
controlling wild dogs at the Wild Dog Summit had engendered was misplaced and,
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further, that the NSW Labor Premier’s commitment to a ‘fair go’ and ‘fair play’ was a 
sham. There was a real sense of betrayal.
To farm families, the question of ‘dingo or hybrid?’ was in large part immaterial -  
‘dingo or wild dog? - they are killing our stock’ -  and in large numbers. To farm 
families, the discursive shift represented much more than an administrative sleight of 
hand, academic conjecture or a reliance on an arbitrary scientific distinction. There was 
a materiality to ‘wild dogs’ which was being ignored by the State. From 1974 until 1985 
-  the year that Wild Dog Control Boards were abolished in NSW - the Southern 
Tablelands Wild Dog Control Board kept records of the numbers of stock killed, hurt or 
lost because of wild dog predation. From 1976 separate figures were also kept of the 
numbers of stock killed by wild dogs emanating out of areas of National Parks [See 





































Moreover, in a submission to the 2005 House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Inquiry Into the Impact of Pest Animals on 
Agriculture, one farmer reported:
When we, as affected farmers have gone to parks authorities and said, ‘Listen, 
guys, you have dogs in there,’ they say, ‘No, I don’t know whether we have,’ 
We say, ‘I’m sure you have.’ After decades, we have convinced them that they 
do have dogs. We have a flow of dogs out of there. Yes, they now acknowledge 
that, particularly since the New South Wales Rural Lands Act 1998. We say, 
‘Can we go in there and do something about it?’ They say, ‘No, you are not 
allowed in there with traps, poisons, and whatever.’ The local community have 
basically been stopped from doing their own work, for whatever reasons -  
policy reasons (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture 
Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 155)
Additionally, many farming families believed they had not been given a ‘fair go’ -  that 
the State had not kept to the rules, had not treated farm families equally with their urban 
counterparts in putting the case forward for WDMC; farm families had not been given a 
‘fair go’ (Brett 2011 citing Hirst, J.: 6) to earn their living free of wild dogs.
This Australian notion of ‘fair go’ was further linked to the notion of ‘fair play.’ Farm 
families felt alienated by the State which from the beginning of white colonisation of 
Australia had venerated agriculture and agriculturalists. Scientific claims regarding the 
extensive hybridisation of the dingo with the wild dog, the claim that it was not ‘native’ 
to Australia, but rather Indonesia, (Low 2003), the view that wild dogs pose disease 
threats, and the materiality of the effects of increasing wild dog predation as reported in 
the Parliament, were sublimated within NSW Labor’s discourse of WDMC from which 
The Nationals argued farming families saw little benefit.
Nevertheless, NSW Labor’s public commitment was underpinned by a comprehensive 
package of legislative instruments. The Brindabella and Wee Jasper Wild Dog/Fox Co­
operative Plan model, known as the ‘Brindabella Plan’ was elevated as a ‘best practice’ 
model and was promulgated widely as both ‘the’ benchmark and as a ‘success’ for the 
rest of NSW to follow (Burton 2003 3 July: 2878, Debus 2004 11 March: 7169, Debus
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2006 7 September: 20696, Kelly 2010 24 November: 2878). In this way the model 
became the instrument of the State.
NSW Labor attempted to realise WDMC policy in six strategic ways:
Firstly, NSW Labor introduced the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995. 
Notably, dingoes were exempted from the listing of ‘threatened species.’ This was 
despite intense lobbying from the Colong Foundation of NSW Labor to list the dingo as 
endangered under the Act. In 1995 The Colong Foundation nominated the Dingo 
(Canus lupus dingo) unsuccessfully as endangered populations under Schedule 1 Part 2 
of the Threatened Species Conservation Act, 1995. Later amended in 2004, The 
Nationals branded the Threatened Species legislation as ‘madness’ and proof that NSW 
Labor had: ‘sold out country New South Wales’ (Stoner 2004 23 June: 9969) because 
NSW Labor had failed in its stewardship of the public estate to eradicate and control 
pests, particularly wild dogs, and weeds from the public estate.
Further, NSW Labor had created the means through which dingoes could be listed as 
endangered. The NSW Scientific Committee comprised of scientists alone had the 
power to list an animal as ‘threatened’ and or ‘endangered.’ This potential became the 
‘elephant in the room.’ Farming families were concerned that should dingoes become 
listed as endangered WDMC would become nigh on impossible without first capturing 
and ‘DNA’ testing each dog.
However, within the Parliament others asserted more opportunistic reasons for the 
introduction of this legislation. The Honourable Rob Oakshott, formerly a member of 
The Nationals, stated:
I have grave concerns, as do other honourable members, that this bill is nothing 
more than a scramble before the election and for Green preferences (Oakshott 
2002 25 September: 5435).
Secondly, NSW Labor introduced the Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 as Amended as 
the Authority through which WMDC would be achieved. This Act abolished the NSW 
PP Board system, which resulted in its successor the RLPB system. This was later 
replaced in 2008 by the LHPA. Overall, the utility of this user pays system was not lost
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on NSW Labor. The size of the mandatory financial contributions made by farm 
families to the State and the Travelling Stock Reserves system it administered was a 
significant revenue source and a convenient instrument through which to initiate and 
promulgate NSW Labor’s solution to WDMC.
Thirdly, NSW Labor introduced the Brindabella Plan as both a legal and administrative 
instrument. This model was privileged and promulgated as ‘the’ model of ‘best practice’ 
(Amery 2002 19 September). It became the centrepiece of the strategy of NSW Labor 
on WDMC.
Fourthly, in 2002 and again in 2007, NSW Labor publicly supported the National Wild 
Dog Summits held in Wodonga, Victoria and Orange, NSW respectively. However, it is 
difficult to see this support as being other than for the purposes of co-optation and 
deradicalisation of the farm families who attended. The resultant NSW Wild Dog 
Advisory Committee formed as an advisory body to NSW DPI on WDMC -  a 
recommendation of the 2007 Summit - is heavily circumscribed both by its ‘advisory’ 
role only and by the overwhelming numbers of public land managers, who actively 
participate and vote as a bloc on this Committee.
Fifthly, NSW Labor committed DPI as a core partner with the IACRC. Minister Debus 
announced:
The New South Wales hub of the new co-operative centre is based in Orange. 
The State Government will commit approximately $2.5 million in in-kind 
support over the next several years to develop new and improved strategies 
that reduce the impact of pest animals (Debus 2006 28 February: 20696).
Increasingly, wild dogs were positioned as a threat to the biosecurity of NSW. The 
transmission of ‘zoonotic’ disease -  diseases that can be spread from animals to humans 
such as hydatids, rabies and the increasing concern regarding neospora, a disease spread 
through dog scats which causes Tate storm’ abortions in cattle - was increasingly 
recognised.
Lastly, NSW Labor introduced the Feral Animal and Game Council Act under intense 
pressure from the Fishers and Shooters Party of NSW, which held the balance of power
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in the Legislative Council. The effect of this was a further fracturing and subverting of 
the storylines of WDMC in the Parliament, while strengthening the power and reach of 
the administrative hand. The storyline of NSW Labor about the function of National 
Parks also changed. National parks were no longer just for aesthetic enjoyment, 
biodiversity conservation and recreation; they were also now places where licensed 
professional hunters served the interests of the State by engaging in hunting. In contrast, 
The Nationals were concerned about the effects the Game Council may have on the 
scheduled work of WDMC across NSW.
Bob Carr and ‘new’ environmentalism
Overall, NSW Labor’s role, especially Bob Carr’s, as part of this changed discourse was 
pre-eminent. Premier Carr positioned himself and NSW Labor as the champions of a 
‘new’ environmentalism. To fann families, NSW Labor’s ‘conservation’ was rank 
hypocrisy, contradictory and myopic. It ignored the necessary public land management 
functions in relation to pest animals and weeds control, discounted the effects of wild 
dogs on native flora and fauna, and, trivialised the escalating impacts of wild dogs, 
which were primarily and immediately experienced by farming families as those most 
affected both by wild dog predation and the decisions of NSW Labor (Hodgkinson 2005 
23 September: 17512, Smith 2010 11 March: 21255). Farming families saw these 
functions as a duty -  and as critical -  for the stewardship of public lands.
Increasingly wild dog predation on agriculture stock and the perceived lack of interest 
in the ‘Bush’ and WDMC through the 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s contributed to a 
sense of crisis in the ‘Bush.’ The parliamentary speeches attest to a dramatic increase in 
wild dog predation on agricultural stock from the late-1970s. Additionally, the floating 
of the Australian dollar in the 1980s, the collapse of the Reserve Price Scheme for wool, 
a series of droughts in the 1980s, and, commencing in 2000, a ten year drought, 
cumulatively resulted in hardships for farming families on an unprecedented scale.
Escalating wild dog predation on agricultural stock was cited as the ‘tipping’ point for 
farm families leaving wool and sheep production completely, for some a turn to cattle 
production -  at least initially -  and for some, a final exit from all agricultural production 
and the sale of agricultural land; dryly referred to as the farmer’s ‘last crop.’
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In juxtaposition, the overwhelming narrative of the NSW Labor storyline was that these 
land acquisitions, and its conservation discourse, were in the public interest. Premier 
Bob Carr, later nicknamed ‘Bob the Realtor’ by The Nationals (Chesterfield-Evans 
2004: 11640) declared his ‘Green Legacy’ to the voters of NSW to be a source of 
immense personal pride and one of his Government’s greatest achievements (Parliament 
of New South Wales 2011).
Yet, NSW Labor’s‘Green Legacy’ only went so far. It did not challenge the 
anthropocentric representation of nature, nor were its regulatory ideals and democratic 
procedures informed by ecological democracy (See Eckersley 1999 , Eckersley 2004). 
On the one hand, NSW Labor and Bob Carr secured NSW Labor’s ‘Green Legacy’ to 
the concept of sustainable development without challenging the underlying tenets of 
capitalism. According to NSW Labor at least, the conservation of the dingo and the 
‘control’ -  not necessarily the eradication -  of wild dogs could coexist.
On the other hand, NSW Labor faced the material reality of the escalating costs of wild 
dog predation which had the potential to mobilise the wrath of agri-business interests, 
undermine the acceptance of the brand Country Labor in the Bush, damage the 
agricultural economy on which the State economy relied and impinge on the progress of 
NSW Labor in regional and rural electorates.
In 2002, as a function, and, a public declaration of this sense of crisis, a National Wild 
Dog Summit was held in Wodonga, Victoria which over 400 representatives of farm 
families; many from across NSW also attended (Webb 2002 19 September: 5069). The 
impetus for this public meeting came, not from NSW Labor, but rather from farm 
families.
These Summits received bipartisan parliamentary support although NSW Labor rejected 
categorically in the Parliament any suggestion that it was not: ‘taking the necessary 
action with regard to wild dogs’ (Amery 2002 19 September: 5069). However, at the 
2007 Summit, the distrust of public land managers and contempt for what was 
perceived as the highly politicised ‘science’ of WDMC was palpable. A senior research 
scientist from the then NSW DPI was noticeably heckled throughout his presentation on 
‘learning by doing - Key steps to developing effective wild dog control plans.’
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Previously, in 2002, the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into Feral Animals (Parliament of 
New South Wales 2002) received overwhelming testimony from farm families 
experiencing severe stress caused by wild dog predation on agricultural stock. Active 
‘destocking’ from agricultural land abutting and adjoining National Parks was occurring 
as a result of wild dog predation (Smith 2001 3 October: 5069). The public 
acknowledgement and recording of stock losses by Departments and Agencies -  not 
least the economic, environmental or social costs -  were increasingly subject to 
administrative procedures or not recorded or both (General Purpose Standing 
Committee No. 5 2002).
The Honourable Richard Jones (Australian Democrats) Chairman of the General 
Purpose Standing Committee No. 5, when tabling the Feral Animals Report, also 
alluded to the significant fragmentation that existed within Government agencies when 
dealing with reports of wild dog predation:
The variation in the responses of statutory bodies once the hearings were 
undertaken was also surprising. One rural lands protection board pretended 
there was no problem, by not acknowledging kills unless stupid, unnecessary 
procedures were followed. Neighbouring rural lands protection boards were 
getting to grips with the problem and doing very good work. However, we are 
given to understand that during the course of the inquiry that errant rural lands 
protection board [sic] realised the extent of the problem and is taking steps to 
remedy its failings. Within the National Parks and Wildlife Service attitudes 
ranged from a cautious “greenies first” position, irrespective of the daily 
carnage on their doorsteps, to a positive “roll up your sleeves” approach, 
which is achieving results (Jones 2002 31 October: 6283).
Increasingly parliamentary speeches from all sides of parliament began to reflect the 
stress and emotional turmoil of farm families as a direct consequence of wild dog 
predation on agricultural stock (Hodgkinson 2000 4 May: 5363, Souris 2000 24 May: 
5705, Webb 2001 30 November: 19312, Amery 2002 19 September: 5069, Hodgkinson 
2002 19 September: 5069, MacDonald 2002 27 June: 5705, Jones 2002 31 October: 
6283, MacDonald 2004 27 October: 12030, Maguire 2007, 26 October: 3469).
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By 2005 NSW parliamentary speeches reported the acute sense of desperation and 
frustration experienced by farming families. A second parliamentary inquiry, the 
Commonwealth inquiry entitled Taking Control: A national approach to pest animals 
(House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 
2005) in response to these frustrations reiterated these anxieties, escalated the issue of 
WDMC to the national stage and reiterated the findings of the NSW report.
However, in contrast to the findings of these reports a 2002 report commissioned by the 
NSW NPWS at the behest of NSW Labor wherein the increase in wild dog attacks was 
described as a ‘perception’ of farm families requiring objective measurement (English 
and Chappie 2002) (English and Chappie 2002). While within this report there appears 
to be empathy, at times, for the social impacts on farm families this appeared to be 
secondary to the privileging and pre-eminence of the discourse of environmentalism. 
Nevertheless, overall, these reports also stood as a dire reflection on the antagonism that 
existed between political parties over the control of the storylines of WDMC.
In a prelude to the tabling of the NSW Feral Animals Inquiry any residual goodwill that 
had existed during the Inquiry’s hearings ‘boiled over’ into a debate which was marked 
by both its triviality and viciousness. In the NSW Parliament, the issue of WDMC 
became the vehicle to score political points: The spirit of bipartisanship, which was for 
short periods manifest during the Feral Animals Inquiry’s hearings, disintegrated during 
the tabling of the Committee Report and the Dissenting Report (Fazio 2002 31 October: 
6283). This occurred over allegations that the NSW Labor Member of Parliament, the 
Honourable Amanda Fazio (Labor) had referred to the Inquiry as a ‘Mickey Mouse 
Inquiry’ (Colless 2002 5 September:4669). The Honourable Amanda Fazio alleged that 
the Honourable Rick Colless (The Nationals) had used the Committee’s proceedings in 
a ‘grubby manner...to meet and greet constituents in country New South Wales...as a 
mechanism to demean the work of the inquiry and obtain a few votes’ (Fazio 2002 5 
September). Moreover, it was alleged that:
the performance of the Hon. Jan Bumswoods [was] nothing short of what one
would expect form the wildest feral animal’ (Pezzutti 2002 5 September: 4669).
Backgrounding this vitriol was the deep antagonism over the NSW Labor Government’s 
stance on gun control.
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It is significant however, that despite the outpouring of empathy witnessed in the 
Parliament, the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry technically precluded the 
examination of the social impacts of wild dog predation on agricultural stock on farm 
families. Yet, this formed the greater part of the testimony that the Inquiry received 
(Jones 2002 31 October: 6283).
In 2002 NSW Labor promulgated The Brindabella Plan as the administrative solution to 
the ‘problem’ of WDMC. This was affirmed by legislative force The Honourable Steve 
Whan declared:
We have an excellent best practice model that has been developed in the 
Brindabella-Wee Jasper area, which controlled wild dog numbers. This is a 
significant problem. The model introduced in that region has resulted in 
significant drops in losses of stock (Whan 2003: 597).
At the same time, NSW Labor specifically allocated funds to a scientific and 
technological solution to the now administratively, legislatively and scientifically 
defined ‘problem’ of WDMC which the ‘model,’ as the administrative and legislative 
solution, would address.
From 2002, NSW Labor located the issue of WDMC within a rationality of agri­
environmentalism. This rationality was predicated on State intervention and control - 
albeit delivered at the grassroots. It institutionalised an administrative rationalist 
approach to the public and private sector arrangements of WDMC. It did not challenge 
the underlying assumptions of capitalism, the scientific paradigm o f ‘social facts’ and it 
relied on and financially encouraged a technological and ‘innovative’ solution.
NSW Labor’s understanding of the issue of WDMC became synonymous with State 
control of WDMC. The State did not concede power to those most affected by WDMC 
-  farming families. Rather, they were interpellated into the position of the ‘manipulate 
being’ (Lockie and Carpenter 2009: 409). The knowledge of farming families -  and the 
viability of agricultural production -  would be ‘harnessed’ in the interests of the State 
and interpellated through a discourse of ‘new’ environmentalism. Over this time, NSW 
Labor deployed various storylines of WDMC to give meaning to this understanding.
83
This was most notably through the promulgation of the policy instruments as ‘best 
practice,’ ‘good news’ stories in the rural media, and the reliance on and promotion of a 
suite of various technological and scientific solutions.
The Liberal National Coalition as the authorial voice on wild dog management and 
control
In contrast to NSW Labor, The Nationals argued that they were ‘the true voice of 
country and regional New South Wales’ (Cansdell 2005 13 October: 18580). The 
imperative to control feral animals was intrinsically understood by The Nationals as a 
rural and regional issue over which NSW Labor parliamentarians representing inner city 
electorates such as Balmain -  the birthplace of NSW Labor -  knew little and should not 
preside.
For example, when the then Minister for the Environment, the Honourable Bob Debus, 
was answering a Dorothy Dixer question from The Honourable Steve Whan (Labor - 
Monaro) about WDMC in Kosciuszko National Park, the then Leader of the Nationals, 
the Honourable Andrew Stoner called a point of order:
Mr Andrew Stoner interjecting: Point of order, I would just like the Minister -
Mr Speaker: What is your point of order?
Mr Andrew Stoner: - to tell us how many wild dogs there are in Balmain. 
(Debus 2005 12 October: 18474).
The narrative within this storyline rests on an implicit distinction between the ‘City’ and 
the ‘Bush,’ invoking the storyline o f ‘countrymindedness’ (Aitkin 2005, Botterill 2009, 
Wear 2009). ‘Countrymindedness’ is a storyline which extols the virtue of country 
living as ‘wholesome and desirable in contrast to the selfish and corrupt ways of the 
city’ (Botterill 2009:2).
The Nationals positioned this distinction as a political imperative in their fight against 
the challenges and incursions into NSW rural electorates from NSW Labor and the 
minority parties such as The Fishers and Shooters Party, The Outdoor Recreation Party,
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One Nation, the Christian Democrats, and the Independent candidates. True to the 
storyline, Andrew Stoner, the then Leader of The Nationals argued during the Second 
Reading of the Rural Communities Impacts Bill that the Carr Labor government was: 
‘the most Sydney-centric government in the history of New South Wales’ (Stoner 2005 
1 December: 20507).
However, the storyline of ‘country mindedness’ in WDMC lacks sufficient explanatory 
power. The parliamentary speeches reveal that WDMC was not just presented as an 
issue which mythologised farm families and wild dogs within a socialist agrarian 
discourse. The material reality of wild dog predation was increasingly recognised across 
all sides of Parliament. The political opportunity that WDMC offered was apparent to 
all.
In the Parliament, NSW Labor did not characterise farm families as ‘rent seekers’ who 
were seeking handouts for WDMC which was ‘properly’ in an age of economic 
rationalism, a private matter; the cost of which farm families ‘should’ bear. NSW Labor 
too recognised that: ‘No one can deny that the farmers have done more than their fair 
share of man-hours’ (Whan 2003: 597).
However, akin to NSW Labor, the narrative of The Nationals positioned farm families 
as the ‘object’ of a subverted storyline; in this case NSW Labor had done ‘things’ to 
farm families which had significantly altered the materiality of their lives. This in turn 
challenged the ‘rugged individualism’ implicit as a narrative in the ‘country 
mindedness’ storyline. The narrative of The Nationals’ storyline was that it was NSW 
Labor which had significantly increased the size of the public estate from which wild 
dogs emanated and that therefore the NSW Labor Government - as the State - had a 
duty of care as the steward of that public estate.
Stewardship is a central narrative within The Nationals storyline. This extended to both 
the land itself and to the native fauna and flora in it. (Stoner 2008 31 August: 397). It 
was morally incumbent on NSW Labor to meet any economic, social, or environmental 
‘spill over’ effects of wild dogs onto private lands. This view was predicated on the 
belief that ‘people had a right to farm’ on private land (Fraser 2005 23 March: 20515) 
free of wild dogs because, in part, ‘feral animals impact on the wealth-creating farmers 
of this nation’ (Colless 2002 5 September: 4669).
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The Nationals stated that they were: ‘not philosophically opposed to national parks, if 
they are properly managed’ (Hodgkinson 2002 21 November: 7380). However, it was 
‘important for this Parliament and honourable members to preserve the animal kingdom 
with commonsense’ (Armstrong 2003 14 October: 3779). The Nationals ‘common 
sense’ discourse of environmentalism was not predicated on ‘the basket weavers of 
Balmain,’ but rather ‘the environment that supports us all, particularly the environment 
and in our national parks and wilderness areas’ (Pezzutti 2002 5 September: 4669). It is 
of note that this anthropocentric approach remained unchallenged by NSW Labor and 
the Liberal/National Coalition across the parliamentary debates over this time.
The Nationals positioned WDMC as ‘personal’ to them; a part of their ‘lived’ 
experiences. In many of their speeches they revealed personal ‘hands on’ knowledge 
and that of their constituents of wild dog predation (Webb 2002 15 March, Hodgkinson 
2005 23 September, Maguire 2007, 26 October: 3469). WDMC was performed 
simultaneously as both a private and public action. It is evident that they were speaking 
from their own ‘life’ experience and generational knowledge of WDMC which in large 
part is not revealed in the speeches of NSW Labor during this time.
Russell (2006) reiterated the phenomenological experience of farming families in a 
small case study. He wrote:
Actual dog attacks are described in horrific terms and as highly sensual and 
perceptual events. The detailed telling of the experience is mutually created and 
fashioned anew at every telling and hearing. Yet few want to hear the actual 
story. Government agencies seek to dismiss the events as hysterical 
exaggerations; industry bureaucrats see the socio-economic impact as minimal; 
and neighbouring landholders don't want to be confronted with detailed 
descriptions for fear of'infection' (Russell 2006 26-27 July: 3).
However, increasingly, The Nationals framed the issue of wild dogs within their 
storylines not only as a rural problem, but also as a peri urban one as well which should 
not depend on a ‘lottery’ of WDMC administered by NSW NPWS and State Forests 
(Smith 2010 11 March: 21255). Urban and peri urban citizens had a stewardship 
responsibility akin - but not equal - to that of their country counterparts to control their
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pet animals; to eradicate pest animals and weeds on their lands and to stop the 
‘dumping’ of unwanted animals in rural areas.
The economic costs to NSW agriculture were a material reality which slowly but 
increasingly was converted into a threat to the State. During this time, the social impacts 
on farm families of wild dog predation on agricultural stock also gained prominence and 
cut across the parliamentary divide as increasingly farm families exited agricultural 
production (Colless 2002 9 April: 1078, Smith 2002 19 September: 5069, Webb 2002 
21 November: 7380, Tingle 2005 8 June: 16544, Stoner 2006 6 September, Whan 2006 
7 September: 1691, Cohen 2010 26 October: 26775).
The ‘social impacts’ as a storyline became a political tool utilised without compunction 
by all sides of politics. In a vitriolic debate, the Honourable Amanda Fazio (Labor) 
accused the Honourable Rick Colless (Nationals) of:
attempting to again to use the feral animal inquiry as a mechanism to prop up the 
ever-dwindling support base of the National Party’ (Fazio 2002 5 September).
The Honourable, Amanda Fazio, challenged the claims of The Nationals that it was the 
legitimate and ‘true’ voice of country NSW: T would not like to be a member of a party 
with a support level of around 3 per cent’ (Fazio 2002 5 September: 4669).
The Nationals in turn pointed out that by ‘locking up’ vast areas within the public 
estate, NSW Labor had not conducted pest animal and weed eradication to the degree 
necessary. The Honourable Ian Armstrong, the then leader of The Nationals, re-iterated 
The Nationals’ storyline of stewardship arguing:
that governments have a responsibility to protect the flora and fauna that they 
own and control, just as private enterprise has similar responsibilities for the 
animals it manages’ to protect the flora and fauna it manages 
(Armstrong 2003 14 October: 3779).
Moreover, The Nationals argued that NSW Labor ‘did not consult properly with 
communities and the relevant parties in the rural sector’ (Cansdell 2005 13 October:
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18580) and this posed a real threat not just to farm families but to the State. In contrast, 
NSW Labor argued that:
The proof should be who actually delivers for rural New South Wales -  not 
just who talks the rhetoric in this place -  and that is Country Labor 
(Whan 2005 13 October: 18189).
The Shooters Party
In 1985, the election of the Shooters Party of NSW to the Legislative Council changed 
the political landscape of WDMC. It drew on a very diverse constituency. The Shooters 
Party further subverted the storyline of WDMC, to challenge the mandate of NSW 
Labor and, particularly, the authorial ‘voice’ of The Nationals on WDMC. With the 
assistance of other minor parties in the Legislative Council, the Shooters Party 
threatened to block the passage of Supply Bills unless NSW Labor agreed to support 
legislation which permitted hunting in National Parks.
The Shooters Party ‘forced’ the introduction of the Game Bill, using the balance of 
power that the minor parties held in the Legislative Council. The NSW Greens ‘were 
appalled’ by its introduction suggesting instead that it should be called ‘the Blood 
Sports Act’ (Jones 2002 27 June:3958, Rhiannon 2002 27 June: 3958). The Nationals in 
turn accused them of being ‘the worldwide wankers,’ who engaged in ‘frivolous 
hysterics,’ and queried why the: ‘national park estate land was excluded from the 
definition of public land’ (Gay 2002 27 June: 3958).
In turn, the NSW Greens argued:
The Carr Government is trying to out-National the National Party and thereby 
catch conservative rural voters. The Greens will be doing everything in their 
power to reach out to the rest of the community and explain to them what this 
Labor Government has done (Rhiannon 2002 27 June: 3958).
The Bill was later amended to the Game and Feral Animal Control Act 2002. This 
indicated the power the minor parties wielded in the Legislative Council; particularly 
the Shooters Party and the Outdoor Recreation Party. The Act established their
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parliamentary ‘voice.’ The Shooters Party consistently argued that it was a citizen’s 
right to bear arms and hunt invoking a Jeffersonian storyline. Feral animal control, of 
which WDMC was a part, had become the means.
This Bill, introduced by NSW Labor (Amery 2002 19 March: 3958) now became one in 
which recreational shooters were permitted, under licence to exercise their right to own 
guns, to shoot, to hunt prescribed feral animals and to gain access to previously 
unavailable NSW geographic locations -  notably public lands. This increasingly blurred 
the objectives of WDMC and the nuances of the storylines were further subverted in the 
Parliamentary Debates.
For example, the Honourable Robert Brown, the successor to the founder of the 
Shooters Party, the Honourable John Tingle, stated in his parliamentary maiden speech:
contemporary hunters, fishers, foresters and farmers are all interested in the 
conservation of biodiversity. They do not need city-based extremists to lecture 
them on stewardship. Perhaps they need someone to champion their collective 
conservation ethic, and the Shooters Party will be that champion (Brown 2005 
23 May: 26).
The Shooters Party, along with the other minor parties such as the NSW Greens, One 
Nation and The Outdoor Recreation Party, challenged the claim of The Nationals to 
speak on WDMC alone. It also argued that the NSW Labor Government was ‘city 
centric;’ that its results on feral animal control were bereft of logic. However, it tied the 
issue of WDMC to a conservation ‘ethic’ and to an interpretation of ‘stewardship’ 
outside of an agrarian discourse. While its constituency had some overlaps with the 
farming community it answered to a far broader one: recreational hunters.
In contrast, the NSW Greens and The Nationals expressed reservations about so-called 
‘weekend warriors,’ especially and particularly the possibility of pig hunters releasing 
pig dogs into the bush after a period of ‘weekend warfare’ (Gay 2002 27 June: 3958, 
Jones 2002 31 October: 6283, Cohen 2005, 6 May: 15869). The narrative within this 
storyline reveals the concern that these hunters would interfere with or be entirely 
ignorant of the control work already undertaken by the 47 RLPBs across NSW and that
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they would act with impunity, irrespective of any legal sanction that the Parliament may 
introduce.
Importantly it was suggested that these hunters may not act in humane ways -  a central 
narrative of the storyline of the NSW Greens. The Nationals were ultimately satisfied 
that the legislative sanctions already in place under the Firearms Act 1996 and the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (POCTAA,) would impinge sufficiently on the 
actions of hunters to prevent this occurrence and allowed the passage of the Bill.
The Shooters Party effectively held NSW Labor to ransom and the Game Council Act 
was passed through both Houses of Parliament. Again, during Premier Kristina 
Keneally’s Labor leadership between 2009 until 2011, the minority parties held the 
balance of power in the Legislative Council. The Shooters Party then threatened to 
introduce the Game and Feral Animal Control Amendment Bill forcing further 
amendments to the Act. The intention of this Act was to allow entry to licensed game 
hunters to hunt game animals in parts of the national park estate.
In contrast, the NSW Greens argued that the creation of the Game Council was for one 
reason only: to fund NSW Labor’s solution to feral animal control. However, in doing 
this, the NSW Greens claimed NSW Labor had failed:
The Minister says self-funding remains the Government's long-term goal. The 
motion is urgent because the council is struggling to stay afloat, and more and 
more public money is being poured into it with dubious benefits. The 
council's business and strategic plans should be in the public arena for the 
public to scrutinise and determine whether public money should continue to be 
spent on this organisation set up by the Labor Party to appease Shooters' Party 
(Hale 2009 8 September: 17536).
In Question Time the Honourable Lee Rhainnon (NSW Greens) went further:
Can the Minister explain why the Game Council's financial statements for the 
2005-06 annual reporting period are not available on its website? Will the 
Minister require that the missing information be included in this year's annual 
report; that council respond to significant issues raised by the Auditor-General in
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2008 as required by legislation; and that the missing information from prior 
years be published publicly in the interim? (Rhiannon 2009 8 September: 
17356).
The NSW Greens
The storylines of the NSW Greens were twofold. Firstly, it endorsed the need for feral 
animal control per se:
I concede that feral animals are a significant problem in New South Wales, and 
the Greens support humane methods to eradicate them (Cohen 2005, 6 May: 
15869).
Secondly, it placed caveats on the humane methods by which this was to be achieved 
(Cohen 2005, 6 May: 15869). Notably, the NSW Greens endorsed solutions to WDMC 
via the administrative rationalist model promulgated by the State.
The narrative of ‘humaneness’ was a central aspect of the storyline of the NSW Greens. 
However, this was not a storyline unique to the NSW Greens. The narrative of 
stewardship espoused by The Nationals was subverted. The NSW Greens positioned 
their narrative as one in which the environment was conceptualised differently to the 
way in which it was by NSW Labor and the Liberal/National Coalition -  without saying 
exactly how. It too claimed to represent the people of NSW for the ‘common good.’ In 
her maiden speech NSW Greens Senator, Lee Rhiannon stated:
The New South Wales Government must put people and their communities 
first. The common good needs to be central to all policies developed and all 
projects undertaken in this State (Rhiannon 1999 26 May: 445)
Nevertheless, the NSW Greens positioned themselves as the gatekeepers and the ‘true’ 
voice of a discourse of environmentalism upon which it claimed its members believed it 
held the mandate to speak. Notwithstanding this, in successive Parliaments, like the 
other minority parties in the NSW Parliament during this time, the NSW Greens were 
not well represented numerically.
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In 2004, a member of the NSW Greens was elected to the Legislative Assembly for the 
first time. At any time during successive NSW Labor Governments, their numbers did 
not increase beyond five members in the Legislative Council.
As such, the power of the NSW Greens was strategic: Firstly, in their role in securing 
preferences for NSW Labor in successive elections -  this gave the NSW Greens 
leverage; and secondly, as the champions of an environmental discourse however 
imprecise which had electoral utility and traction in inner city electorates. Hence the 
NSW Greens were also strategically useful to NSW Labor. Not surprisingly, over the 
period of NSW Labor Government the Liberal/National Coalition consistently accused 
NSW Labor of ‘trying to appease the Greens’ on issues not just limited to WDMC 
(Stoner 2002 21 November: 7380).
In conclusion, over the years of successive NSW Labor Governments WDMC was a 
matter of State. Each parliamentary party claimed the mandate to speak on behalf of 
farming families and to hold the authorial voice on WDMC. This contest was 
characterised by acrimony, distrust and cynicism in both Houses of the NSW 
Parliament.
NSW Labor Government framed the issue of WDMC within an administrative 
rationalist discourse. Propelled by perceived political opportunism, NSW Labor 
sublimated the issue of WDMC within a Country Labor storyline. This storyline in turn 
contributed to the overall framing of WDMC. Within the new empiricist frame, it was 
not only necessary to define and quantify the problem of WDMC, it was also imperative 
to control it. An analysis of the parliamentary speeches during this time spoke more of 
the discourse of the T  -  successive attempts by the State to control the meanings of 
WDMC.
Significantly, the State and farming families were no longer working in concert. 
Farming families were now rendered the object; not the T  of this discourse. The ‘local’ 
and the material reality of escalating wild dog predation and the meanings that farming 
families ascribed to WDMC were subsumed within the administrative rationalist 
discourse.
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However, perennial questions which challenged the legitimacy of successive NSW 
Labor Governments arose. This concerned the lack of transparency and accountability 
in the financial expenditures on WDMC. This issue came under increasing scrutiny. It is 
to this examination that I now turn in Chapter Three.
93
Chapter Four
‘Pulling the Wool Over Your Eyes:’ Transparency and Accountability in NSW
wild dog management and control
In Chapter Two, the parliamentary speeches revealed that during its time in Government 
from 1995 until 2011 NSW Labor represented its financial allocations to WDMC in 
storylines. These storylines pivoted around claims by successive NSW Labor 
Governments of the manifest care and concern it held for rural and regional people. The 
storylines of financial expenditures on WDMC in the NSW Parliament served as the 
tangible proof of this care and concern and was a dominant narrative within successive 
NSW Labor Government’s storylines on WDMC.
This Chapter compares these storylines against the financial expenditures on WDMC as 
reported in a survey of the Annual Reports, Financial Statements and allied Reports of 
six institutional actors charged with affecting WDMC on public lands over this period. 
This survey includes the Annual Reports and Financial Statements of: NSW NPWS and 
its successors; the Wild Dog Destruction Board; the Department of Agriculture and its 
successors; State Forests NSW and its successor; Game Council NSW; and, the State 
Council of the Rural Lands Protection Boards.
It draws on the Hansard of the NSW Parliament during this time as well as the 2002 
Report of the Inquiry of the General Standing Committee No. Five, Feral Animals, to 
provide the parliamentary context for this analysis. It also draws on the six Audit 
Reports emanating from the Audit Office of the NSW Auditor-General. These include: 
Performance audit report: Managing Natural and Cultural Heritage in Parks and 
Reserves National Parks and Wildlife Service (The Audit Office of New South Wales 
2004); Performance audit report: NSW Agriculture: managing animal disease 
emergencies (Audit Office of New South Wales 2002); Game Council of New South 
Wales Auditor-General's Report to Parliament, Financial Audit (Audit Office of New 
South Wales 2006); Game Council of New South Wales Auditor-General's Report to 
Parliament, Financial Audit (Audit Office of New South Wales 2006); Game Council of 
New South Wales Auditor-General's Report to Parliament, Financial Audit (Audit 
Office of New South Wales 2008); and, Department of Industry and Investment 
Auditor-General's Report to Parliament, Financial Audit (Audit Office of New South 
Wales 2010).
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Finally, the Chapter draws on relevant allied Reports. These include: the State of the 
Parks 2004 Report (Department of Environment and Conservation 2005); the State of 
the Parks 2009 Report (New South Wales Department of Environment Climate Change 
and Water 2009); the 2004 State of the Environment Report for the Australian Capital 
Region (The Office of the ACT Commissioner for the Environment 2004); and the 
McLeod Report: Counting the Costs: Impact of Invasive Animals in Australia (McLeod 
2004).
This Chapter has not been selective. It has examined the Reports publicly available. 
This systematic analysis reflects what little information is available. It is apparent that 
there was a lack of transparency and accountability in the public reporting of financial 
expenditures on WDMC over time. Moreover, it appears that the allocation of financial 
expenditures appears ad hoc, if not, chaotic. There appears to be no financial 
coordination between the Departments and Agencies over expenditures on WDMC. 
There is no delineation in these Reports between monies directed specifically to 
WDMC work and monies directed specifically to the conservation of the dingo. It is 
also apparent that the administrative costs were disproportionate to the cost of 
operational ‘on ground’ work and that these administrative costs appeared to subsume a 
great deal of any allocations.
Nonetheless, these Annual Reports, Financial Statements and allied Reports had utility 
in the contributions they made to the dominant discourse. The Reports were used to 
authenticate NSW Labor’s public commitment to farming families and acted as a 
legitimising power to the overall discursive turn in WDMC. In this sense, these Reports 
can be understood not as ‘fact’ but rather as rational instruments of the State which 
contributed to the process o f ‘fact building’ within a specific discourse. Collectively, the 
minutia of these Reports privileged the social construction of ‘expertise’ and reified the 
administrative ‘hand.’ Over time, these Reports reveal more about the production of 
‘knowledge’ and the consolidation of taken-for-granted assumptions, the networks, and, 
relations of power inherent in the dominant discourse than they do about financial 
expenditures on WDMC in real terms across NSW.
Additionally, while the Audit Reports of the NSW Auditor General temper the 
storylines of NSW Labor by pointing increasingly to disparities between the dominant 
storylines of NSW Labor on WDMC and the material reality of WDMC as reported, 
these observations did not prove sufficient to challenge the power of the administrative
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rationalist discourse. Rather, the Audit Reports can be seen as instruments (see 
Gendron, Cooper et al. 2007:102) contributing to the re-embedding of WDMC within 
the overarching administrative rationalist discourse.
This Chapter presents the findings of this empirical research in two parts. Part One 
examines the Annual Reports and Financial Reports of NSW NPWS. Part Two 
examines the Annual Reports and Financial Statements of State Council of the RLPB; 
State Forests; Game Council NSW; the Wild Dog Destruction Board; and NSW DPI. 
Allied Reports and the Reports of the Auditor General of NSW are integrated 
throughout the Chapter. Part III analyses the findings of this empirical research.
Part I - ‘Show me the Money’
NSW NPWS Annual Reports and Financial Statements
In 2004 Bob Debus (Minister for the Environment -  Labor) announced in the NSW 
Parliament:
This financial year alone, National Parks will spend $17 million across NSW 
on feral animal and weed control. This is a record amount. From 1991 to 1995 
the Coalition allocated a mere $4.2 million for pest management in 
national park’s around $1 million a year, over four years. In other words, the 
Carr Government is spending seventeen times more than the Coalition ever 
did (Debus 2004 11 March: 7169).
In 2005 Minister Bob Debus again attested to NSW Labor’s largesse. This time he 
claimed the figure was $18 million (Debus 2005 12 October: 18474). By 2011 the 
figure had declined to $15 million.
The reporting - or lack thereof -  of financial expenditures within the Annual Reports of 
NSW NPWS and the lack of detail in the Financial Reports over the period of NSW 
Labor Government makes storylines of financial expenditures on WDMC difficult to 
substantiate; if not impossible using documents available in the public domain.
In the immediate period preceding NSW Labor government in 1991-92 and 1992-93 
there is no mention within the Annual Reports of NSW NPWS of expenditure on 
WDMC. The NSW NPWS Annual Report 1994-95 reported simply that ‘seventy
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percent of the recurrent expenditure provided has been used to employ private 
contractors’ (NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 1994-95:32).
Nor is it possible to substantiate the later suggestion by NSW NPWS that no funds were 
allocated to WDMC in the Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys in the period 1995-96 
(Department of Environment and Conservation 2006:28); there is simply insufficient 
information provided in the Reports and Financial Statements of NSW NPWS during 
this time.
Notwithstanding this, the outsourcing of work to private contractors and the 
commercial-in-confidence nature of these contractual arrangements raises reasonable 
questions regarding the degree of public sector accountability and transparency 
generally in the processes of feral animal and weeds control, and, WDMC specifically. 
Instead, the Annual Reports and Financial Statements point to the degree to which these 
arrangements can be ‘abused for political ends’ (Jacobs 2009:1280) and can be vehicles 
of ‘rhetoric.’ Overall, there is no publicly available audit of this outsourcing process for 
contractual work or a public listing of the locations of WDMC work completed against 
costs in real terms in any of the Annual Reports and Financial Statements over the 
period of Labor Government in NSW. As a consequence Minister Debus’ 2004 claim of 
expenditures ‘...seventeen times more than the Coalition...’ cannot be substantiated 
against the Annual Reports and Financial Statements of that time.
Nevertheless, in 1996-97, the NSW NPWS Annual Report claimed that NSW NPWS 
had undertaken ‘...over 400 programs, aimed at minimising the impacts of pest 
animals’ (NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 1997:34). The number of programs 
reported increased exponentially to 1,500 over the period of NSW Labor Government. 
This may well have been true. However, during this time, in successive Annual Reports 
the reporting of the locations and the programs undertaken is generalised. In lieu of this 
reporting, the use of strategic case studies within these Reports is selective and 
widespread. They are held within these Annual Reports to be representative of 
widespread success in pest animal, WDMC and weeds control across NSW.
The utility of the NSW NPWS Annual Reports therefore as instruments of an 
administrative rationalist discourse lies in the way they frame the ‘problem’ of WDMC. 
This specific framing is used to perpetuate storylines of success through the
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construction of the ‘social facts’ of both the implementation of WDMC and the 
consultation process with stakeholders.
In this way, the NSW NPWS Annual Reports and Financial Statements over the period 
of the NSW Labor Government acted as a corroborating ‘authority’ providing 
legitimacy for the parliamentary claims of NSW Labor. They were mutually 
reinforcing. The empirical evidence provided in the Annual Reports and Financial 
Statements in support of these claims however is problematic as the substantive ‘proof 
proffered is neither transparent nor coherent. This next section examines in turn this 
substantive ‘proof.’
‘Major works -  pest weed and animal management’
In 2000-2001, the NSW NPWS Annual Report stated under ‘2000-2001 major works’ 
that $4,587,000 was spent on ‘pest species management’ (NSW National Parks and 
Wildlife Service 2001:145). No detail of the locations of the feral animal control work 
or public accounting of the expenditures in real terms is provided.
In 2001-2002, the NSW NPWS Annual Report also revealed an expenditure of 
$4,964,000 under the heading ‘major works,’ ‘pest species management’. Notably, this 
figure appears to contradict the figure of $2.5 million reported by NSW NPWS to the 
Feral Animals Inquiry (General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 2002). [See further 
discussion in this Chapter]
However, in 2002-2004 (stet), the Annual Report included the following caveat:
DEC prioritises its pest control programs to focus on parks and reserves where 
the impact of pests are likely to be greatest’ (Department of Environment and 
Conservation 2004:145).
However, the geographic locations where the impacts were likely to be greatest were 
not provided.
Importantly, from 2004, the reporting of pest eradication in the Annual Reports is linked 
directly to biodiversity conservation values and programs dealing with Regional Pest 
Management Strategies (Department of Environment and Climate Change NSW 2007), 
and Threat Abatement Plans (TAPs) in line with the legal provisions of the Threatened 
Species Conservation Act 1995 (TSCA).
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The NSW Office of Environment and Heritage defines Threat Abatement Plans (TAPs)
as:
a statutory document prepared and approved in accordance with Part 5 of the 
TSC Act, and Ministers and public authorities are required to take any 
appropriate action available to them to implement the measures in the plan. A 
threat abatement plan:
• outlines actions to manage the threatening process
• explains how the success of these actions will be measured
• identifies the authorities that will be responsible for carrying out those actions, 
gives a cost estimate and timetable, if possible, for carrying out the plan
(New South Wales Office of Environment and Heritage 2011: np).
On the other hand, the purpose of a Regional Pest Management Strategy (RPMS):
provides NPWS with a strategic approach to pest management across NSW. 
The Strategy developed for each region provides a tool to broadly identify pest 
distribution and their associated impacts across the park system. It details 
priorities for each Region, including actions listed in the PAS and TAPs as 
well as other actions such as wild dog and feral pig control to protect 
neighbouring properties and site-based weed control and allows resources to 
be allocated to high priority programs. The RPMS also identifies the 
requirement for other plans or strategies, such as Wild Dog Plans or Bush 
Regeneration Plans, that provide a more detailed approach 
(Department of Environment and Climate Change NSW 2007:7).
However, the efficacy of TAPs was widely questioned.
In 2004, in its submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Inquiry, the Managing Director of Animal Control 
Technologies and Applied Biotechnologies Group wrote:
It is a plain reality that the pest animals of Australia are neither constrained by 
geographical boundaries of land tenure nor by bureaucracy. They focus only on 
eating and breeding while the rest of us throw harmless policy statements in
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their general direction. A betting man would rather place his money of (sic) the 
terrorist fox, feral pig or innocuous female mouse with a litter of 10, than on a 
threat abatement plan backed with policy documentation, regulations, 
enforcement and surveys. It is a war zone in Australia and there needs to be a 
more systematic approach to supporting effector actions (Animal Control 
Technologies and Applied Biotechnologies Group 2004 August: 5).
Likewise, a small survey of a sample of four Regional Pest Management Strategies 
across NSW from 2007-2012 did not provide information pertaining to financial 
expenditures (Department of Environment and Climate Change 2007, Department of 
Environment and Climate Change NSW 2007, Department of Environment and Climate 
Change NSW 2007, Department of Environment and Climate Change NSW 2007).
It is clear that the capacity to report publicly on financial expenditures on WDMC is 
possible. The Annual Reports and Financial Statements alone could reasonably be seen 
as the appropriate place and certainly provided an opportunity annually to provide 
financial information from Regional Pest Management Strategies across NSW. The 
necessity to report through an Annual Report and accompanying Financial Statements 
was a statutory obligation. The introduction of the RPMS and accompanying TAPs too 
also offered the opportunity - but this was not done.
Instead publications emanating from NSW NPWS and its successors are profuse in 
scientific data but are severely deficient in the reporting of precise or even meaningful 
financial expenditures. It is difficult to conclude that this is other than obfuscation.
In 2003, the Department was renamed the Department of Environment and 
Conservation (NSW).
In 2004-05 the Annual Report stated:
Management of pest animals and weeds is a high priority for DEC and 
expenditure on their control reached a record $18 million in 2004-2005. The 
State of the Parks 2004 showed that our pest animal and weed control 
programs were either effectively holding the line or reducing pest animal and 
weed impacts in more than 90 per cent of our parks
(Department of Environment and Conservation 2005:54).
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This figure of $18 million represents the zenith of claims of spending by NSW Labor.
However, several anomalies in the reporting of this figure are immediately apparent. Of 
note, the Financial Statements of 2004-2005 report under: ‘2004-2005 Major works’ 
that the cost to date of: ‘pest weed and animal control’ across NSW amounted to 
$612,000 (Department of Environment and Conservation 2005:107).
In the following year, in 2005-06, the Financial Statements reported under the heading 
‘pest weed and animal control’ that the cost to date was $927,000 (Department of 
Environment and Conservation 2006:125).
However, from 2005, NSW NPWS Annual Reports reported against new performance 
indicators. The entry: ‘Pest weed and animal control’ was now subsumed within the 
performance indicator of: ‘conservation management.’
‘Conservation management’ is directly linked to the objective of the Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1995. This is reflective of the discursive shift in WDMC. The purpose 
of the Act broadly is: ‘to conserve threatened species, populations and ecological 
communities of animals and plants, ‘native’ species that need protection.’ Dingoes are 
defined as ‘native’ species under this Act and are to be conserved. While some scientific 
studies explicitly promote the hypothesis that wild dog predation on other invasive 
species has functional utility in protecting native species (Corbett and Newsome 1987) 
this is not prescribed under the Act nor commented on in the Annual Report.
In 2006, the Department of Environment and Conservation was renamed the 
Department of Environment and Climate Change under the direction of two new Labor 
Government Ministers, The Honourables Phil Koperberg and Verity Firth. The 2006- 
2007 Financial Statements, reported under: ‘pest weed and animal control’ that the total 
cost to date was $1,273,000.
From 2008, it is not possible to identify financial expenditures on: ‘pest animal and 
weed control’ as the entry listing: ‘Major works’ or ‘pest animals and weed control’ no 
longer appears.
Of note, the Annual Report claims that:
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DECC’s State of the Parks has been recognised internationally through the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature using the 2004 report as a 
best practice case study in a publication released in 2007
(Department of Environment and Climate Change 2007:85).
However, despite this accolade, there appears to be significant omissions in the State of 
the Parks Report in the public reporting of financial expenditures on pest control and 
weeds. Without this information it is difficult to see how the legitimacy of this claim 
could be substantiated.
NSW State of the Environment Reports
The purpose of the NSW State of the Environment Reports is:
to provide credible, scientifically based, statewide environmental information 
to assist those involved in environmental policy- and decision-making and 
managing the state's natural resources
(Department of Environment and Climate Change 2009).
A survey of the 2004 NSW State of the Environment Report reveals no detail of 
financial expenditures on which to make those ‘management’ decisions. The Report 
stated that the overall intention of NSW NPWS at this time was:
To apply cost-effective methods that will have minimal negative impacts on 
the environment and in the case of pest animals provide humane control 
options (Department of Environment and Conservation 2004:45).
Yet, across the 2004 NSW State of the Environment Report, pest animals were 
identified as: ‘...a significant issue in 500 parks (78 per cent)” (Department of 
Environment and Conservation 2005 p.47). Weeds and pest animals were framed within 
successive reports as a problem that :‘... is growing daily with severe economic and 
environmental impacts (Department of Environment and Conservation 2004:43).
In 2009, the NSW State of the Environment Report stated:
Although SoE 9 (stet) 2009 has been prepared by the Department of 
Environment, Climate Change and Water (DECCW), much of its content is the
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result of extensive input by a wide range of state and local government agencies, 
other organisations and individual specialists, who provided data, information, 
analysis and interpretation, and reviewed the assembled content of the report. 
DECCW relies heavily on receiving such support from contributing agencies 
(Department of Environment and Climate Change 2009).
The Disclaimer to this Report states:
DECCW does not accept responsibility for any inaccurate or incomplete 
information in the report supplied by third parties. No representation is made 
about the accuracy, completeness or suitability for any particular purpose of the 
source material included in this report (New South Wales Department of 
Environment Climate Change and Water 2009).
The McLeod Report: Counting the Cost: Impact of Invasive Animals in Australia 
2004
From 2004, successive NSW Annual Reports and NSW State of the Environment 
Reports cited the figures provided in the McLeod Report (2004) as representative of the 
indicative costs of WDMC (McLeod 2004). However, an analysis of the empirical data 
on which the McLeod Report (2004) drew is revealing.
McLeod (2004) predicated his findings of economic costs based on ‘guesstimates’ 
supplied by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and 
Sciences (ABARES) and NSW government scientific studies from which McLeod then 
made estimates. The Report did not factor in the ‘hidden costs’ or ‘costs foregone’ as a 
result of wild dog predation on agricultural stock. The cost of wild dog predation on 
goats was not factored. The estimates were based on the replacement cost only of sheep 
and calves based on fixed market price of $30 and $540 respectively. It did not 
differentiate between say, ‘wethers,’ ‘fat lambs’ ‘super fine merinos,’ or ‘stud’ merinos. 
Future earning capacity, reductions in wool quality, sheep weight, saleyard price, effects 
on the existing health of remaining flocks and mobs, mismothering of lambs, fencing, 
trapping, baiting, management and change over costs, for example, were not factored in.
In particular, the social and environmental costs were not quantified. Leaving McLeod’s 
notion of the ‘performance’ of wild dogs to one side, there was no triple bottom line
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reporting. As Fitzgerald and Wilkinson (2009) subsequently argued, McLeod’s 
approach - that losses are quantifiable - was also problematic because:
Not everything that counts can be counted in a meaningful way, and where 
something can be counted it cannot necessarily be converted to one agreed 
standard measure such as dollar values (Fitzgerald and Wilkinson 2009: 3)
Social costs were vague. These were described only in the most general of terms: the 
potential threat wild dogs posed to public health, the trade in dingo scalps, the threat of 
dingo attacks on tourists, and, the iconic place of the dingo in the Australian 
imagination. Moreover, the environmental costs appear predicated on ‘taken for 
granted’ ecological assumptions regarding the function of wild dogs in an ecosystem.
Yet, the findings of this Report and the quantum of the problem of ‘invasive species’ 
are reified and repeated across all NSW Annual Reports, and appear on NSW DPI, 
NSW NPWS, and DAFF websites as indicative of the ‘triple bottom line’ costs of 
WDMC. Yet, clearly the McLeod Report did not report on the ‘triple bottom line.’
The McLeod Report concedes that the information was far from complete and that the 
empirical data was based on guesstimates. Nevertheless the Report concludes:
Around $16.5 million per year is spent by the public sector on extensive wild 
dog population management programs, including $10 million building and 
maintaining barrier fencing. A further $1.5 million dollars is invested in 
research (McLeod 2004: 40).
There is no empirical data provided to support these claims. The Disclaimer in the 
Preface that: ‘it is not exhaustive...it is conservative...it is transparent’ and that: ‘All 
methodology is included in the report to enable others to build on it or too argue 
whether an impact is under or overstated’ (McLeod 2004:Forward, np) is obfuscation. It 
is apparent that the author just simply did not know.
The logic of the Report that ‘...the report therefore provides us with a springboard for 
looking at investments into invasive animal management’ (McLeod 2004: Forward, np) 
is inherently circular. The comments appear self-serving and prefaced on the
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assumption these investments should be properly directed to the IACRC as the lead 
‘scientific authority’ on invasive species.
Overall, McLeod (2004) estimated conservatively in a ‘desk top’ review, using a ‘triple 
bottom line’ approach, that wild dogs in Australia cause financial losses of $66 million 
nationally to agricultural production per annum (McLeod 2004). However, this figure 
has been repeatedly repudiated by other studies (Kenny 2008). For example, Kenny 
(2008) found:
It was conservatively estimated that wild dogs cost Queensland $33 million 
through lost production, disease and the cost of control (Rural Management 
Partners, 2003). In the five years since that report the Queensland sheep flock 
has continued to decline from an estimated 4.3 million to less than four million 
(DPI&F website). As stated, AgForce Queensland reported a further decline of 
400,000 sheep between 2007 and 2008 amongst its membership, resulting in one 
hundred less properties running sheep in Queensland. However, the presence of 
wild dogs has additional impacts on the livestock industry such as less wool 
growth and weight gain in livestock (including cattle) due to stress and the 
reduction in market prices as a result of the downgrading of carcasses exhibiting 
dog bites (Kenny 2008: np).
In 2009, AgForce, on one indicator alone, estimated the major economic costs 
associated with wild dogs in the Queensland grazing industry at $67,016,575. Agforce 
found that:
The social costs, opportunity losses associated with lost or damaged stock and 
in-kind contributions of producers toward wild dog management were not 
encapsulated by the study, and it is expected that these factors would have a 
substantial upwards impact on the total economic cost of wild dogs (Agforce 
Queensland 2009: ii).
The 2004 State of the Environment for the Australian Capital Region Report
The 2004 State of the Environment for the Australian Capital Region Report - a 
complementary report to the NSW State of the Environment Reports - was prepared 
consistent with state of the environment reporting requirements of the ACT
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Commissioner for the Environment Act 1993 and the NSW Local Government Act 
1993. Its purpose was to report on areas within NSW which encompassed the ACT 
Region. The Report was compiled using Local Government Shire (LGS) areas. These 
reporting areas were not commensurate with the reporting and geographical areas of the 
then 48 RLPBs. An analysis of a small sample of the information contained within this 
Report -  the South East indicates that the information was far from complete. [See 
Table 4:1 over]
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Table 4:1 2004 State of the Environment Report for the Australian Capital Region
-  ‘South East’*
Shire Council 
2004






Bega No information available Yes
Cooma Monaro No information available Yes
Bombala 179,236 Yes RLPB rates
Boorowa No information available
Other pests'
$5,600 RLPB rates
Cootamundra Nil Not identified
Gundagai No information available Yes
Eurobodalla No information available Yes
Goulburn
Mulwaree No information available Yes




* 27,500 Yes RLPB rates
Queanbeyan No information available Yes See Note 1




Tallaganda No information available
No information
available




Upper Lachlan No information available Yes
(* Information provided only for Queanbeyan City Council)
*Source: Compiled from information in the State of the Environment Report for the
Australian Capital Region 2004
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A large part of the information appears to have been supplied by DPI and pertains to 
scientific studies compiled by DPI. It is unclear if the RLPBs were consulted in the 
compilation of this report. Of note, consistently used statements throughout this report 
that: ‘...No data were provided by the RLPB for this report...’ and, specifically, that: 
‘...no information was available regarding South Coast RLPB expenditure on pest 
animal control within Bega Valley Shire for the current reporting period’ (The Office of 
the ACT Commissioner for the Environment 2004) are misleading.
For example, Tumut, Harden and Cootamundra defined as geographic areas within 
South East NSW, were not part of the then South East RLPB region. This region differs 
from the South East reporting area of the Local Government Shires. Likewise, the 
Southern Rivers Catchment Management Area (SRCMA) boundary differs again and 
does not encompass the entire RLPB reporting area.
In 2008, the Department of Environment and Climate Change Annual Report under the 
helm of newly appointed Minister, the Honourable Carmel Tebbutt, reported that 
reducing the impact of invasive species was now one of 12 state-wide targets for natural 
resource management under the statewide plan. WDMC now was considered under the 
heading of ‘natural resource management.’ It defined its key objective in this regard as 
being: ‘prioritising management programs to areas where benefits are greatest’ 
(Department of Environment and Climate Change 2008:75).
In 2009, the Department of Environment and Climate Change Annual Report under the 
helm of newly appointed Minister, the Honourable John Robertson - the third Minister 
in just over 12 months - claimed under the heading ‘wild dog control’ that:
Controlling wild dogs has continued to be a major priority for park managers 
during the year. Control is guided in most cases through local wild dog 
management plans which are developed in consultation with other public land 
managers, livestock health and pest authorities and wild dog associations. The 
plans identify where dogs are causing a problem and where control 
programs need to be undertaken, independent of tenure’
(Department of Environment and Climate Change 2009:81).
Overall, the claims in the Annual Reports of NSW NPWS regarding the largesse of the 
NSW Labor Government on expenditure on WDMC and the success of the Brindabella
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Plan as the benchmark model for all NSW were widely disseminated through the 
Annual Reports as ‘taken-for-granted’ ‘facts.’ Yet, it is not possible to corroborate the 
‘taken-for-granted’ ‘facts’ against the information provided in the Annual Reports and 
Financial Statements of NSW NPWS. Nevertheless, they contribute to the overall 
discourse of WDMC because as Gendron (2007) points out: ‘Claims are understood to 
be widely accepted and taken-for-granted when they are supported by stable and solid 
networks’ (Gendron, Cooper et al. 2007:105).
A Report on the Management of Feral Animals by the New South Wales National 
Parks and Wildlife Service.
In juxtaposition, in 2001, NSW NPWS commissioned a report at the instruction of the 
NSW Labor Government. It contained specific Terms of Reference following the 
national public outcry against the NSW NPWS authorised culling of wild horses in the 
Guy Fawkes National Park and the subsequent NSW Supreme Court case led by the 
RSPCA against NSW NPWS for alleged cruelty (Bumswoods 2002 5 September: 4669, 
Tingle 2005 14 September: 17649).
This Report found that the 2001-2002 NSW NPWS budget for operational programs by 
feral animal species, which listed ‘wild dogs’ separately -  dingos were included - 
amounted to $793,000 (English and Chappie 2002). This was reported as the total NSW 
NPWS operational budget for WDMC for a public land mass of 5,419,343 hectares 
(State of New South Wales 2001-2002). There is no further breakdown of this figure. 
[See Table 4:2 over page]
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Table 4:2
NSW NPWS Operational Budget for Wild Dog Control*
*Source: Figures Compiled from NSW Hansard and (English and Chappie 2002)
(Note: Figure 2001-2002 includes $345,000 for the development of WDMC plans)
This figure is salutary for a number of reasons and three in particular: First, the 2001-02 
figure of $793,000 represented a 58 per cent increase in the WDMC budget on the 
previous year. In 2001-2002 an additional $345,000 was given to the NSW NPWS to 
develop and implement WDMC plans. (Tebbutt 2001 20 September: 20028). Second, it 
appears that the ‘actual’ total NSW NPWS operational budget for WDMC in 2000-2001 
was $448,000 across 5,419, 343 hectares of NSW public land. Third, in light of the 
publicly declared task at hand across the landscapes within NSW NPWS control at this 
time -  both by NSW NPWS and NSW Labor -  these amounts appear insufficient.
The Report recommended that:
Critical decisions must also be made on the use of resources for reactive, tactical 
activities as opposed to long-term, strategic preventative measures. There is no 
better example of this than with the control of wild dogs, and there will always 
be this requirement to balance tactical with strategic activities, in seeking the 
most cost-effective outcomes (English and Chappie 2002:56).
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This framing of ‘critical decisions’ is problematic. In the first instance, it positions the 
State’s contributions as unilateral. It pays little regard to the financial contribution of 
farm families to WDMC on public lands which continues to date. Overwhelmingly, the 
narrative of this storyline does not factor the financial and in kind contributions made 
previously by farm families to WDMC work on public lands; work completed 
voluntarily by farm families prior to their exclusion across this landscape. This 
contribution is subject to erasure or framed as a storyline of ‘blame.’ It ignores what by 
this point was increasingly reported in the Hansard - the social and economic impacts 
on farm families of wild dog predation on agricultural stock were acute.
In contrast, the Report posits a number of economic scenarios as ‘interesting’ arguments 
to consider (English and Chappie 2002:63). The Report cites two principles: ‘the 
polluter pays principle’ and ‘the beneficiary pays principle’ through which farmers 
could become involved in cost sharing arrangements for feral animal control on public 
lands. These principles draw on suggestions made in the Sharing for Biodiversity 
Conservation: A Conceptual Framework, Productivity Commission Staff Research 
Paper wherein it states:
In 1972, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
adopted the polluter pays principle, which requires individuals to meet the full 
costs of their actions, requiring them to bear the costs of implementing pollution 
prevention and control measures necessary to maintain the environment in an 
acceptable state... The beneficiary pays principle (also known as the victim pays 
principle) requires anyone who benefits from an activity to contribute to the 
costs of undertaking it’ (Australian Government Productivity Commission 2001: 
Appendix D: 81)
It couches these scenarios in terms of the concept of ‘additionality.’ These scenarios 
attribute land degradation and biodiversity loss to the historical actions of farmers and 
the rise in feral animals as a direct result therefore they should pay commensurate with 
the derived benefit they received over time. This is ‘wool gathering’ at best and 
demonstrates an ignorance of the socio-political context in which agri business is 
situated.
While each economic scenario is speculative -  and highly inflammatory in the socio­
political context of WDMC -  the Report overlooks the inherent flaws in these models.
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Firstly, farm families already contributed through annual rates levied by the RLPB 
system to pests and weeds control on private lands.
Secondly, while the Report suggest that the socio-political context must be considered 
in any feral animal control program (English and Chappie 2002:3) the models do not 
recognises this. Each model relies entirely on quantitative measurement, all ‘things’ 
being equal, explicitly posits the erroneous assumption that all ‘things’ can be measured 
and factors out differentials in relations of power. Farmers are framed as only ‘profit 
maximisers’ who act only in their own selfish interests thereby denying a space for their 
concerns over the environment. This is a simplistic representation.
Thirdly, each model negates the overarching influence of: ‘party politics or the 
constitutional conventions of ministerial and collective responsibility’ (Rhodes and 
Wanna 2007:206). It positions public land managers as the unelected ‘new Platonic 
guardians and arbiters of public interest’ (Rhodes and Wanna 2007: 406). As Rhodes 
and Wanna write there is inherent risk in this as in each model unelected public land 
managers: ‘...are charged with imagining value and defending their notions of the 
‘public good’ against other conceptions’ (Rhodes and Wanna 2007:412). As Rhodes 
and Wanna (2007) argue this is a power within the Westminster system of government 
public officials should not have.
Nevertheless, viewed in this light, NSW NPWS are active agents in the performance of 
knowledge, its production and dissemination through storylines that contribute to and 
reinforce the overall framing of the discourse of administrative rationalism as positive 
and in the public interest. [For further discussion on ‘public interest’ see Rhodes & 
Wanna (2007)].
Lastly, while the Report places land degradation and biodiversity loss squarely at the 
feet of farmers it excises the historical role of the State and its agents in actively 
encouraging farm families in activities which contributed to these effects. This is a 
revisionist view of history in so far as European ecological knowledge of the Australian 
environment at that time was limited. The Report nevertheless positions farmers instead 
simply as functionaries whose knowledge of feral animals must be harnessed for the 
‘common good’ of the environment. Farm families in this paradigm lack both agency 
and identity.
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Notwithstanding these concerns, - and as the Report acknowledged - the financial 
capacity of NSW NPWS to fulfil its commitment to WDMC as part of being a ‘good 
neighbour’ was already additionally compromised in the public sphere:
Given the current and historical antipathy toward, and lack of trust in, the 
NPWS, community involvement in the Services programs plus 
communication and information dissemination should be of high priority 
(English and Chappie 2002: 67).
The utility of the Report is that it reveals the network of institutional actors charged by 
the NSW Labor Government to produce and disseminate ‘knowledge.’ The Report 
found that:
Most of the NPWS policies are directly translated from other agencies, such as 
NSW Agriculture. More recent policies are derived from biodiversity 
conservation legislation and strategies (English and Chappie 2002: 69).
Additionally, the Report cites Policy 2.6 of the NSW NPWS Field Management 
Policies:
Policy 2.6 Wild Dogs acknowledges the complexities inherent in the need to 
conserve native dingoes (and their hybrids), together with the need to control 
wild dogs. Baiting programs may only be undertaken on Service estate where 
there is adequate evidence of wild dogs coming from Service estate and 
killing or maiming stock (English and Chappie 2002:81).
The notion of ‘adequate’ pivoted on both an empiricist understanding o f ‘facts’ and the 
degree of subjective judgment that the word imputes.
The implicit assumption of the Report nevertheless remains: NSW NPWS was best 
positioned to be the adjudicator of social values and norms and the arbiter of the most 
cost effective outcomes. This was based on a discourse -  vaguely expressed -  as 
environmentalism. This reasoning appears predicated on the acceptance of a scientific 
framing of the ‘problem’ - however inadequate and incomplete - and the privileging of 
an increased bureaucratic control of WDMC.
The Report in turn suggests strongly that NSW NPWS: ‘has been much maligned’ 
(English and Chappie 2002: 63) and decries the influencing o f ‘politics’ on resourcing.
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It does not countenance the idea that NSW NPWS and its successors are political actors 
within the socio-political context of WDMC or that it may exercise power in 
furtherance of its own interests or that as a government department NSW NPWS is 
beholden to the Government of the Day.
A Point of Comparison: NSW NPWS Annual Report 2002-2004 and the NSW 
Parliament General Standing Committee No. 5, Feral Animals Inquiry
In 2001, NSW NPWS reported to the NSW Parliament General Standing Committee No 
5, Feral Animals Inquiry, that in 2001-02 the NSW NPWS pest budget was $15,738 
million, with over $2.5 million ‘expected’ to be spent on ‘on-ground’ feral animal 
programs (General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 2002).
A close examination reveals that these figures did not include financial expenditures 
allocated to scientific research and development, assets, capital items and salaries 
separate from the cost of feral animal control completed on the ground in real terms. 
They also included total ‘intended’ not ‘real’ expenditures.
Specifically, the Inquiry found that contracts for WDMC work across individual 
Departments and Agencies were often fulfilled by outside contractors in partnership 
with individual Rural Lands Protection Boards. These were commercial-in-confidence 
contracts. For example, dog trappers were employed by Departments and Agencies on 
short term contracts not necessarily specific to WDMC work. The picture of ‘who paid 
what’, ‘how much’ and ‘for what’ cannot be discerned.
Nevertheless, the 2002-2004 [stet] NSW NPWS Annual Report reported that:
DEC spent approximately $5.5 million ($17 million including pest control- 
related salaries and assets) on around 1500 weed and pest animal control 
programs across NSW. Reports on many of these are available on the DEC 
website or from DEC offices (Department of Environment and Conservation 
2004).
This claim of financial expenditures on pest animal control programs is again difficult 
to substantiate. A search of the DEC website for further details -  as recommended in the 
2002-2004 Annual Report - reveals that it did not report on ‘many’ programs or provide 
financial detail. Nevertheless, the Report states that:
114
Last year NPWS alone spent almost $17 million on pest animal and weed 
management. This constitutes a 1700 per cent increase in the level of funding 
over the past 10 years, within the park system alone (Department of 
Environment and Conservation 2005:44).
Together these two claims corroborate NSW Labor’s storylines of expenditures on 
WDMC but there is insufficient detail provided in the Annual Reports and Financial 
Statements to discern the detail of financial expenditures on WDMC in real terms.
Protecting Our National Parks from Pests and Weeds
This report recommends in turn a further report -  Protecting Our National Parks from 
Pests and Weeds (Department of Environment and Conservation 2006) for further 
detail. This report states:
As part of the lemma Government’s 2006-2007 budgets, a record $18million 
will be spent to run pest control programs and develop new initiatives’ 
(Department of Environment and Conservation 2006:35).
A close analysis of this Report reveals that the total: ‘estimated statewide NSW 
expenditure’ on ‘wild dogs’ was $1.5 million(Department of Environment and 
Conservation 2006: 35). Of note, this reported funding was intended not for the 
eradication of wild dogs but rather: ‘for a range of works at priority sites including 
cooperative control, fencing, trials of new innovations, public education.’
The Report reveals that the total: ‘estimated statewide NPWS expenditure on weed and 
pest animal control in 2006-2007 and some indicative programs’ was reported as $7.3 
million. The Report also revealed that: ‘Labour and other costs directly associated with 
carrying out pest animal and weed control programs’ amounted to $10.7 million 
(Department of Environment and Conservation 2006:35). In order to spend $7.3 million 
on programs it appears that some $10.7 million was spent.
The financial allocations within the $7.3 million, for ‘cooperative control;’ ‘trials of 
new innovations;’ the detail of the ‘innovations,’ the geographic locations, the nature or 
purpose of the ‘public education’ are not specified. Importantly these reported total 
expenditures cannot be corroborated against the Annual Report and Financial 
Statements.
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In contrast, many farm families expressed the view that the expansion of the National 
Estate was lacking the necessary infrastructure. The Country Women’s Association 
(CWA) (2004) wrote:
The cost of a National Park is a lot greater and more ongoing than seems to be 
considered by Government when they announce the acquisitions of more land to 
be set aside as national Parks. These announcements are sure-fire vote winners, 
and maps issued showing the percentage of a state given aside to national parks 
are certainly impressive. The question is, can Governments afford to operate 
these vast areas in a (sic) ecologically sound and sustainable manner? (Country 
Women's Association of New South Wales 2004 12 May: 2).
The Audit Office of New South Wales
In 2004, the Audit Office of New South Wales conducted a Performance Audit of NSW 
NPWS in Managing Natural and Cultural Heritage in Parks and Reserves. The Auditor- 
General concluded that: ‘The Service has yet to clarify what constitutes success in 
reserve management’ or to: ‘develop an adequate information base to measure its 
success’ (The Audit Office of New South Wales 2004:2). The Auditor-General found 
that:
The law requires each reserve to have a Plan of Management. Less than one 
third of reserves have such a plan. Some areas have been without a plan for 
many years, and many that now have them were without a plan for a long time. 
The Service’s annual budget per hectare has roughly doubled in real terms since 
1991-92. It is not possible to determine whether this is sufficient because the 
Service cannot reliably demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness (The Audit 
Office of New South Wales 2004: 5).
The Audit Office Report also concluded that reporting by the Service did not provide: ‘a 
basis for improving management performance and demonstrating accountability’ (The 
Audit Office of New South Wales 2004:48).
Part II -  Other Institutional Actors 
State Council of the Rural Lands Protection Boards Annual Reports
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This overall lack of financial detail is replicated in the financial information supplied by 
the State Council of the Rural Lands Protection Boards to the Feral Animal Inquiry. In 
later correspondence the State Council of the LHPA, the successor to the State Council 
of the RLPB, revealed that: ‘the general rate income is not subdivided into categories 
such as wild dog control.’ It is therefore difficult to ascertain what ‘actual’ WDMC was 
completed on private lands and where the $6 million reported to the Feral Animals 
Inquiry was spent.
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the LHPA wrote ‘There is no comprehensive list 
of current wild dog control activities across the State’ (Milan 2011 11 September). 
Further to this correspondence, in personal communication the CEO stated: ‘There is 
no centralised collection of statistics relating to feral animals and, wild dogs in 
particular - the figure was an estimate’ (Milan, N. 2011 11 September).
It is salutary to compare this lack of financial detail within the 2004 State of the 
Environment Report for the Australian Capital Region with the State Council of the 
RLPBs 2004 Annual Report. Across 48 RLPBs there is evidence of extensive pest 
animal control and specifically WDMC work conducted across NSW. There is mention 
of programs for the control of: rabbits; locusts; pigs; deer; foxes; goats; wild dogs; 
wingless grasshoppers; cats; rats; mice; and domestic dogs. Little financial detail is 
provided in individual RLPB reports regarding feral animal control yet WDMC work is 
mentioned in most (State Council of Rural Lands Protection Boards 2005). Individual 
RLPBs, for example, state:
The Board was able to access the million dollar State Government grant funds 
allocated to the Western division for pest animal destruction
(State Council of Rural Lands Protection Boards 2003:64).
Yet, no further explanatory financial detail is provided. Likewise, in 2002, the Grafton 
RLPB reported:
The sheep industry has become virtually non-existent due to the inability of 
landholders to control wild dogs effectively despite the use of available 
control methods (State Council of Rural Lands Protection Boards 2003:64).
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From these Reports, it is evident that there is considerable fragmentation in the 
reporting of financial expenditures on WDMC and an ad hoc approach to WDMC work 
completed without any description of financial expenditures in real terms -  or in any 
terms. There is no estimation of the ‘social cost’ to farm families. There is no economic 
cost. There is no reporting of the environmental costs of wild dog predation.
State Forests, Forests NSW
In 2001-2002, State Forests reported to the NSW parliamentary Feral Animal Inquiry 
that it spent $430,203 on feral animal control and managed approximately 2.8 million 
hectares of land. An analysis of the Financial Statements of State Forests and its 
successor, Forests NSW, from 1997 until 2007 reveals that the total budget for the 
control of ‘targeted pests’ -  foxes, dogs, goats, possums, pigs, cattle - increased from 
$328,000 to $528,000. From 2003, the amount allocated to feral animal control was in 
overall decline. No information specific to WDMC expenditure is provided. [See Table 
2:3]
From 1995 until 2009, across the Annual Reports of State Forests and its successor, 
Forests NSW, reported against ‘six performance indicators.’ There is no further 
breakdown of financial expenditures against the locations of work completed.
In 2004, State Forests amalgamated with the NSW DPI along with NSW Agriculture 
and was renamed Forests NSW. From 2004, Forests NSW was a public trading 
enterprise within NSW DPI (NSW Department of Primary Industries 2005:2).
In 2002, with the passage of the NSW Game and Feral Animal Control Act, the role in 
part of Forests NSW was to facilitate access ‘...by suitably qualified and licensed 
hunters onto 97 state forests declared under the Act to undertake feral animal control’ 
(NSW Department of Primary Industries 2005:31). By 2008 the number of State Forests 
in NSW declared for licensed hunting covering more than two million hectares 
increased to 372 State Forests (Game Council New South Wales 2008:3).
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Table 4: 3 State Forests and Forest NSW Total Reported Expenditure on All Feral
Animal Control 2009-2010*
1997-  1998-  1999-  2000-  2001-  2002-  2003-  2004-  2005-  2006-  2007-  2008-  2009-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
*Source: Figures Compiled from State Forests/Forests NSW Annual 
Reports 1997-98 up to and including 2009-10
In 2010, Forests NSW reported that the number of wild dogs removed by licensed 
hunters from State Forests for the financial years 2007-2008 until 2009-10 totalled 211 
(Forests NSW 2010:41). State Forests employee’s sometimes publicly stated adage: 
‘wild dogs don’t eat trees’ as a justification for not investing in WDMC highlights the 
different objectives and reporting mechanisms as reported in the Annual Reports across 
the whole of government.
Game Council NSW
Under the Game and Feral Animal Control Act 2002 the Game Council has two 
objectives:
a) To provide for the effective management of introduced species of game 
animals, and
b) To promote responsible and orderly hunting of those game animals on 
public and private land and of certain pest animals on public land
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(Game Council New South Wales 2006:6).
Pursuant to the Act, the Game Council and Feral Animal Control Regulation 2004 
commenced on 6 August 2004 allowing licensed hunters access to NSW public lands 
(Game Council New South Wales 2005:15).
In attempting to fulfil its objectives the Game Council experienced significant and 
continuing financial indebtedness. In successive Financial Audits - 2004-05, 2005-2006, 
and 2006-2007 - the Audit Office reported material concerns regarding its ongoing 
viability.
In 2004, the Audit Office reported that Game Council NSW had net liabilities of over 
$0,634 million and that:
the Treasurer approved a grant of $2 million for the 2005-2006 year’ and that: 
‘without this funding significant uncertainty would exist as to whether the 
Council could pay its debts as and when they fall due’ (Audit Office of New 
South Wales 2006:17).
In 2005-06 the Audit Office reported that:
In addition, the Treasurer gave his approval for the Council to request a TCorp 
loan not exceeding $1 million in 2006-07 year’ and that: ‘without this funding 
significant uncertainty would exist as to whether the Council could pay its debts 
as and when they fall due’ (Audit Office of New South Wales 2006:23).
Revenue from license fees decreased from $426,000 in 2004-05 to $379,000 in 2005- 
2006. The Audit Office noted the Government’s intention that by 2007-2008 Game 
Council NSW would be fully self-funding (Audit Office of New South Wales 2006:87).
By 2008, the Audit Office, in its third Financial Audit, expressed:
material uncertainty about the Council’s ability to continue as a going concern 
(Audit Office of New South Wales 2008: 79).
Further, the Audit Office found:
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the Council had an excess of liabilities over assets at the reporting date and its 
ongoing viability is dependent on its ability to derive sufficient future 
government funding’(Audit Office of New South Wales 2008:79).
The NSW Treasurer extended funding until 30 April 2008.
From 2009, the Audit Office made no further comment as grants from the NSW 
Government exceeded Game Council NSW expenditures. The Audit Office does not 
comment on Government policy. Its only concern was its financial viability.
Nevertheless, the pervasive storyline of Annual Reports of Game Council NSW is that 
it is a ‘success.’ This ‘success’ appears to be measured in the Annual Reports in two 
ways: First via the financial contribution hunters make to the State in license fees and 
tourist dollars spent in regional and rural NSW; and, second, by the contribution hunters 
make in eradicating pest animals from the NSW landscape thereby lessening the 
economic burden of feral animal control to the State.
On both counts, there is a distinct lack of empirical evidence to support the material 
claims emanating from successive Game Council Annual Reports. First, collections 
from license fees did not offset expenditures. Successive Financial Audits from the 
Audit Office of NSW affirm this understanding. Second, successive claims within and 
across all Annual Reports attempt to establish a causal relationship between the number 
of licensed hunters and the number of tourist dollars generated by hunters in regional 
and rural NSW. These figures are, at best, speculative. Third, in 2009-2010, Game 
Council NSW reported that licensed hunters across NSW had eradicated 15, 232 
animals. It is not possible to corroborate these material claims. Lastly, and of particular 
note, across successive Annual Reports from 2003-2004 up to and including 2008-2009 
- the cumulative tally of wild dogs eradicated was reported as 136. That is across more 
than two million hectares of public lands. It is difficult to see how this contribution 
could materially diminish the need for State intervention or how Game Council NSW as 
an entity can offset its own expenditures against its revenue.
The utility of Game Council NSW came not from its economic contribution but from 
elsewhere. Game Council NSW is best understood as a creature of NSW Labor’s 
creation whose raison d’etre lies within the prevailing socio-political context of that 
time. The passage of the Game and Feral Animal Control Act 2002 and the subsequent 
creation of the entity, Game Council NSW, offered NSW Labor a bloc of votes in the
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Upper House to further its legislative agenda. Its utility cannot be understood in terms 
of its contribution to WDMC.
The Wild Dog Destruction Board
The Wild Dog Destruction Board was created originally under the Wild Dog 
Destruction Board Act 1921. The Board’s broad objective is to:
‘allow the multimillion dollar grazing enterprises to continue to be carried out in 
the Western Division of New South Wales without the threat of wild dog 
attacks’ (Wild Dog Destruction Board 2003:5).
However, to explain the ‘dog fence’ simply in terms of its financial expenditures would 
be remiss. It is widely held to serve as an icon of the Australian imagination which 
resonates clearly with the central tenets of country mindedness and speaks of a time 
when Australia ‘Rode on the Sheep’s Back’ (Bean 1945, Rolls 1969, Grattan 2004, 
Woodford 2004, Massey 2007).
An additional survey of its Annual Reports in 1986-89 -  prior to the collapse of the 
Reserve Price Scheme for wool - indicates the size of the sheep flock and the estimated 
gross value of the sheep industry. For example, the 1987 Annual Report states: ‘In 
1986, the area served by the Board carried approximately 7.8 million sheep, which 
produced wool with an estimated gross value of $137m’ (Wild Dog Destruction Board 
1987:np). In 1988: ‘the flock had grown to 7.6 million and produced an estimated value 
of $315 million (Wild Dog Destruction Board 1988:np). In 1989 the Annual Report 
stated: ‘In the 12 months to March 1989, the area served by the Board carried 
approximately 8.5 million sheep, which produced wool with an estimated value of $353 
million’ (Wild Dog Destruction Board 1989:np).
By 1997-98, the Annual Report reported that the: ‘area served by the Board carried 
approximately 4.9 million sheep’ (Wild Dog Destruction Board 1998, np). Its value was 
not recorded and in successive Reports no information regarding the value of sheep or 
the size of the NSW flock is provided.
From 1995 until 2009, the Wild Dog Destruction Board received a grant of $60,000 
annually from DPI to erect, maintain and repair:
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a dog proof fence along specified section of the New South Wales borders with 
Queensland and South Australia, thereby excluding wild dogs from the grazing 
lands of the Western Division’ (The Wild Dog Destruction Board 2004:3).
In the 2002-03 and 2003-04 Annual Reports, the Board reported that:
as part of the NSW Premiers’ Drought Relief Package wild dog rates were 
waivered for the Western Division landholders and paid for by the State 
Government’ (Wild Dog Destruction Board 2004:np).
This amounted to over $1 million for each financial year. No other explanatory detail is 
provided.
In addition, the Wild Dog Destruction Board, unlike any other Department or agency in 
NSW, is authorised to pay bounties on the presentation of dog scalps. The payment is 
reported as $10 per scalp. For example, in 2002-03, 230 scalps were presented for 
payment as compared with the 2003-04, when 62 scalps were presented for payment.
NSW Department of Primary Industries
The Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture and its successors stated 
successively that its ‘Vision’ was: Profitable, adaptive4 and sustainable primary 
industries building vibrant communities’ (Industries 2009).
A review of the Annual Reports of NSW Agriculture and DPI and DII, reveals a lack of 
detail in the reporting of financial expenditures on feral animal control and, specifically, 
WDMC in real terms and for some years -  in any terms. DPI”s reporting of its 
performance is difficult to reconcile against this Vision.
Of note, details of DPI financial expenditure on WDMC are provided only for the 
financial years, 2004-2005, 2005-06 and 2006-07. The Financial Statements report that 
within these financial years the monies were to: ‘assist in the destruction of wild dogs.’ 
The exact use of these financial allocations is unclear although the financial 
expenditures may have contributed towards offsetting the costs of aerial baiting of 
public lands although this is conjecture. [See Table 2. 4]
4 The word ‘adaptive’ was added to the Vision in Annual Report 2008-09. Prior to that the vision was 
‘profitable, and sustainable primary industries building vibrant communities.’ Chapter Four will 
demonstrate how the word ‘adaptive’ denotes a particular administrative meaning within WDMC.
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Nevertheless, it is apparent that the financial allocations to the Yass Board appear 
significantly larger than other RLPBs. An analysis of the information compiled from 
these Reports reveals that overall three RLPBs received the greatest financial 
allocations -  Yass RLPB; Northern New England and Armidale RLPBs.
Table 4.4 Actual NSW DPI Expenditure to Rural Lands Protection Boards: ‘to 
assist in the destruction of wild dogs’. *
2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008
Armidale RLPB 5626.27 4,186.43 6,435.03 10 786.21
Bombala RLPB 509.7 502.71
Braidwood RLPB 5189.33 4,412.81 4,443.70 2,088.99
Central Tablelands RLPB 396.30
Cooma RLPB 2343.67 8,327.10 2,414.44
Gloucester RLPB 2847.68 1,904.74 3816.95 5,514.44
Goulburn RLPB 1288.11 419.33 1,501.53 1,261.70
Grafton RLPB 2408.40 1,706.10 1227.54 2,608.89
Gundagai RLPB 1,859.72
Hume RLPB 5,317.92 3,287.02 1,790.29
Hunter RLPB 3795.86 2,547.86 3397.28 5,429.33
Kempsey RLPB 1318.59 1,387.51 2,939.30 2,099.07
Maitland RLPB 636.22 610.22
Moss Vale RLPB 2,727.58 1,790.45
Northern New England 
RLPB 8,540.60 6,213.54 13,635.48 16,735.12
South Coast RLPB 732.42
Tamworth RLPB 1923.41 1,443.91 1,656.54 2,537.61
Yass RLPB 24,719.28 15,719.01 9,538.43 5,443.29
Young RLPB 2,653.74 3,406.61
*Source: Figures Compiled from Annual Reports of the NSW Department 
of Primary Industries 2004 -  2008
It is clear from the Hansard that NSW Labor targeted specific geographic areas of NSW 
disproportionately (Tebbutt 2002 9 April: 1078, Whan 2004 25 June: 10234). For
124
example, in 2001-02 of the reported $448,000 NSW NPWS allocated in its operational 
budget, approximately $55,000 was given to one geographic area in NSW for both 
WDMC and fox control -  the Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys (Department of 
Environment and Conservation 2006:28). The then Minister for the Environment, the 
Honourable Bob Debus announced:
There has never been a time in the history of this State when so much money 
and so much effort has gone into the elimination of wild dogs in Kosciuszko 
(Debus 2001 7 November: 18203).
Kosciuszko National Park, and later the 2002 Brindabella Plan, were considered the 
‘jewels in the crown’ and celebrated by NSW Labor as the benchmark of its success in 
WMDC [See Chapter Seven for an evaluation of success].
Kosciuszko National Park was also recognised for its alpine habitat as well as for its 
ability to generate: ‘a great deal of revenue for reinvestment in conservation’ through 
various imposts on visitors, as one of only two winter ski destinations in Australia 
(Richardson 2004 18 February: 6221). Across the Parliament the importance of this 
revenue collection was undisputed. This was evident in the Parliamentary Debates over 
the Thredbo Landslide when management of the Alpine Way and Kosciusko Roads 
were transferred from NSW NPWS to the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority following 
the NSW Coroners’ Report (Hand 2000, Richardson 2004 18 February: 6221, Whan 
2004 18 February: 6221).
In 2005, NSW DPI announced it had become a partner in six new cooperative research 
centres funded by the Australian Government, one of which was the IACRC. Of note, 
the 2006 Financial Statements accompanying the DPI Annual Report, reflect a major 
contribution for research and development from the IACRC. The detail of this research 
and development and the detail of this ‘major’ financial contribution are not specified. 
This partnering of DPI with the IACRC along with its unspecified ‘major’ financial 
contribution further consolidated a specific framing of WDMC as an administrative 
‘problem’ which required a ‘scientific and technological’ solution.
In 2006, the then Minister for Primary Industries cemented this relationship announcing 
at the NSW Farmers’ Association Annual Conference that:
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Over their seven-year life, we will invest in excess of $71 million in science 
staff related resources within the Australian Government providing $159 
million in grant funding (NSW Farmers Association 2006: np).
In the Parliament, the then Minister for the Environment, the Honourable Bob Debus 
reinforced this commitment to scientific research. He announced in response to a 
Dorothy Dixer question:
The Department of Primary Industries is a core partner in the new Invasive 
Animals Co-operative Research Centre...The State Government will commit 
approximately $2.5 million in in-kind support over the next several years to 
develop new and improved strategies that reduce the impact of pest animals. 
The State’s wild dog management plans provide some of the best examples of 
co-operative pest control in New South Wales
(Debus 2006 28 February: 20696).
It is unclear from the Annual Reports and Financial Statements where and how much of 
this in-kind support was allocated to the WDMC. The financial expenditure on scientific 
and technological research in real terms is not supplied. Likewise, how potential 
conflicts of interest that may arise from this relationship were to be resolved were not 
detailed. It is apparent that departmental staff from DPI played a prominent and active 
partnership role within the IACRC (Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 
2006).
The Audit Office of New South Wales
In 2002, The Audit Office of New South Wales conducted a Performance Audit of 
NSW Agriculture in Managing Animal Disease Emergencies. The Audit Office 
recommended that there were:
...significant gaps in our ability to respond to and manage large-scale 
emergency animal disease outbreaks’ and that ‘....while planning and 
response issues remain unresolved, the State is at significant risk from large 
scale emergencies...’ (Audit Office of New South Wales 2002:2).
Further the Audit Office found, that
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NSW Agriculture does not have memoranda of understanding in place with any 
neighbouring States to help manage common response issues (Audit Office of 
New South Wales 2002:6).
It is difficult to see how, without a memorandum of understanding in place, cross 
jurisdictional issue arising out of WDMC could be overcome and the concept of ‘nil 
tenure’ could conceivably work. [See Chapter Seven for discussion on ‘nil tenure’].
Part III - Findings
Overall, the Annual Reports and Financial Statements and allied Reports across the 
whole of government are instructive as storylines which contributed to the dominant 
discourse of administrative rationalism through which WDMC was promulgated in the 
public sphere.
The Annual Reports and Financial Statements perpetuate the storylines of NSW Labor. 
They do not challenge them. Collectively, they contributed six main storylines to 
WDMC: they add legitimacy to the claims of expenditures by NSW Labor -  however 
incomplete; they establish and privilege a ‘knowledge community’ which projected a 
‘common’ understanding of WDMC [see Chapter Four]; they privileged a scientific and 
technological understanding of WDMC which was underpinned by an empiricist 
understanding of ‘fact’; they promote the Brindabella Plan as the benchmark of success 
and implicitly suggest that the adoption of this model is widespread across NSW; they 
render the impacts of wild dog predation on farm families -  where noted - in 
generalised terms; and lastly, they reveal differing objectives through which WDMC 
was understood.
In contrast, the Annual Reports and Financial Statements do not answer two questions 
raised consistently by NSW farm families: ‘How much money was spent on WDMC in 
real terms?’ and ‘Where did the money go?’ In lieu of any definitive answers to these 
questions four observations can made:
Firstly, and overwhelmingly, the Annual Reports, Financial Statements and allied 
Reports highlight the absence of a public audit trail through which financial 
expenditures on WDMC in real terms are both self-evident and publicly accessible.
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Second, the role of Audit Reports can be seen as ‘producing legitimacy’ (Power 
2003:379) for the NSW Labor Government as the terms of its inquiry are strictly 
prescribed. In this sense, as Power (2003) writes, auditing:
must be understood as an activity with significance beyond the manifest 
(programmatic) rational function attributed to it in official documents...how 
auditing is done is essential to understanding its micro-and macro social role’ 
(Power 2003: 385).
Thus, the social and economic base of each Audit Report and its purchase on: 
‘legitimacy will be constructed around specific rhetorics of public interest and 
knowledge’ (Power 2003:391-2). These specific rhetorics centred on the conservation of 
the dingo as being in the public good and the importance of a scientific and 
technological approach.
Thirdly, as Townley et al. (2003) point out the introduction of ‘performance 
measurement’ in the public sector - as witnessed across most of the Annual Reports 
cited - can be interpreted as a:
dissatisfaction with pluralistic or interest group politics and that its use is an 
attempt to replace the ‘rationality of politics’ with the ‘rationality of planning’ 
(Townley, Cooper et al. 2003:1045).
This posits public land managers as ‘Platonic guardians of the public interest’ -  a role 
which some argue they should not have in the Westminster system and that this role, in 
turn, silences and disenfranchise social actors.
Fourthly, the parliamentary claims of NSW Labor regarding the largesse of its 
expenditure referred to total expenditures for all feral animals and weeds control on 
public lands across NSW. The parliamentary claims did not reveal the amount allocated, 
for example, to scientific research and development, assets, capital items and salaries 
separate from the cost of feral animal control and weed control completed on the ground 
in real terms; nor do the Annual Reports and Financial Statements.
Lastly, it is difficult to corroborate the accuracy of the NSW Labor financial allocations 
to feral animal control and, specifically, the expenditure directed to WDMC in real
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terms against the Annual Reports and Financial Statements of the six social agents 
charged with implementing WDMC.
Notwithstanding these four observations, there is a significant gap between the NSW 
Labor storylines of expenditures on WDMC and the expenditures as reported -  or not - 
in the Annual Reports and Financial Statements. It is only possible to identify specific 
financial expenditures on WDMC in one location of NSW: the areas of land under the 
control of the Wild Dog Destruction Board.
Notwithstanding this, the Annual Reports and Financial Statements highlight the 
meagre financial allocations to the Departments and Agencies involved in WDMC over 
time; a task, nevertheless, which each institutional actor respectively declared to be 
committed. The analysis of the financial expenditures when compared against the NSW 
Labor parliamentary storylines suggests that the issue of WDMC was used 
opportunistically by NSW Labor because it resonated so strongly with ‘grassroots’ farm 
families under siege from wild dog predation on agricultural stock.
The NSW Labor rhetoric which relied so heavily on claims of a dramatic increase in 
expenditure on WDMC as part of the overall political strategy of Country Labor was 
inherently misleading. Nevertheless, NSW Labor and Country Labor continued to claim 
in the NSW Parliament to be working in the interests of its targeted constituency -  rural 
and regional voters -  on the issue of WDMC (Debus 1996 23 May: 1496). However 
unintentionally, this analysis of the Annual Reports and Financial Statements acts as a 
counterpoint to the claims of the largesse of NSW Labor and its commitment to 
WDMC.
The differing Departmental objectives of each institutional actor also point to 
considerable fragmentation in the ways ‘wild dogs’ and the actual purpose of WDMC 
were understood. There is also evidence of considerable variance in the respective 
financial commitments to feral animal control and, WDMC more specifically, between 
Departments and Agencies and the RLPBs.
Collectively, the Annual Reports and Financial Statements highlight the paucity of 
financial information in the reporting of operational budgets in real terms, ‘actual” 
WDMC work completed over time, and a complete lack of whole of Government 
indicators across WDMC. More tellingly, the sheer size of the public land mass 
involved in turn raises reasonable questions regarding the capacity and capabilities of
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each Department, Agency and Statutory Authority to fulfil the task of WDMC across 
the landscapes under its control within the allocated financial expenditures.
In sum, during the period of successive NSW Labor Governments it appears that there 
was a lack of transparency and accountability in the reporting of financial expenditures 
on WDMC in real terms across the whole of Government. Nevertheless, the dominant 
discourse positioned institutional actors in ongoing narratives through storylines which 
were reproduced in the Annual Reports, Financial Statements and allied Reports. These 
narratives provided these Reports an internal coherence while masking the apparent 
internal contradictions. The narrative of the storylines, of NSW Labor and its country 
cousin, Country Labor, of the care and concern it had for farming families and the 
largesse of NSW Labor Governments, were challenged by storylines which disputed 
their legitimacy; emanating from other political parties and fanning families. However, 
it is evident that across all Annual Reports, Financial Statements and allied Reports 
these challenges were not sufficient to unseat the ways in which the administrative 
rationalist discourse represented and understood WDMC; rather these Reports 
collectively contributed to it.
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Chapter Five:
Dyed in the Wool: The epistemological basis of wild dog management and control
This Chapter examines the dominant discourse coalition within WDMC in NSW during 
the period of successive NSW Labor Governments. It draws on Hajer’s (1993) 
definition of a discourse coalition:
A discourse coalition is the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utters 
these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all 
organized around a discourse (Hajer 1993: 47).
The storylines of the dominant discourse coalition pivoted around scientific rationalism, 
‘ecological science;’ the notion o f ‘good science’ and ‘the strategic approach.’ Notably, 
the storyline o f ‘good science’ is pervasive throughout the WDMC public policy yet the 
criteria of it remains unspecified (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council 
2007). In contrast, the marginalised discourse coalition privileged storylines that 
pivoted on generational knowledge and experiences of WDMC. These storylines did not 
espouse a disbelief in ‘science’ per se. Rather these storylines rejected the legitimacy of 
‘science’ as it was applied in the implementation of WDMC policy in NSW at the 
‘grassroots’ and within the context of their knowledges and experiences.
Overall, this Chapter argues that the current ‘strategic approach’ is a deeply problematic 
approach to the management of people. It argues that the dominant discourse coalition 
in turn facilitated the entry of new commercial actors in WDMC and the rise of the self- 
proclaimed ‘growth industry’ (Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2006) as 
an area of expanding employment in the necessity of further ecological research in 
WDMC. This ‘growth industry’ privileged a scientific and technological understanding 
of the ‘problem’ of WDMC wherein the ‘anecdotal’, the lived experiences and ‘situated 
knowledges’ of farm families were held subordinate to ‘fact’ and ‘truth.’
There is an uncritical circularity at the basis of the ‘strategic approach’ as it is applied in 
WDMC policy and implementation which is self-fulfilling and self-serving of the 
interests of the dominant discourse coalition. Scientists, public land managers and, 
increasingly, commercial entities, defined the criterion of ‘success’ in WDMC and 
evaluated where, how, and, if, it was achieved in largely ‘quantifiable’ terms. (West
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and Saunders 2006, Hart and Bomford 2006 February). ‘Science’ and public land 
managers were the self-appointed ‘experts.’ This period was characterised by a reliance 
on the ‘scientific method’ and the development o f ‘new’ technologies and ‘innovations’ 
in a ‘tools in the toolbox’ approach to WDMC (NSW National Parks and Wildlife 
Service 2006, NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 2006, Invasive Animals 
Cooperative Research Centre 2007, NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 2010, 
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2012); all of which were purportedly 
underpinned by ‘good science.’
However, in a pluralist society the purchase of the ‘strategic approach’ on claims to 
legitimacy is strongly contested. The effect of the dominant discourse coalition was to 
subvert the storylines of the marginalised discourse coalition. As a consequence, 
farming families were largely excluded from the policy making arena wherein the 
reliance on evidence based policy was integral to the framing and implementation of 
WDMC.
The Fundamental Clash of Epistemologies
In NSW, the discourse of WDMC public policy reflects an epistemological dependence 
on scientific rationalism. As Fischer writes:
‘logical empiricism’ (also called ‘logical positivism’) is an epistemology -  a 
theory of knowledge -  holding that reality exists as an objective phenomenon 
and is driven by causal laws of cause and effect that can be discovered through 
empirical testing of hypothesis and deductive statements (Fischer 2003: 118).
However, within WDMC policy, it is apparent that there is a fundamental clash of 
epistemologies, namely between, positivism and social constructivism. This applies in 
many areas, unrelated to WDMC. The reasons for this theoretical difference are deep 
seated and long held (Feyerabend 1978, Kuhn 1996, Feyerabend 2002, Marsh and 
Stoker 2002, Hawkesworth 2006, Yanow 2006: 79 - 82).
As Marsh and Furlong (2002) write, positivism is a ‘foundationalist ontology’ whose 
core belief is that ‘...the world exists independently of our knowledge of it.’ As applied 
in WDMC it espouses ‘the scientific method.’ This is ‘a method which derives
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hypothesis from theory and then tests them in an attempt to falsify them’ (Marsh and 
Furlong 2002: 17-41). The central tenets of positivism posit the idea of ‘manifest truth’ 
(Hawkesworth 2006: 31). Within WDMC, this is characterised by a belief in 
‘objectivity,’ the existence of ‘fact,’ and a reliance on measurement as ‘proof of 
empirical rigor, reliability and validity.
The storyline of adaptive management
The adaptive management model (Holling 1978, Gunderson and Holling 2002) applies 
the ‘scientific method’ to natural resource management of which WDMC has been 
deemed by successive Federal and State Governments to be a part (Vertebrate Pests 
Commitee 2003 November, Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council 2007, 
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2012). It has become a ‘buzzword’ 
(Simberloff 2009: 76) and ‘rhetorically embedded ... in natural resource management 
culture’ (Allan 2007: 1).
In essence, adaptive management ‘...treats on-the-ground actions and policies as 
hypotheses from which learning derives’ (Armidale Rural Lands Protection Board 2004 
1 May to 1 May 2005). It is a form of instrumental rationality which privileges the 
knowledge of ‘experts’ and proceeds by way of experiment over long periods for the 
purpose of falsifying hypotheses as an opportunity for ecological and social learning. 
Lee (1993) puts it more bluntly:
Adaptive Management is an approach to natural resource policy that embodies a 
simple imperative: policies are experiments; learn from them (Lee 1993, Lee 
2005).
More recently, there have been significant calls in the ecological literature for ‘adaptive 
management’ to embrace a ‘non-technocratic’ management approach (Jiggins and 
Roling 2002, Oglethorpe 2002, Warner 2002, Huitema, Mostert et al. 2009, Chappie, 
Ramp et al. 2011). These iterations suggest variously a form of:
adaptive co-management’ - a non-technocratic management approach which -  
in theory -  at least ‘should’ embrace ‘multiple centers of power (polycentric) 
rather than one center of control’ (Huitema, Mostert et al. 2009).
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These iterations pivot around public participation and a bioregional approach to natural 
resource management (Lee 2005).
Adaptive management as it is interpreted in WDMC policy literature lays claim to 
notions o f ‘co-management.’ However, it is conceded in the academic literature that as 
a model of ‘co-management’ ‘...adaptive management might be full of promise, 
generally, it has fallen short on delivery’ and that it has been ‘...more influential so far, 
as an idea than as a practical means of gaining insights into the behaviour of ecosystems 
utilized and inhabited by humans’(Stankey, Clark et al. 2005: 7). Significantly, as its 
critics argue, judged against its own criterion, ‘...it is rarely truly practiced’ (Simberloff 
2009:76, Williams 2012).
The inherent assumption of adaptive management is that ‘co-management’ should be 
‘driven’ by science and public land managers (Holling 1978, English and Chappie 2002, 
Chappie, Ramp et al. 2011). The knowledges of ‘stakeholders’ are captured in 
furtherance of ecological science and subject to evidence based assessments made in 
turn by scientists and public land managers.
Yet, in advocating this model as a model of governance, ‘adaptive management is 
irreducibly socio-political in nature’(Stankey, Clark et al. 2005: 57). Adaption is 
decided by people and this exercise of power. Not surprisingly therefore:
significant barriers confront adaptive management and that legal, 
organizational, and ideological changes must occur before 
implementation can succeed’ (Stankey, Bormann et al. 2003: 45).
At its core, the model of adaptive management enshrines and privileges scientific 
rationalism because it is the ‘experts’ who make the decisions about what requires 
adaptation.
The Strategic Approach
The dependence on scientific rationalism in WDMC policy manifests itself most clearly 
in the adoption of the so-called ‘strategic approach’ (Braysher 1993, Fleming, Corbett et 
al. 2001, Braysher and Saunders 2003, Allen B. L., Ballard et al. 2011). The ‘strategic
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approach has its genesis in the ‘adaptive management’ model (Holling 1978, Braysher 
1993, Gunderson and Holling 2002, Braysher and Saunders 2003). Yet, it is conceded 
even by its advocates that:
There is more potential for conflict between stakeholders in wild dog 
management than for any other vertebrates pest species’ (Fleming, Corbett et al. 
2001: 114).
And, that:
The dingo elicits divergent opinions like no other species of Australian wildlife, 
and discussions on dingo management can quickly turn into explosive disputes 
(Johnson and Ritchie 2012: 9).
Notwithstanding this, the ‘strategic approach’ is ‘the’ model of governance in WDMC 
in NSW (Fleming, Corbett et al. 2001, Allen B. L., Ballard et al. 2011). It is a model of 
governance based on an interpretation of ‘adaptive management’ (Holling 1978, 
Gunderson and Holling 2002). Yet, at the same time, it is generally conceded across the 
academic literature that while the adaptive model: ‘...might be full of promise, 
generally it has fallen short on delivery (Halbert 1993, McLain and Lee 1996, Roe 
1996, Stankey and Shindler 1997, Walters 1997)’ (Stankey, Clark et al. 2005: 7).
The ‘strategic approach,’ or Teaming-by doing’ as it is sometimes called, mimics a 
linear step by step policy process. As Fleming (2001) -  one of the chief proponents of 
the strategic approach - writes:
The four steps that constitute a strategic approach to the management of wild 
dogs are: defining the problem; developing a management plan; implementing 
the plan; and monitoring and evaluating progress (Fleming, Corbett et al. 2001: 
112) .
PestPlan Toolkit, a further iteration of the strategic approach, models community 
participation and engagement in a three-stage chart replete with a score card as a marker 
of implementation success. The authors caution readers:
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The success of PESTPLAN relies on participants constantly questioning (often 
long-held beliefs and reviewing new information as it is received in various 
Stages and Steps (Braysher and Saunders 2003: 1).
However, observations of WDMC meetings throughout South East and North East of 
NSW reveal this ‘review’ of long held beliefs as a linear unidirectional process [See 
Chapter Seven]. Moreover, in 2003, the RSCPA reported:
Much has been said about the need for strategic and coordinated control of 
vertebrate pests, however there is a strong feeling, from within the RSPCA and 
from many people involved in the management of vertebrate pests, that we have 
a long way to go before this is the reality on the ground (Jones 2003 25 
February: 11).
Nevertheless, the strategic approach is the pivotal scientific and administrative storyline 
of WDMC which is actively promulgated throughout WDMC policy literature. Notably, 
it was promoted by the NSW Labor Government despite growing political pressure 
from farm families and agricultural organisations about the decline -  if not ‘the verge of 
collapse’ (Kenny 2008: 4) -  of the sheep industry across Australia (Milbum 2007 
September, Kenny 2008, Curtis 2009, Nason 2009, NSW Farmers Association 2010 25 
January) and the increasing threat wild dog predation posed to the cattle and goat 
industries.
The strategic approach to WDMC mimics ‘incrementalism’ (Lindblom 1959) in its 
Teaming by doing’ experimental design. This view, that:
policy principally as a process of problem solving. The fundamental assumption 
of the model is that there is a best collective decision, the public interest, that 
can be rationally and analytically determined if the correct neutral procedure is 
followed (Bacchi 1999: 17)
informs the strategic approach to WDMC. The strategic approach privileges the ‘correct 
neutral procedure’ as the ‘scientific method.’ All iterations of the ‘strategic approach’ in 
NSW WDMC policy are underpinned by a reliance on it. As Fleming (2001) writes:
136
The strategic approach to pest management incorporates adaptive management 
principles recommended by Walters (1986). In passive-adaptive management 
(Walters and Holling 1990) a single strategy is selected, implemented monitored 
and evaluated, and adapted according to the success or otherwise of the strategy. 
The active-adaptive approach puts up a number of alternative strategies which 
are all implemented, monitored and evaluated, and adapted according to which 
strategies work best (Walters and Holling 1990). The latter technique is more 
experimental and requires standardisation of monitoring and effort across 
strategies, replication of strategies, and, ideally, nil-treatment areas where no 
control strategy is imposed (Fleming, Corbett et al. 2001: 112).
This approach in turn is used to justify the ‘necessity’ of further ecological research. 
The rubric of ‘wild dogs’ and ‘dingoes’ extends now to a myriad of ecological studies 
of native fauna (Howden 2012, 14 May, Beef Central 2013, King 2013, Invasive 
Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2013 ) as well as the pursuit of ‘technological’ 
innovations under the auspices of the Commonwealth Australian Pest Animal Research 
Program (ARARP) (Department of Agriculture 2013) and the Commonwealth strategy 
entitled Caring for Our Country -  an initiative of the Commonwealth Labor 
Government (Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2013).
The ‘strategic approach’ serves the advocates of scientific rationalism well. It reflects 
the ‘power’ of the overarching administrative rationalist discourse to ‘control’ the 
direction of WDMC policy through the imposition of and reliance on scientific 
‘expertise’ which defines and circumscribes the meaning of WDMC and its praxis. It 
controls the ‘language’ of WDMC and in doing so it controls the basis on which and the 
ways in which people can be heard.
Currently, the language of WDMC centres around an ‘Eco-speak’ -  ‘a distinctive 
language of ecological campaigning and consciousness’ (Hajer 2005: 178-180); the goal 
of which is ostensibly the preservation of the Australian dingo and the continuation of 
the distinction between ‘wild dog’ and ‘dingo.’ This language is not benign and has 
significant repercussions for farm families. The ‘common parlance’ of WDMC: 
‘purity;’ ‘hybrid;’ ‘feral;’ ‘buffer zones;’ ‘core areas;’ ‘potential habitats;’ ‘sand plot 
monitoring;’ ‘top order predator;’ ‘mesopredator release;’ ‘Schedule 2 lands’ and 
‘experts;’ attempts to cement particular scientific meanings, to create and privilege a
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scientific storyline of ‘wild dog;’ to homogenise discussion and to ‘other’ dissent as ill- 
informed and/or ignorant. Any attempt at discussion in plain language, or dissent from 
the scientific language is seen as ill-informed and/or ignorant. In this way, it materially 
affects the way, if and where, WDMC is implemented.
Similarly the current emphasis on multiple technological ‘solutions’ through the 
advocacy of ‘tools-in-the-toolbox’ approach to the ‘problem’ of WDMC jettisons off 
the platform of these scientific assumptions and is underscored by imperatives of 
continued research and commercial exploitation of the technology of that research. This 
is implicitly driven by a political imperative not only to increase the development of 
‘new’ technological ‘innovations’ but also to control the discourse of WDMC itself. 
Notably, the elaboration of the ‘strategic approach' has been perpetuated as ‘common 
sense.’ It has been elevated to ‘best practice’ and as the ‘benchmark’ (West and 
Saunders 2006: 11) throughout WDMC policy literature (Department of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Forestry 2011) -  and in public WDMC forums.
In 2007, at the NSW Wild Dog Summit held in Orange, NSW, it was asserted by a 
research scientist of NSW DPI Vertebrate Pest Research Unit to an audience of over 
four hundred, mainly farm families, as ‘democratic’ because he claimed it involved 
farming families at the grassroots. This comment was received with derision and 
cynicisim.
Lockie (1998) argues the concept of ‘best practice’ is a:
signifier, or sign, to which a whole range of culturally produced meanings may 
be attached, or signified by competing social groups (Lockie 1998: 243).
Yet, this conception o f ‘best practice’ in WDMC is formulated on the presumption that:
a central agency knows which actions are best for the common good, and are 
equally desired by all, independent of culture, gender, religion and other 
differences among people and among or within communities (Andrew and 
Robottom 2005: 64).
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At the same time, the deliberate strategy of the Vertebrate Pest Unit of NSW DPI, the 
NSW Government and the IACRC during this time was to ‘nationalise’ the ‘strategic 
approach’ (Fleming, Allen et al. 2006: 759). This was self-serving of the intent of the 
dominant discourse coalition to control the discourse of WDMC.
Yet, the rise and rise of the ‘strategic approach’ in WDMC occurred during the rise of a 
broader call for ‘postempiricism’ - ‘an orientation that seeks to move beyond an 
‘objectivist conception of reality’ (Fischer 2003: 12). As Fischer notes: ‘In the 
postempiricist view, there are many valid forms of explanation, empirical- 
scientific/causal analysis being only one of them’ (Fischer 2003: 13). However, this is 
not the case in WDMC policy.
In the dominant discourse coalition, the storylines of the New South Wales Invasive 
Species Plan 2008-2015 is a case in point (NSW Department of Primary Industries 
2008). It equates ‘effective management’ with an strong adherence to both ‘strategic 
management programs’ in WDMC and the ‘adaptive management’ model (NSW 
Department of Primary Industries 2008: 7).
The Inherent Problem within the Strategic Approach
It is difficult to see the incorporation o f ‘community engagement’ in this model as being 
anything other than an ‘add-on’ to the ‘strategic approach,’ if not a ‘spray-on-solution’ 
(Head 2007: 441) which places local farm families at a disadvantage. Engagement and 
consultation of farm families are circumscribed within boundaries of rationality that are 
defined a priori by the ‘strategic approach.’ In this sense, the often-dissenting storylines 
as well as the contributions of farm families are marginalised.
Iterations of NSW WDMC policy as enunciated in ‘Pest Plan,’(Braysher and Saunders 
2003) - a guidebook to public land managers - have not travelled far. It is ‘stuck’ in a 
scientific rationalist frame wherein the experiences and knowledges of farm families are 
limited and subordinate to the degree to which the participants accept the underlying 
tenets of scientific rationalism. These findings echo the findings of Andrew (1997) who 
critiqued the Bureau of Resource Science publication, ‘Managing Vertebrate Pests: 
Principles and Strategies’(Braysher 1993) which were adopted by successive Federal
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and NSW State Governments as the guiding principles in NSW WDMC. Andrew 
(1997) wrote then of these vertebrate pest management principles and strategies that:
The handling of this issue within the Principles and Strategies document 
demonstrates an objectivist view of knowledge and, further to this, a linear 
conception of information transfer (Andrew 1997: 84).
The same holds true for WDMC policy during the period of successive NSW Labor 
Governments. The ‘strategic approach’ remains the pivotal storyline within WDMC 
policy (Fleming, Corbett et al. 2001). It upholds and reinforces the meaning, values and 
power that contribute to the administrative rationalist ‘framing’ (Baumgartner and Jones 
1991, Bacchi 1999) of WDMC and deviates little from its scientific and technocratic 
roots.
While the first of the four steps in the ‘strategic approach’ asks: ‘What’s the problem?’ 
the problem definition is limited to the extent that the underlying precepts of the model 
allow. It is also iterative. Feedback loops in the model continue until ‘the’ problem is 
defined and consensus is achieved (Fleming, Corbett et al. 2001). Many stakeholders 
are unable to influence these choices. There is no capacity in ‘the’ model of governance 
to conclude that the model itself is flawed or biased.
In this regard, the ‘strategic approach’ reinforces a central tenet of positivism that ‘...it 
is possible to separate empirical questions -  that is, questions about what is -  from 
normative questions -  that is, questions about what should be’ (Marsh and Furlong 
2002: 22). Moreover, the ‘strategic approach’ prescribes a rationality whereby ‘freedom 
is granted only to those who have already accepted part of the rationalist (i.e. scientific) 
ideology’ (Feyerabend 1978: 76). However, as Feyerabend asks:
is it desirable to support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else? 
Should we transfer to it the sole rights for dealing in knowledge, so that any 
result that has been obtained by other methods is at once ruled out of court? 
...my answer will be a firm and resounding NO (Feyerabend 2002: 11).
Overall, there are several ‘problems’ with the application of the ‘strategic approach.’
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First, the ‘strategic approach’ is less than transparent in its approaches to alternative 
‘ways of knowing.’ As Yanow (2003) writes more generally of the positivist approach:
The lack of attention to (at best) or outright devaluing of (at worst) local 
knowledge has been a common occurrence in several policy issue areas. (Yanow 
2003:236).
Second, it attempts to homogenise the existence of non-uniform preferences among 
members of society. For example, the NSW Invasive Species Plan states that ‘Relevant 
stakeholders’ will be consulted. Flowever, questions of who is ‘relevant,’ who is a 
‘stakeholder’ and who is not, and to what extent any contributions will be of any 
consequence remain.
Third, it exemplifies one of the many points where a discourse of scientific rationalism 
entered the realms of the public policy on WDMC in furtherance of its own agenda. The 
strategic approach is based on an ecological model designed to further future ecological 
research and social learning about that ecological research. The salient point here as 
Simberloff (2009) asks is:
At what point is an adaptive hypothesis considered adequately tested, and under 
what circumstances is a treatment deemed to be not working and suitable for 
termination (Simberloff 2009: 73).
To date, the ecological research in WDMC has been very broad ranging (Allen, Fleming 
et al. 1989, Paltridge 2002, Kortner and Watson 2005, Letnic, Crowther et al. 2009, 
Rhodes, McAlpine et al. 2013) and often the implications of this research -  if not the 
methods of the research themselves - have negatively impacted on the lives of farm 
families (General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 2002, House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005, NSW Farmers 
Association 2010 25 January).
For example, in 1997, the use of 1080 was banned in most parts of NSW, particularly in 
South East NSW, by NSW NPWS pending the outcome of native quoll research. The 
research subsequently found that native quolls were not susceptible to 1080 (Kortner
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and Watson 2005). The Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) repudiated its 
former stance stating in 2010:
Research in northern and southern NSW on the impacts on spotted-tailed quolls 
of aerial baiting with 1080 poison found that aerial baiting had little impact on 
the quoll populations studied. As a result of these findings, NPWS now routinely 
uses aerial baiting as an additional control technique where access from the 
ground is limited (Office of Environment and Heritage 2012: 2).
Moreover, the OEH reported:
NPWS is also an active participant in the Invasive Animal Cooperative Research 
Centre’s demonstration project integrated canid management (Office of 
Environment and Heritage 2012: 3).
However, in the intervening period, across NSW, farm families argued that there was a 
strong correlation between the removal of 1080 and the rise in the number of wild dogs 
and the numbers of attacks by wild dogs on agricultural stock.
Lastly, the ‘strategic approach’ masks the intent of Government to control the entry of 
alternative discourses through the power of the dominant discourse which reifies its 
dependence on scientific rationalism. More recently, ecological research has 
encompassed explicitly normative ecological objectives: studies that are intended to 
assist in the conservation and/or preservation of dingoes (Purcell 2010) and/or studies 
that would support or refute the hypothesis that wild dogs have utility in the ecosystem 
as the so-called ‘top order predator’ in controlling other ‘invasives’ (Beef Central 2013). 
Yet, at the same time, the proponents of this research hold the ‘scientific method’ - a 
belief in the empiricist distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘values’ and the notion of 
‘scientific objectivity’ - as a ‘truth.’ This is a non sequitur and a misnomer. It is veil 
behind which a desired goal is sought. It is a value laden hypothesis.
The issue of WDMC is highly political. As Flannery (2012) concedes more generally of 
the conservation of endangered species, it ‘is a matter of values’ (Flannery 1994: 10). 
Yet, he also insists on the primacy of the ‘scientific method.’ He argues:
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Quantify the problem, devise a plan to deal with it based on sound science, and 
report on the outcomes. And keep the politics out of it (Flannery 1994: 76).
This is naive. It is also typical of many of the storylines within the dominant discourse 
coalition within WDMC which hold as true claims o f ‘objectivity.’
Against this light, the salient questions of the ‘strategic approach’ as it is applied in 
WDMC remain: Who is learning what? To farm families, to suggest that their 
livelihoods are subject to ‘ecological experiment,’ that ‘experiments’ that may result in 
ongoing material harm to the lives of farm families are ‘just’ examples of ‘bad science’ 
or ‘a failure in technical studies’ (Braysher and Saunders 2003: 2) or a part of a broader 
Teaming-by-doing’ storyline appears clearly inadequate.
Yet, within the ‘strategic approach’ farm families are socially constructed and 
positioned as the ‘passive’ recipients of ‘ecological knowledge’ delivered by ‘experts.’ 
It is at the point of the transmission of knowledge that ‘learning’ occurs as well as in its 
formulation. However, what is Teamed’ from these forms of highly institutionalised and 
politicised ecological ‘lessons’ may well be not what is intended and, it probably goes 
without saying, not what is reported in the public policy literature. As Andrew (2003) 
writes:
Reflection on observation shapes knowledge. Knowledge is therefore, 
historically and socially constructed and, as a consequence, it relates to the 
context in which it is derived (Andrew 2003: 1015).
Yet, the ‘strategic approach’, is committed to ‘implementing policies as experiments’ 
(Lee 2005) within an ecological limits storyline wherein the livelihoods of farm families 
are held subordinate to ‘fact’ and ‘truth,’ and, whose motivation, in the face of conflict, 
is judged of lesser consequence than an ill-defined ‘common good.’ The 2008 NSW 
Invasive Species Plan states that:
It will be of benefit to the people of NSW by providing a whole of government 
approach to managing invasive species in this State. Its implementation will 
reduce the impact of weeds and other pests resulting in more profitable
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agricultural production and lower costs of control for land managers (NSW 
Department of Primary Industries 2008: Forward).
However, in light of the exploitation of the issue of WDMC for political capital as 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, the seemingly inadequate financial expenditures on 
WDMC and the apparent fragmentation between the social actors over the ‘actual’ 
purpose of WDMC, the question remains: ‘How?’
While it is suggested that the basis of a strategic wild dog management plan: ‘...should 
be flexible and respond to measured changes in economic, environmental and pest 
circumstances (Fleming, Corbett et al. 2001:112) this cannot be achieved without 
significant funding for the management of the National Estate. In the interim, it is farm 
families who shoulder the initial and direct costs of wild dog predation on agricultural 
stock -  not ‘experts.’ It is also apparent that the definitions of ‘measured’ and the 
‘processes of measurement’ themselves constitute highly normative undertakings and 
are less than ‘objective’ and processes from which farm families are seldom included 
yet are often critical.
The 2008 Plan refines the Government’s commitment further when it states:
The NSW Invasive Species Plan delivers on the NSW State Plan’s commitment 
to target resources to manage weeds and pests in key locations in NSW (NSW 
Department of Primary Industries 2008: Forward).
There is a bitter irony here. First, the identification of ‘key’ locations remains a 
normative decision of public land managers and ‘experts.’ Second, this does little to 
alleviate the concerns of farm families who are not geographically ‘located’ in ‘key’ 
areas and are subject to public land managers’ ‘interpretations.’ Third, while the 
‘strategic approach’ privileges the role of scientists and public land managers as 
‘objective’ and ‘experts’ they are often dependent on the large scale involvement and 
knowledges of ‘stakeholders’ of WDMC at the grassroots level; not least the financial 
support garnered through the mandatory levies imposed on farming families. The 
location of wild dogs; their typical ‘runs’ and their whelping areas also form part of this 
historical knowledge.
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Very often, farm families define the ‘problem’ of WDMC differently and cumulatively 
hold considerable personal knowledges and experiences of wild dogs. Yet, by virtue of 
the dependence on scientific rationalism within the ‘strategic approach’ the alternative 
knowledges and experiences of farm families are held as subordinate, subject to 
falsification, or, are ‘captured’ (West and Saunders 2006: 12) through consultation 
wherein they are rated against an established hierarchy of scientific and ecological 
knowledge. This same ‘benchmark’ is not applied to the ‘experiences’ of public land 
managers. For example, when describing ‘an innovative and reliable knowledge-based 
technique’ of pest animal management, West and Saunders (2006) write:
It captures two types of information: information contained within formalised 
datasets and records wherever available and referred to by land managers, and 
perception-base information from land managers based on their experiences and 
observations (West and Saunders 2006: 12).
The same cannot be said of the ‘perception-base information’ of farm families. There is 
a palpable double standard here.
Overall, the ‘strategic approach’ is in essence ‘strategic.’ Its ‘power’ is its convenience 
to and utility in serving the interests of the administrative rationalist model. It 
marginalises alternative discourses and relies on the authority of ecological science and 
public land managers in the administration, implementation and maintenance of State 
power (Lukes, 2005; Foucault, 2003).
The effect of a scientific rationalist approach on the public policy of WDMC
The effect of this dependence on the institutional response to WDMC during the time of 
successive NSW Labor Governments was simply to subjugate alternative discourses 
which embraced differing epistemologies. This is achieved in discourse coalitions by:
blocking the flow of differences in meaning and setting itself up as the centre of 
interpretative processes (Fischer 2003:78 citing Battistelli and Ricotta 2001:4).
In contrast, as Boswell (2012) describes of anecdotes more generally:
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Anecdotes are stories of personal experience. They play a critical role in helping 
people to make sense of their world and their place in it (Boswell 2012: 4).
‘Wild dogs’ and ‘dingoes’ became known officially only through a ‘scientific 
rationalist’ discourse which relied on ‘experts.’ The personal experiences and in many 
cases, generational knowledges, that farm families had acquired of wild dogs and 
dingoes through their ‘shoe leather’ were relegated to ‘anecdote’ and hence 
‘unscientific’ or, at very best, subject to scientific ‘validation.’
Similarly, the recognition in the public policy literature that wild dog predation on 
agricultural stock may also have ‘much more direct, emotional consequences...’ (Hart 
and Bomford 2006 February: 4) on farm families is often held to be indicative of the 
‘truculence’ of farm families in achieving ecological objectives and not a reflection of 
the failure of the ‘strategic approach’ to countenance different forms of meaning and 
emotional expression that may be pivotal within alternative discourses and/or a 
recognition that the material effect of the application of the ‘strategic approach’ on the 
daily lives of farm families may result in on-going harm to their well-being.
Further, an analysis of WDMC policy documents reveals that the overall aim of 
scientific research was to establish the precise nature of the relationship between 
‘variables’ and wild dogs in order to produce causal models which could then be 
utilised predictively to aid in the conservation of the dingo as well as native fauna 
(Lunney, Matthews et al. 2002, Daniels and Corbett 2003, Kortner, Gresser et al. 2003, 
Kortner and Watson 2005, Elledge, Leung. L. K. -P. et al. 2006, Fenner 2009, Brook 
and Kutt 2011). What is interesting about these studies are the ways they were 
generalised and the overlaps that occurred among those conducting the research and the 
determination of policy.
This approach relied on the scientific method wherein there is also a considerable 
emphasis -  as well as considerable funding given to it by successive Federal 
Governments - on a ‘tools in the toolbox’ approach. This is evidenced by the continued 
promotion of ‘tools’ as ‘solutions’ to WDMC. These have included: synthetic lures 
(Hunt, Dali et al. 2007), Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping (Robley, 
Gormley et al. 2010), ‘sand plot’ monitoring (NSW National Parks and Wildlife 
Service 2006, NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 2006, NSW National Parks
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and Wildlife Service 2006, NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 2010), the 
‘satellite tracking of wild dogs (Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2007, 
Claridge and Hunt 2008 August, Claridge, Mills et al. 2009), the development and trial 
of ‘M-44’ injectors (Hooke, Allen et al. 2006), the ‘blue-sky’ development of the as yet 
unregistered, chemical toxin, para-aminopropiophenone as Dogabate, commonly known 
as ‘PAPP’ and its antidote, Methylene Blue ‘Blue-Heeler’(Lapidge, Dali et al. 2006, 
Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2012) and the promotion of the dingo as 
‘tropic regulators’ (Glen and Dickman 2005, Glen, Dickman et al. 2007). The storyline 
of ‘tropic regulators’ is repeated frequently throughout the ecological literature. Put 
simply, it is a hypothesis only that suggests that wild dogs serve a utilitarian function in 
the ecosystem in controlling other ‘invasive’ species.
This ‘tools-in-toolbox’ ‘innovative’ and ‘modern’ approach focused on a ‘technical 
rationality’ (Fischer 2003: 13) which was compounded and enforced by the creation of 
a ‘“quasi-guardianship” of autonomous experts, no longer accountable to the ordinary 
citizen’ (Fischer 2005: 7) -  mostly emanating from within Government, particularly 
NSW NPWS, the Vertebrate Pest Research Unit of NSW DPI, the IACRC and 
researchers from within the ecological science disciplines of a number of Australian 
universities (Dickman, Glen et al. 2009, Purcell 2010).
Cumulatively these organisations promoted specific meanings o f ‘wild dog’ and ‘dingo’ 
both from within government departments and agencies and from scientific 
organisations closely allied to government. Hence wild dogs became known as ‘wild,’ 
‘feral,’ ‘pest,’ ‘commensal,’ ‘alien,’ ‘hybrid’ or, more recently, ‘free-ranging’ (Fleming, 
Corbett et al. 2001, The Conversation Media Trust 2013 18 February: 12).
The principle aim of most of the research appeared not to be the eradication of wild 
dogs per se but rather the acquisition and promotion of ecological knowledge. Wild 
dogs in many instances appeared peripheral but seemingly provided the funding stream 
(Lapidge, Dali et al. 2006). Often, technological ‘innovations,’ which were represented 
as the new ‘tools’ of WDMC, were progressed to trial largely independent of direct 
input from farm families regarding either their efficacy or even their need. At times, 
these trials were also conducted without their knowledge.
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This is not without irony, as it was the support from farm organisations and farm 
families and the skills of ‘doggers’ on which Government Departments and agencies 
often relied during field trials in the first instance to trap wild dogs, and for 
accommodation, in-kind support and ultimately for research funding, endorsement, and 
promotion of potential new ‘products.’ Two organisations, for example, the Meat and 
Livestock Association (MLA) and Australian Wool Innovation (AWI) alone contributed 
almost $6 million to the development of ‘PAPP’ of which the IACRC was the leading 
research organisation and commercial proponent (Australian Wool Innovation Ltd 
2012, Meat & Livestock Australia 2012).
Crossing the Rubicon - The commercialisation of WDMC
During the time of successive NSW Labor Governments, there was a palpable shift in 
WDMC towards ‘new’ technological innovations. This ‘turn’ was accelerated by the 
pervasive intertwining of the Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre (IACRC) 
-  a cooperative research centre established in 2002, whose predecessor, established in 
July 1991, was the Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) for Biological Control of Pest 
Animals, known more familiarly as the Pest Animals CRC (PACRC) -  with that of 
government agencies both State and Federal (Peacock 2006 August) who are charged 
with WDMC in NSW.
In 2003, Australian Wool Innovation (AWI) signed a commercial agreement with:
the ‘Pest Animal Control Cooperative Research Centre (now Invasive Animals 
CRC)...to evaluate and develop a new toxic agent for control of wild dogs and 
foxes (canids) (Lapidge, Dali et al. 2006: 259).
It would appear that this was largely in response to concerns that the 2005 APVMA 
Inquiry into the continued use of ‘1080’ (Australian Pesticides and Veterinary 
Medicines Authority 2007) may make a recommendation that would withdraw it from 
use in WDMC (Lapidge, Dali et al. 2006: 259). This concern appeared to have 
contributed to the rise of a ‘science and technology’ discourse in WDMC which the 
IACRC itself promoted as a ‘growth industry’ (Invasive Animals Cooperative Research 
Centre 2006).
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Chief among the claims of the IACRC was that:
The IACRC brings together about 40 partners representing private and public 
land managers, universities, and training, research and development 
organisations in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America (Fleming, Allen et al. 2006: 753 - 754).
This period was marked by the entry of new commercial actors in WDMC (NSW 
National Parks and Wildlife Service 2006, Animal Control Technologies 2007 12 
February, Humphrys and Lapidge 2008, Eason, Fagerstone et al. 2010, Pestat Pty Ltd 
2010), many of whom were in direct commercial relationships and/or provided in-kind 
support to the IACRC (Fleming, Allen et al. 2006, Animal Control Technologies 2007 
12 February).
In 2005, the Commonwealth Government subsequently recommended the IACRC as the 
‘authorial voice’ on WDMC -  albeit, originally, in scientific ‘research’ alone (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005).
In 2006, the Chief Executive Officer of the IACRC in a report to the Productivity 
Commission on ‘the Advantages of a Cooperative Research Centre’ commented:
All jurisdictions have retained some capacity to conduct R&D into invasive 
animal issues. However, even within jurisdictions, this capacity is often split 
between agriculture and environment agencies and the largest grouping (NSW 
DPI) probably remains less than a dozen people, even with significant cash 
support from the IA CRC (Peacock 2006 August: 1).
Government, technological ‘innovation’ and ecological science were thus seen to be 
acting publicly in concert -  because they were. The quest for technological 
‘innovations’ created a ‘club’ of ecological scientists, researchers and advocates who 
came mostly from within existing and very small research units within Government 
Departments and science based academic institutes whose research reified and 
reaffirmed their own empiricist values. Davis (2003) reported:
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There are relatively few Australian scientists in the vertebrate pest arena. They 
collaborate closely, both directly and through the Pest Animal Cooperative 
Research Centre and other institutions. Funding bodies like BRS also facilitate 
coordination of research effort (Davis 2003: 36).
Many co-authored scientific papers together. Many were also members of the 
Australasian Wildlife Management Society (AWMS), later held positions of authority in 
the IACRC and were, at the same time, members of the NSW DPI Vertebrate Pest 
Research Unit or members of NSW DPI (Invasive Animals Cooperative Research 
Centre 2010, Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 2010). The stated aims of 
AWMS were to:
influence policy and management decisions through the provision of clear, 
explicit and pragmatic advice on options for wildlife management and 
associated risks (Australasian Wildlife Management Society 2010: np).
Close links were forged between Commonwealth and State Governments and scientific 
organisations over this period.
A National Wild Dog Facilitator -  previously employed by NSW NPWS - was 
appointed specifically to ‘facilitate’ the ‘strategic approach’ (Invasive Animals 
Cooperative Research Centre 2010). These organisations simultaneously ‘jockeyed’ for 
the ‘authorial voice’ on WDMC. However, in 2005, the Federal Government 
subsequently and very publicly recommended the IACRC as:
the appropriate body to take responsibility for national coordination of pest 
animal research, given its existing focus on collaboration with community 
groups, government agencies, RDCs, industry, research providers and 
educational and training institutions (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 183 - 185).
This ‘research’ was predicated on the ‘scientific method,’ the ‘strategic model’ and the 
development of ‘new’ technological ‘innovations.’ Consultation and engagement with 
farm families -  re-presented as ‘new’ innovations - was predicated, perhaps not 
surprisingly, on the explicit and implicit acceptance by farm families of the ‘truth’ of all
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three empiricist precepts. This is problematic because as Fischer (2000) writes generally 
of discourses:
Not only do such explanatory models empty the meaning out of the lives of the 
relevant social actors, but even worse, they refill these lives with their own 
imposed meanings (Fischer 2005: 66)
Progressively over this time, a sharp demarcation emerged in responsibilities for 
WDMC. Successive ALP Federal Governments invested in ‘research.’ The States -  at 
least according to the Federal Government - were responsible for funding 
implementation, that is, the actual ‘eradication and control.’ Nevertheless, this sharp 
delineation in the control of so-called ‘invasives’ became a source of angst in 
Federal/State relations not least because the States claimed to have insufficient money 
to complete the task. The Commonwealth Government was also not averse to flexing its 
muscle when it sought to intervene using the ‘trump card’ of the Environmental 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBCA).
Overall, the relationship between Federal and State government departments, agencies 
and scientific organizations, particularly the IACRC was often held in storylines by the 
marginalised discourse coalition to be less than ‘arms-length’ and lacking in 
transparency. However, more recently the Vertebrate Pest Unit of NSW DPI revealed 
that it was often assisted and/or was dependent on the financial largesse and/or in-kind 
support o f ‘independent’ commercial organisations for the continuation of research. For 
example, in an article in the e-newsletter, The Conversation, both authors -  both 
employees of the NSW DPI -  disclosed that the Vertebrate Pest Unit DPI had received:
funding and inkind contributions for research about wild canid management 
from Invasive Animals CRC, Wildlife and Exotic Disease Preparedness Plan, 
Australian Pest Animal Research Program, Australian Wool Innovation, 
Biosecurity NSW, Forests NSW and NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service.
The second author revealed that he had similarly received support from:
the Australian Pest Animals Research Program, Australian Wool Innovation and 
the Invasive Animals CRC. He has previously received funding and in-kind 
contributions from organisations including Catchment Management Authorities
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and the NSW National Parks & Wildlife Service (The Conversation Media 
Trust 2013 18 February).
During this time, close relationships were also forged between Government and 
industry. In 2006, for example, NSW NPWS reported in an ‘Information Fact Sheet’ 
that during ‘M-44 ejector trials’: ‘Close liaison with Pestat Ltd and the Invasive 
Animals CRC will continue throughout the trial’ (NSW National Parks and Wildlife 
Service 2010). In 2007, Pestat Ltd reported:
Pestat was established by the Pest Animal Control Cooperative Research Centre 
(PAC CRC) in 1999. Pestat is now is a member of The Invasive Animals Co­
operative Research Centre.
At the Commonwealth level, for example, in 2013, Southwell et al (2013) reported that: 
‘This work was funded by the Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 
(IACRC)’. The research paper investigated the barriers to the uptake of the as-yet 
unregistered chemical toxin, PAPP, which is being developed by the IACRC. The 
authors of this paper were all employees of the Australian Bureau of Agriculture and 
Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES), from the Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF). It appears that the IACRC is commercially dependent 
on the Commonwealth Government under the Cooperative Research Centre model 
literally for its continued existence (Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre 
2012) while, at the same time, the Commonwealth is also its commercial client 
(Southwell, Boero et al. 2013). To farming families this form of commercialisation and 
the public safeguards involved in these forms of networked governance are not easily 
apparent.
Importantly, to many farming families it is also difficult to discern in the public arena 
on whose authority and in which capacity social actors particularly from within the 
NSW DPI Vertebrate Pest Unit are acting. This often gave rise in WDMC public 
meetings to accusations of a lack of transparency and accountability in governance and 
accusations of a conflict of interest. There are recurring storylines that suggest a strong 
perception among farm families that WDMC policy is based on highly skewed 
‘ecological science’ which is often flawed by virtue of its design, into which they have 
no input and for which their farming levies and rates pay.
152
One example of this is the controversial but continued use of ‘sand plot monitoring’ as 
an indicator of the presence of wild dogs. It involves the monitoring of transects of land 
on which sand is literally placed at regular intervals to monitor the presence of wildlife, 
not just wild dogs. Yet, these ‘sand plots’ are often washed away, are monitored only 
for three days yet are still held to be indicative of the presence or absence of wildlife -  
and wild dogs - in the area. The delimitations placed on these ‘sand plots’ are that no 
baiting must have occurred previously within a prescribed distance and that transects 
‘run’ for at least twenty five kilometres. The criticism is that the location of the sand 
plots themselves precludes meaningful results and rather than being a measure of 
wildlife they are actually used to establish critical weight ranges of fauna. Farming 
families argue vehemently that this is not a WDMC method.
Likewise, the insistence on a reliance on ‘mound-baiting’ and the endorsement of ‘M- 
44’ injectors occurs in the face of trenchant criticisms from farm families and trappers 
that they do not work and that they create ‘bait-shy’ wild dogs. Importantly, farming 
families argue that these techniques are not indicative of the presence of wild dogs yet 
they nevertheless absorb large WDMC financial expenditures; especially when infra-red 
camera monitoring or ‘radio-collaring’ of dogs occurs at the same time. In this way the 
methods o f ‘science’ and the ‘science’ itself is perceived to work against the interests of 
farm families. Yet, within the scientific literatures there is a palpable sense of 
‘fascination’ that emerges from these studies and ‘new’ technologies.
Crucially, farming families often argue that in raising their commercial imperatives 
publicly, that is, their ‘right to farm’ they are presumed to speak only from self-interest 
-  not from any environmental concerns; and that cumulatively, the emphasis on 
questionable ‘ecological’ research and ‘new’ technological innovations have obscured 
their ‘voices’ even though the day-to-day impacts of wild dog predation on agricultural 
stock are felt foremost by farm families. Implicitly, the livelihoods of farm families 
appear secondary.
Paradigm shift -  same old, same old...
Overall, the period of successive NSW Labor Governments, the formation of a 
discourse coalition among policy, scientific and technological actors occurred in which 
the marginalised discourse, which pivoted on storylines of the knowledges and
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experiences of farm families, was held as subordinate to ‘fact’ and ‘truth.’ The ‘strategic 
approach’ became one of the dominant storylines of the dominant discourse coalition. 
However, the demise of the NSW Labor Government in 2011 coincided with the 
beginning of a paradigm shift in the ecological understandings of WDMC which in turn 
began to challenge and unravel accepted maxims in ecological science pertaining to 
wild dogs, and, particularly the assertion that wild dogs have a function in an ecosystem 
in predating on other ‘invasive’ species (Allen and Fleming 2012, Fleming, Allen et al. 
2012, Johnson and Ritchie 2012). This is reminiscent of the storylines that surrounded 
the ‘native quoll’ research which again is being played out in the ecological science 
literature and which has direct effects on WDMC in NSW.
This latest paradigm shift occurred amid concerns that the large financial investments in 
the development of ‘new’ technologies for the ‘control’ of wild dogs may not reach 
fruition and/or implementation, that they may have biological impacts on livestock (The 
National Possum Control Agencies (NPCA) nd: 5) and native fauna, particularly birds 
(Eason, Murphy et al. 2010); and/or that the physical restrictions on their use and its 
delivery may significantly compromise results. For example, many experienced 
doggers argue that a wild dog will not enter an enclosed cage and will ‘teach’ their pups 
not to touch a ‘processed’ meat bait delivered in either ‘mounds’ or inside an enclosed 
cage.
However, the main storylines of the marginalised discourse coalition appeared to have 
been missed by many: The so-called ‘growth industry’ in the science and technological 
‘tools in the toolbox’ approach to WDMC appeared to coincide with a ‘growth’ in wild 
dog predation on agricultural stock (Agforce Queensland 2009) -  a problem that a cost- 
benefit analysis of investments in scientific and technological research, ‘new’ 
technological innovations and the introduction of a ‘National Wild Dog Facilitator’ -  
the subject of reports all commissioned by the IACRC - claimed to be overcoming 
(Gong, Sinden et al. 2009, Chudleigh, Simpson et al. 2011).
These reports conveniently failed to report that the national sheep flock, euphemistically 
called the ‘disappearing flock’ was also at its lowest since 1915 (Curtis 2009) and that 
many lands previously stocked with sheep have been actively destocked because of wild 
dogs.
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Notwithstanding this, the public acknowledgment of the research and development 
focus in WDMC in contrast to a focus on the eradication of wild dogs, and, the financial 
links -  if not interdependency - between government agencies and commercial entities 
such as the IACRC appears to reiterate the storyline of the marginalised discourse that 
the ‘line’ between research and development and government had been crossed. This 
often repeated storyline circles around issues of transparency and accountability in 
governance and conflicts of interest. This remains of particular concern to many farm 
families.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Fulton and Vanclay (2011) report that across Australia reported 
levels of trust in agricultural extension has waned significantly (Fulton and Vanclay 
2011). Vanclay argues that the emphasis on models of traditional top-down agricultural 
extension, the positioning of farmers as ‘passive recipients,’ of ‘education,’ the ‘push’ 
for the ‘uptake’ of ‘new’ products through commercial partnerships and the implicit 
assumption of trust in ‘Science’ by farm families has proved to be misplaced. 
Importantly, and overwhelmingly, as Vanclay (2011) writes: ‘It is inappropriate to 
believe that only ‘Science’ (as a social institution) can create knowledge that is then 
transferred to the public via extension’ (Vanclay 2011: 57).
It is evident that there was an unwillingness to review the short comings of the ‘strategic 
approach’ - its claims of ‘objectivity’, the appropriateness of the ‘model’ as it is applied 
to the management of people, or, it seems, an intention to relinquish power in or 
through polycentric centres of governance. This is despite a considerable rhetoric of 
‘leaming-by-doing’ in WDMC literature. It is apparent that what ‘learning’ occurs is 
selective. As Fleming et al (2010) implicitly suggest it is people’s values that have to be 
‘overcome:’
In moving from theoretical ecology to real-world management (i.e. from 
proposing positive management of dingoes to actually achieving it), the biggest 
stumbling blocks are people and their associated sociopolitical views (Fleming, 
Allen et al. 2012: 753).
Instead, the oft-repeated storyline of the dominant discourse coalition was that it is:
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being applied with some success to wild dog management in New South Wales 
and the Australian Capital Territory (Fleming, Allen et al. 2006: 758 citing 
Jenkins et al. 2002).
Importantly, the criteria of ‘success’ is not enunciated, nor is widespread empirical 
evidence provided to substantiate this purported ‘success’ or more recent claims of 
‘success’ across NSW other than in purely numerical terms. Any isolated case of 
reported success is held to be representative of the whole. In this way the initial success 
of the Brindabella Plan was continuously represented as a ‘success’ story for others to 
follow. However, at the same time, the rise of other discourses in WDMC began to 
make their presence felt and it is this that the next Chapter turns.
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Chapter Six:
‘Strangers in the Home Paddock’ -  the competing discourses in wild dog
management and control
During the period of successive NSW Labor Governments, competing discourses acted 
progressively as the counter point to the dominant discourse of administrative 
rationalism. These include: ‘new’ environmentalism, agrarianism, animal welfare and 
biosecurity. Within the administrative rationalist discourse of WDMC, ‘wild dogs’ were 
positioned in storylines as a risk to the future of the agricultural industry, as a threat to 
the purity of the dingo through hybridisation, and as a by-product of modernity which 
was manifest in the form of ‘pests.’ However, wherever their origin and whatever the 
internal inconsistencies that existed within and between them, these storylines were 
ultimately subverted in service of the dominant administrative rationalist discourse.
This Chapter examines four contending discourses in turn: ‘new’ environmentalism; 
agrarianism; animal welfare; and, biosecurity. It argues that the function of the 
storylines within these competing discourses was threefold: to create meaning and 
validate action, to mobilise action, and to define alternatives (Hannigan 2006: citing 
Gelcich et al. 2005: 379). Overall, the Chapter reveals that while the NSW Labor 
Government privileged ecological science as the authorial voice in WDMC, the 
legitimacy of this authority was strongly contested. This added further complexity to the 
understanding of the issue of WDMC and, in turn, impacted dramatically on its 
implementation in NSW.
Background
In 2002, the NSW Parliament General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 found:
Feral animals cause extensive damage to Australia’s natural resources and 
agricultural production and cost the nation hundreds of millions of dollars in lost 
agricultural production and conservation expenses. The major environmental 
impacts of feral animals involve predation of and competition with native 
animals and the destruction of native plants. Feral animals also cause land
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degradation, and are a potential threat for the spread and distribution of exotic 
diseases.
As well as the financial impact, feral animals can have a debilitating social 
impact on farming families and communities that have to deal with the 
consequences of feral animal attacks on farming stock (General Purpose 
Standing Committee No. 5 2002: xii)
Later, in 2005, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry reported:
The committee considers that feral dogs are the most serious pest animal 
currently facing Australian sheep and cattle farmers. They are also one of the 
most significant pest animal problems for Australian agriculture generally 
(House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and 
Forestry 2005: 17).
The discourse o f ‘new’ environmentalism
Hajer (1993) argues that:
The re-emergence of environmentalism in the late 1950s was not just a protest 
against the perceived risk implied in new large-scale technological projects. It 
was also a celebration of the virtues and morality of unspoiled nature and a call 
to change the conceptual framework and start thinking about nature in terms of 
beauty and as necessary to life instead of in terms of domination and as a system 
of cause-and-effect relationships (Hajer 1993: 47).
This was positioned as a direct rebuke to the discourse of agrarianism. However, within 
the discourse of ‘new’ environmentalism several disparate storylines emerged, most 
noticeably the storylines of ecological science. During this time, within the ecological 
storylines ‘wild dogs’ were understood as a threat to the ‘purity’ of the dingo (Canis 
lupus dingo) through hybridisation (Benson 2004). Yet, at the same time, throughout the 
ecological literature wild dogs were also believed to have utility as a ‘top-order’ 
predator in controlling other animals prescribed also by the Minister as ‘pests’ under the
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Pest Control Order (Gien and Dickman 2005, Gien, Dickman et al. 2007, Johnson 2009, 
Letnic, Crowther et al. 2009). Both of these storylines rested on hypotheses only. Yet, 
these hypotheses were often ‘taken-for-granted’ as ‘fact’ (General Purpose Standing 
Committee No. 5 2002, Claridge, Mills et al. 2009, Brook and Kutt 2011: 79).
In 2002, for example, the NSW Government reported:
In terms of their impact on native animals, it is recognised that dingoes and wild 
dogs are the top order predator in natural ecosystems in Australia (General 
Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 2002: 17).
To many farm families this was arrant nonsense: ‘white man has been the top order 
predator since colonisation and before him, Aboriginal man’ (Franklin 2001 March: np).
Nevertheless, these ecological hypotheses rested on strongly held but divergent 
storylines in the ecological literatures which informed and overlapped with WDMC 
policy and restricted the ways in which WDMC at the grassroots was implemented. 
Successive NSW Labor Governments contained WDMC within a broad political 
rhetoric that espoused ‘ecological sustainable development’(General Purpose Standing 
Committee No. 5 2002) as part of its self-proclaimed ‘Green Legacy.’ In NSW, WDMC 
proceeded on the basis of the ‘precautionary principle.’
In 2002, in furtherance of this, in its Report, Feral Animals, the NSW Parliament 
General Purpose Standing Committee No. 5 stated:
The Committee believes the precautionary principle should prevail, and so 
supports the current approach by the NPWS (General Purpose Standing 
Committee No. 5 2002: xvi).
The effect of the precautionary principle in WDMC was that ‘potential habitats’ of 
dingoes were identified across NSW and were designated ‘core’ areas. Any measure 
that may affect these locations required ecological assessment. All WDMC in these 
areas was prohibited.
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In 1999, NSW NPWS commissioned a species impact statement (SIS) into the effect of 
1080 on native quolls (Jones 2002 31 October: 50). As a result, NSW NPWS ceased 
aerial baiting in NSW as 1080 was considered to pose ‘...too great a risk to populations 
of the spotted-tailed quoll in three areas examined’ (Jones 2002 31 October: 50).
In a response to the interpretations given by NSW NPWS to the findings of the SIS, the 
NSW Farmers Association argued emphatically:
The 1999 SIS recommended that 1080 aerial baiting should not be undertaken in 
a small area of Kosciuszko National Park called the Byadbo Wilderness Area 
(an area that comprises only 0.9 % of the Kosciuszko NP).
Importantly, it is the clear understanding of the Association that the SIS did not 
recommend a total blanket ban on aerial baiting in the remainder of the 
Kosciuszko National Park or southern NSW. In the future, the Association 
requests that NPWS officials acknowledge the published recommendations of 
the SIS (NSW Farmers Association 2004: 9 - 10).
In the interim, in 2001, the Victorian and NSW Wild Dog Coordinating Committee was 
formed as a result of the ‘...serious and escalating wild dog problem in the rangelands 
grazing country of Victoria and NSW’ (Tallangatta Branch Victorian Farmers 
Federation 2001: 1). This was convened by Wodonga District Council of the Victorian 
Farmers Federation, the Albury-Wodonga Region of the Australian Superfine 
Woolgrowers Association and the Cooma Branch of the NSW Farmers Association 
(Tallangatta Branch Victorian Farmers Federation 2001).
Additionally, in July 2002, the APVMA began a review into 1080 following the public 
regulatory review of chemicals by the National Registration Authority for Agricultural 
and Veterinary Chemicals (NRA) (State Council of Rural Lands Protection Boards 2002 
24 July). However, the APVMA did not publicly report its preliminary findings until 
2005 or present its final Review until 2008. The decision to proceed with the Review 
was based on the application of the precautionary principle ‘...because of concerns over 
poisoning of non-target animals’ raised in submissions to the NRA (Australian 
Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority 2007: iv).
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Subsequently, the APVMA found:
that although poisoning of non-target animals occurs, it is limited to individual 
animals and does not adversely affect overall populations of the non-target 
animals (Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority 2007).
However, many farm families, in response to the widespread withdrawal of 1080 and 
the ban on aerial baiting by NSW NPWS from 1997, expressed frustration, anger and 
concern. A Ranger with the then Armidale Rural Lands Protection Board also voiced 
the concern of many of the local NSW RLPBs at this time:
The deregulation of 1080 would be an intolerable situation for all landholders 
and land managers (Van Eyk 2001 17 December: 1 - 2).
Further to this, the Chief Executive Officer, of the then State Council of the Rural Lands 
Protection Boards in a submission to the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry wrote:
Of major relevance in pest animal management is the use of 1080 poison to 
control various pest species. The crucial importance in pest species program 
cannot be overemphasised. In many ways it is the primary tool in controlling 
such pests. Without the continued availability of 1080 poison for this purpose, 
the deleterious effects of the pest species would no doubt increase to disastrous 
levels. State Council and Boards are aware of the opposition to the use of 1080 
which comes from various individuals and organisations. However, the benefits 
of use of the chemical for pest control far outweigh any problems associated 
with its use (State Council of Rural Lands Protection Boards 2004 29 June: 2).
In contrast to the institutional responses of the State Council of the RLPB and many 
individual Boards across NSW, many submissions from representatives of farm families 
received by the Parliamentary Inquiry viewed the management of wild dogs very 
personally. One witness reported:
I am one of the survivors from the original Barnard Valley area. Mr Moore’s 
family is the other family that is there after the dogs ate everybody out in the late 
1950s. I have seen a change in my lifetime, and I certainly do not want to see the
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change go back the other way. I have seen the heartache and despair of the dogs 
eating sheep and dogs eating wildlife. I was never privileged as a child to see the 
sort of wildlife that I can see every day of the week since the introduction of 
aerial baiting. That was never, ever evident. What has made that possible is 
aerial baiting, cleaning up feral dogs and foxes. I make it very plain, feral dogs; 
feral dogs and bread (sic) twice a year, unlike a dingo. There are twice as many 
of them than there would have been before. Once they start to eat sheep or 
something it is like having a front-door key to the butcher shop...If you want to 
see the country cleaned out and devoid of wildlife, leave feral dogs and foxes in 
abundance over there like they were when I was a boy and you will have 
nothing. We have to have a long hard think about how we look after and 
maintain our national parks and forest country (Wiggan 2002: 12).
Over successive years, increasing concern was voiced across and by many farming 
organisations. In 2002, a National Wild Dog Summit was convened in 
Albury/Wodonga, a NSW and Victorian border town, at the instigation of farm families 
and farm organisations across NSW and Victoria where:
all but two of the 400 people present voted in favour of the reintroduction of 
aerial baiting across the wild dog breeding areas of all mainland states and 
territories’ (National Wild Dog Summit 2002 22nd February: 3).
In 2004, NSW Farmers Cooma District Council submitted the following unanimous 
motion to the National Inquiry:
That the National Inquiry on Pest Animals recommend immediate re- 
introduction of aerial baiting programs within State held lands, to protect the 
productivity of the rural sector affected by wild dog predation, and also to 
protect our native fauna from wild dog predation (NSW Farmers Association 
Cooma District Council 2004 16 June: np).
After NSW NPWS field studies in 2004 and 2005 in NSW and in Queensland between 
2004 and 2005, NSW NPWS reversed its original decision and resumed aerial baiting 
with 1080. It concluded that:
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It may be that quolls have a higher resistance to 1080 than would otherwise be 
predicted on the basis of laboratory-based trials (New South Wales Office of 
Environment and Heritage 2011: np).
Nevertheless, the NSW NPWS Steering Committee ‘...identified the need for further 
research to improve quoll conservation’ (New South Wales Office of Environment and 
Heritage 2011). Fenner et al (2009) later concluded:
Therefore, determination of theoretical risk should be regarded only as a first 
step in assessing the actual risk faced by non-target species (King 1989; Kortner 
et al. 2003; Komter and Watson 2005; Claridge et al. 2006; Claridge and Mills 
2007; Kortner 2007). Without monitoring the fate of individual animals and 
populations during the actual baiting campaigns, any risk assessments of baiting 
remain highly speculative and can lead to erroneous management decisions 
(Fenner 2009: 531).
However, the public standing and the sincerity of the public commitment by NSW 
NPWS to continue aerial baiting was further challenged. In 2005, the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry took 
evidence in Cooma that:
the re-introduction of aerial baiting in these areas has been a ‘token’ effort, and 
that there has been little attempt to reintroduce aerial baiting, particularly in 
national parks. The committee is hopeful that an effective aerial baiting 
campaign will resume following the release of research showing that dog baits 
do not harm native wildlife (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 124).
In contrast, in a stinging rebuke, Animal Control Technologies, described as the chief 
manufacturer of baits in Australia, presented a storyline of risk within a context of the 
abrogation of national responsibility. It argued:
...without any doubt, the nation must face the reality of aerial baiting campaigns 
if we seek to make a serious impact on the pest problems in larges (sic) areas of 
low human density or inaccessible country and where budgetary constraints
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limit other options. The only debate is on how to best mange (sic) the slightly 
higher non-target risk that may be associated with such baiting. In doing so the 
analysis should not only consider the risk but also the benefits from the control 
operation. The do-nothing option is always risk free but the downside is that 
there are no benefits either. This is the current approach at many sites and it is a 
totally reprehensible abrogation of responsibility (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005 84: 35).
The Determination of the NSW Scientific Committee and the risk of hybridisation
In 2001, pressure from an increasingly politicised ecological science discourse re the 
extensive, if not irreversible, genetic hybridisation of the ‘native dog’ (Australian 
Native Dog Conservation Society 1993: 1, Colong Foundation nd) fuelled attempts to 
‘list’ dingoes as ‘endangered populations’ under the Threatened Species Conservation 
Act (TSCA) 1995.
In 2008, the NSW Scientific Committee, using its powers under the Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1996, found in its preliminary determination that:
Predation and Hybridisation by Feral Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) is eligible to 
be listed as a key threatening process as, in the opinion of the Scientific 
Committee:
(a) it adversely affects threatened species, populations or ecological 
communities, or
(b) could cause species, populations or ecological communities that are not 
threatened to become threatened (Department of Environment and Climate 
Change 2008 29 August).
Under this Act, the NSW Scientific Committee subsequently ‘listed’ the predation and 
hybridisation by feral dogs as a ‘key threatening process’ but the attempts to ‘list’ the 
dingo as ‘endangered populations’ failed (Dickman and Lunney 2001, Department of 
Environment and Climate Change 2008 29 August, Colong Foundation nd).
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Progressively during the time of the NSW Labor Government, meanings which 
distinguished ‘wild dogs’ from ‘dingoes’ were ‘fixed’ in WDMC policy literature. A 
plethora of ecological meanings emerged that drew further distinctions among types of 
‘dogs’ and these were variously described and detailed based on the Cartesian system of 
classification. This became the plank around which the administrative language of 
WDMC in NSW was built.
This ‘naming’ of ‘wild dogs’ was administratively convenient and self-serving of the 
interests of ecological science because over time the language of the discourse became 
taken-for-granted. More generally, Kuhn (1996) notes o f ‘paradigms’ that:
When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for granted, he [sic] need no 
longer, in his major works, attempt to build his field anew, starting from first 
principles and justify-the use of each concept introduced (Kuhn 1996: 19).
However, the material reality of this distinction and the ‘listing’ of the risk of 
hybridisation as a threat to the purity dingoes had a direct bearing on the lives of farm 
families who were experiencing escalating wild dog predation on agricultural stock 
because how, where, when, and, if wild dogs could be killed became further restricted 
(Doherty 2008 15 August).
Additionally, the attempt to ‘list’ dingoes as ‘endangered’ in practical terms, had the 
potential, at the very least, to present policy makers with ‘...an intriguing legal 
conundrum,’ (Dickman, Glen et al. 2009: p 60), if not, severely curtail all WDMC in 
NSW. This was because:
...the practical implications of such a decision would be to never kill any wild 
dog because it might be a dingo, or obtain a license to kill any wild dog as 
threatened fauna’ (Dickman and Lunney 2001).
As a consequence:
In collaboration with NSW Agriculture, NPWS convened four meetings of 
public land management agencies to consider arrangements capable of meeting 
both agricultural protection and conservation objectives, but avoiding conflict
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between the RLP Act 1998 and the TSC Act 1995. To ensure transparency, 
limited representation from Rural Lands Protection Boards (RLPB) also 
attended these meetings. Broader consultation occurred at a later stage (Davis 
and Leys 2001: 109).
Nevertheless, core dingo conservation areas were identified across NSW as ‘potential’ 
habitats for dingoes and WDMC in these areas was prohibited. At the same time, 
‘buffer zones’ were created around many National Parks in which WDMC was often 
prohibited (Moore 2002, 22 February). However, the size of these ‘buffer zones’ varied 
across NSW and the decision of whether trapping or baiting could occur within these 
zones ultimately rested on the interpretation of the Area Managers of various 
Government Departments. From the 1960s this became a cause of intense hostility 
between public land managers and farm families adding further fuel to the storyline of 
the ‘locking up’ of the National Estate. These decisions were often hotly contested and 
became the cause of intense and lingering acrimony and vitriol between farm families 
and local land managers.
In 2001, in a land mark case, Ron Stockwell, a farmer from Victoria successfully sued 
the Victorian Government. Justice Gillard (2001) found that:
the government was liable for private nuisance and common law negligence 
because it knew of the presence of wild dogs, it was foreseeable that that the 
Stockwells would suffer damage if nothing was done, and the government failed 
to take reasonable measures to rectify the problem (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 156).
Moreover, the Court found that the Victoria Department of Conservation had failed to 
take reasonable measures to rectify the issue. However, the victory was pyrrhic. By the 
time of the legal ruling, Ron Stockwell was bankrupt and had lost the family farm 
(Gillard 2001 17 December: 427).
The ecological framing of ‘wild dogs’
The attempt at ‘listing’ dingoes also gave added impetus to further challenge the 
remnant power of the ‘wool discourse’ in WDMC [See Chapter Two for discussion].
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During this time, some ecological scientists called publicly and regularly for the 
removal of sheep from the landscape, the retention and utility of wild dogs as perceived 
‘top order’ predators and the reintroduction of the dingo into national parks, 
conservation zones, arid zones and rangelands (ABC News 2006 15 November, Macey 
2007 11 July, Dayton 2007, 11 July, Smith 2009 13 August). One academic advocated 
the introduction of elephants and komodo dragons into the Australian landscape 
(Bowman 2009); another suggested retaining wild dogs to control feral pigs (Flannery 
1994).
In 2007, at the Australian Biodiversity Conference, Chris Dickman (2007), a Professor 
from the University of Sydney, made a very public call to release wild dogs into the 
Western Division of NSW to contain feral goat populations. Under his plan, farm 
families would simply receive compensation for any stock losses (Clarke 2007). The 
exact details of this scheme were not clarified. This call attracted considerable criticism 
because such a plan, if introduced, would severely affect, if not, curtail the existing feral 
goat industries which was valued in 2010 as A$113 million in Western NSW (Ferguson 
2012: 21).
In 2009, Dickman et al (2009) further argued: ‘That dingo reintroduction would be a 
cost-effective means of restoring Australia’s conservation wastelands’ (Dickman, Glen 
et al. 2009: 239). Cumulatively, these ecological challenges were couched in a language 
o f ‘risk.’ As Dickman et al (2009) argued:
However, if we do insist on continuing “business as usual,” we must factor in 
the catastrophic costs in future of the loss of ecological processes and ecosystem 
function owing to more over-grazing, the further spread of noxious weeds, the 
continuing overuse of poisons to reduce impacts of pests, and ongoing loss and 
salinization of the soil that remains. If returning dingoes to the system can help 
to alleviate these costs, then we cannot afford to delay reintroductions any 
longer (Dickman, Glen et al. 2009: 261).
This ‘new’ environmental storyline of ‘risk’ resonated with some ecologists and 
signified a much more strident approach. In a direct affront to the findings of many 
industry and Government Reports and the overwhelming collective knowledges and 
experiences of farm families, Purcell (2010) claimed:
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The considerable resources devoted to dingo control, the number of dingoes 
controlled, and the assertion that controlling predators is necessary to maintain 
the viability of the Australian livestock industry appears to be a fa9ade (Purcell 
2010: 127).
However, noticeably absent from this ‘analysis’ was any substantive evidence. 
Similarly, his argument that: ‘All wild-living dogs regardless of pelt colour or genetic 
status should be labelled dingoes and their functional role should be 
preserved’(Fleming, Allen et al. 2012: 125 citing Purcell 2010) was highly normative -  
and inflammatory.
In contrast, in an extraordinarily wide ranging polemic, Low (2003) argued:
And what about dingoes? We treat them in national parks as native animals 
while knowing they are really feral dogs brought in from Indonesia 4000 years 
ago. We need them for ecological stability, but do they fit the idea of 
wilderness? (Low 2003: 44).
It is not surprising these very public announcements and the unwillingness to see 
‘ecology’ as a political discourse was met with both incredulity and consternation 
among farm organisations and farm families.
Nevertheless, these divisions of opinion in the ecological science literature are 
instructive. Collectively, they point to the piecemeal, fractured and markedly different 
storylines that contributed to an overarching ecological science discourse of WDMC 
within WDMC policy in NSW.
A change in the ecological storylines
However, during the time of successive NSW Labor Governments, the ecological 
storylines that advocated ‘dingo’ conservation changed. Much of the ecological 
literature on dingoes now suggests that the complete hybridisation of the ‘dingo’ is all 
but inevitable (Benson 2004, Anon 2008 6 December). Further, it appears that while the 
dingo was understood to have ‘iconic’ status in the national and cultural imaginary and
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in the Aboriginal Dreamtime, the claim that the ‘dingo’ was ‘native’ was challenged 
consistently (Savolainen 2002, Savolainen 2004, Fleming, Allen et al. 2012, Johnson 
and Ritchie 2012).
The oft repeated storyline in the ecological literature is that the ‘dingo’ was brought to 
Australia most probably by fisher peoples (Low 1999: 7, Johnson and Ritchie 2012). 
Yet even here, the ecological storylines reveal dissenting opinions that emanate from 
within the ecological science literature.
Corbett (1995-96), for example, refutes the ‘non-native’ nomenclature essentially 
arguing that ‘any’ animal bom in Australia qualifies as ‘native.’ Low (1998) in turn 
refutes this as ‘questionable’. He rails:
The word [native] sheds its meaning. Native rabbits, native goats, native toads, 
native trout, native camphor laurels and native prickly pear. O brave new world! 
(Low 1999:256 -257).
This begs some hard but necessary questions that impinged directly on WDMC in 
NSW: ‘Is it the ‘idea’ of the ‘dingo’ in the cultural imaginary that is being conserved? 
Or, is it the case now that ‘any dog will do,’ that is, the reason dingoes cum wild dogs 
must be conserved is because they are assumed to have 'utility’ in the ecosystem in 
controlling other species.
In an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Catalyst program, Purcell 
(2009) forcefully pushes this line: ‘They definitely act like dingoes so I’d have no doubt 
to say they are dingoes’ (Newby 2009). Daniels and Corbett (2003) too reiterate this 
line of reasoning. They argue:
Protecting animals for where and how they live, and for their cultural or 
ecosystem function value rather than focusing on their appearance, offers the 
best solution for maintaining their conservation status (Daniels and Corbett 
2003:213).
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This solution may be politically expedient but the argument that the conservation of the 
dingo, whether it is a dingo or wild dog, is hardly honest. More recently, Fleming et al 
argue:
The key question is not ‘are they native’ but ‘should they be treated as though 
they are’? (stet) (Fleming, Allen et al. 2012: 21).
Overwhelmingly, the ecological science literature reveals that these arguments are not 
based on notions of ‘objectivity’ but rather on highly normative beliefs of what ‘should 
be.’
Departmental ‘news’ stories attempt to subvert this storyline of agrarianism by re­
presenting case studies that embrace an ecological storyline. Images of NSW NPWS 
and DPI departmental staff standing or kneeling besides radio-collared dogs, sand plots 
or M44’s as well as the visual imagery from infra-red monitoring cameras are 
foregrounded to suggest the superiority of the ecological discourse (Beeby 2007, 
Floskins 2007 13 September, Hoskins 2007 October 11, Anon 2009 5 November, York 
2011 6 July, Anon 2012 3 May, Anon 2012 7 June, Howden 2012 14 May). These 
storylines attempt to legitimise ‘new’ technologies, ‘new’ innovations and the entry of 
scientific actors in WDMC.
A visual binary is therefore created which delineates between the traditional 
knowledges and experiences of ‘doggers’ and/or farm families, and, scientific and 
technological expertise. In this way, the storyline functions to downplay the experiences 
and knowledges of the ‘trapper’ as well as the anger and frustration of the farm family. 
In these storylines it becomes immaterial who actually caught the wild dog -  often the 
‘trapper’ is noticeably absent from the photograph. The new imagery and symbols 
suggest the management of wild dogs through new ‘innovations’ as well as the ‘control’ 
of ‘the unintended consequences of modernity’ by the application of ecological 
‘science.’
The storylines of jingoism, racism and anthromorphism
At times, however, some of the storylines that emerged from the storyline of ‘native’ 
were simply jingoistic, racist or anthropomorphic. For example, the Australian Native
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Dog Conservation Society exclaimed in its newsletter: ‘It is our Native Dog, our 
National Dog’(Australian Native Dog Conservation Society 1993: 1).
It is also clear that the ‘dingo’ cum ‘wild dog’ is significant in the Aboriginal Dreaming 
(Rose 2000: 47). However, within an ecological discourse the storyline of the 
significance of the dingo in the Aboriginal Dreaming was subverted. The ‘new’ 
storyline used the ‘dingo’ to reinforce the ecological call for a specific Australian 
ecological identity and to bolster the claims for the conservation, if not, the preservation 
of the dingo.
However, some storylines evidenced strains of anthropomorphism. For example, in a 
Sydney Morning Herald newspaper article, an officer from NSW DPI, states:
the wild dogs have names - Tim Owen, Debbie Donna, Buck Too, Stinky 
Too...People see what dogs do as evil and cruel ... [but] they don't mean to do it 
(Howden 2012, 14 May).
This attributes ‘wild dogs’ the human characteristic of rationality.
Advocates of the preservation of the dingo claimed that the dingo is ‘an esteemed 
Australian mammal’ (Purcell 2010), or a ‘very elegant animal’(Breckwoldt 1983). 
However, these descriptions are offered, in essence, as the legitimating storyline for its 
preservation -  not necessarily just its conservation. In this context, hybridisation is 
framed as a risk to the ‘purity’ of the dingo; wild dogs put at risk Australia’s so-called 
‘unique,’ ‘natural,’ and national identity.
Overall, Flannery’s (2012) assertion that the management of invasive animals and the 
conservation of endangered species is all about ‘values’ may well be true -  but this line 
of argumentation goes only so far if advocates of the ecological discourse are then the 
ultimate arbiters -  the self-appointed experts’ - of what is in the ‘common good.’ This 
line of reasoning is pervasive in some of the ecological literature of WDMC.
For example, Purcell (2010) advocates a radical and utopian restructuring of society in 
which ‘science’ should be the arbiter of the ‘common good.’ He writes:
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The most important concept in contention is that many tiers of culture will have 
to accommodate change and evolve to a new level. Fortunately this cultural 
evolution can be based on objective scientific measurement rather than on 
subjective judgement, anecdote and the resultant cultural transmission of 
behaviours between humans (Purcell 2010: 130).
Putting aside the repugnant strains of eugenics in this storyline, the storylines of purity, 
hybridisation, conservation, preservation and anthropomorphism -  contributed to the 
ecological science discourse in WDMC. This was a discourse centred on the primacy of 
‘science’ and the belief that wild dogs and ipso facto farm families and their activities 
needed to be ‘managed’ to the degree that they no longer posed a ‘risk’ to what ‘rightly’ 
belonged in the ecosystem.
The discourse of agrarianism
In Australia, as Botterill (2009) notes, so-called ‘countrymindedness,’ the Australian 
variant of agrarian sentiments, mimics a discourse which has been ‘a feature of Western 
culture for centuries’ (Botterill 2009: 20); the academic critiques of which have been 
well canvassed in the literature (Craig and Phillips 1983, Aitkin 1985, Beus and Dunlap 
1994, Aitkin 2005, Botterill 2006, Botterill 2009, Wear 2009).
Much of this discussion emanates from the critique of Flinn & Johnson (1974) wherein 
they cumulatively invoke the classical works of Aristotle, Hesiod, Cicero, Virgil, 
Horace, and Locke while downplaying the works of the relative ‘newcomer’ Thomas 
Jefferson, in their search for the historical antecedents of agrarian ideology (Flinn and 
Johnson 1974: 187). They argued that American agrarianism -  based on surveys of 
approximately seven hundred Wisconsin farmers - enshrined five central tenets:
(1) Fanning is the basic occupation on which all other economic pursuits depend 
for raw materials and food;
(2) Agricultural life is the natural life of man; therefore, being natural, it is good, 
while city life is artificial and evil;
(3) The complete economic independence of the farmer;
(4) The farmer should work hard to demonstrate his virtue, which is made 
possible only through an orderly society;
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(5) Family farms have become indissolubly connected with American 
democracy (Flinn and Johnson 1974: 189 - 193).
Aitken’s (1985) subsequent reformulation of the discourse of agrarianism in the 
Australian context as, ‘countrymindedness,’ is equally well known. As Botterill (2009) 
points out: ‘The term is of uncertain origin but is traceable to the beginnings of the 
Country Party in the 1920s’ and reflects ‘the wholesome nature of agricultural activity 
and the contrast between the virtues of farming and the unpleasantness of urban life’ 
(Botterill 2009: 62). Aitken argued that the characteristics of Australian 
‘countrymindedness’ were:
(i) Australia depends on its primary producers for its high standards of 
living, for only those who produce a physical good add to a country’s 
wealth.
(ii) Therefore, all Australians, from city and country alike, should in their 
own interest support policies aimed at improving the position of primary 
industries
(iii) Farming and grazing, and rural pursuits generally, are virtuous, 
ennobling and cooperative; they bring out the best in people.
(iv) In contrast, city life is competitive and nasty, as well as parasitical.
(v) The characteristic Australian is a countryman [sic], and the core elements 
of the national character come from the struggles of country people to 
tame their environment and make it productive. City people are much the 
same the world over.
(vi) For all these reasons, and others like defence, people should be 
encouraged to settle in the country, not in the city.
(vii) But power resides in the city, where politics is trapped in a sterile debate 
about classes. There has to be a separate political party for country 
people to articulate the true voice of the nation (Botterill 2009: 21 citing 
Aitken, 1985: 35)
However, more recently, there has been greater variance in the ways in which the 
storylines of agrarianism position farming families and the ways in which the storylines 
of agrarianism are deployed. Traditionally, as Botterill (2009) notes, party political
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differences were understood to rest on societal ‘cleavages’ that drew distinctions 
between rural and urban capital. However,
From Federation until the 1970s, the big debates over policy settings were not so 
much between the squatter/grazier class and the city but between the former and 
the smaller ‘farmer’ organisations over government intervention, both in 
agriculture and the broader economy (Botterill 2009: 20)
However, as Cockfield and Botterill (2010) found in an exploratory survey ‘agriculture 
and rural areas are still considered to be important to Australia’s future’ and that there 
was little in their research to suggest that ‘rural industries and communities are 
generally considered to be anachronistic’. Moreover, they found:
There is still a tendency to attribute stereotypical countryminded characteristics 
to rural people, strong support for farmers’ production methods, and very strong 
belief in the importance of agriculture to the future of the nation (Cockfield and 
Botterill 2010:609).
In contrast, in the context of NSW WDMC the discourse of agrarianism functions as the 
‘straw man’ of the ecological discourse. For example, Low (2003) argues that: ‘The fact 
remains cows and sheep have done irrevocable harm to Australia’ (Low 2003: 295 - 
296). Positioned in this way, agrarian values and, ipso facto, farming families - who are 
assumed to hold these values dear - are a ‘risk’ to the Australian ecosystem. The ‘risk’ 
that agrarianism and farming families therefore pose implicitly warrants intervention by 
‘experts’ - ‘wild dogs’ and farming families need to be both managed and their 
‘ignorance’ and their ‘behaviour’ modified and/or over come through State intervention 
and environmental ‘education.’ Within the ecological storylines of WDMC, Australian 
agrarian values are often held to be ‘old fashioned and ‘out of date.’ These storylines 
not surprisingly incur the wrath of many farming families. As one farmer wrote:
Since the days of the Snowy Scheme farmers have been portrayed as the 
environmental villain for cheap political gain. Stockmen claim that after any 
political capital has been obtained by Governments declaring gully filling by 
dams or new National Parks, interest and commitment to maintain management 
excellence plummets and by default neighbours out of shame and necessity are
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compensating for what is flawed conservation policy and legislation essentially 
justifying the circumstances of neglect. Stockmen have endured a protracted 
‘consultative’ and ‘lets (sic) research it’ culture dismissing their educated advice 
based on proven management outcomes, endorsed by thriving wildlife 
populations on most private land. Stockmen have nurtured and created an 
environment where biodiversity can and does persist’ (Franklin 2001 March: 4).
Brett (2011) argues that often in the Australian context the adherents of agrarianism are 
the subject of both trenchant criticism and derision. Farming practices and ipso facto 
farm families are often held responsible, if not, ‘blamed’ for environmental damage. 
Thus, within this storyline, the social, environmental and economic impacts of wild dog 
predation can be easily downplayed or dismissed as having been caused by farming 
families in the first instance, by farm families simply continuing to ‘be there’ or through 
their ‘interference’ in the ecosystem in eradicating wild dogs or in ‘disturbing’ dingo 
pack structure (Purcell 2010); agrarian ‘values’ ‘are conceived as convenient “covers” 
for the pursuit of self-interest (Banchoff, 2004)’(Stewart 2006: 183). Yet, in contrast, 
ecological ‘values’ are not.
The utility of agrarian storylines as a political strategy in invoking iconic images of 
Australian cultural mythology is pervasive and powerful despite the relative decline in 
the power of the wool discourse in Australian society generally. However, like all 
storylines, the various storylines of agrarianism have rhetorical power in: ‘invoking 
discourses in the audience conducive to the claim made by the representative, and 
downplaying competing discourses’ (Dryzek 2010: 320). As demonstrated in Chapter 
Two, the issue of WDMC was universally exploited by all political parties in NSW 
throughout the years of successive NSW Labor Government from 1995 until 2011 
wherein storylines of agrarianism were invoked for political capital.
The discourse of animal welfare
In NSW, within the dominant discourse animal welfare is informed by 
anthropocentrism. The storylines that emanate from within this discourse pivot in part 
around the idea of the stewardship of animals. Wild dogs are not afforded intrinsic 
rights. However, the wild dog is judged sentient.
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The period of successive NSW Labor Governments was marked by a significant change 
in the ways ‘wild dogs’ and ‘dingos’ were represented. These representations spilled 
over, not surprisingly, in to the implementation of WDMC and resulted progressively in 
significant changes in the methods that could be accessed and/or used by public land 
managers and farm families across NSW. What were once entirely legal methods of 
control that carried with them the full imprimatur and sanction of the State, such as the 
use of fixed wing aeroplanes other than in the Western Division of NSW, bounties, 
strychnine poisoning and hard jaw traps were now prohibited. In addition, allied 
legislation progressively emerged that further impinged on the implementation of 
WDMC at the grassroots. The methods of WDMC were also increasingly regulated and 
prescribed by the State through a raft of Commonwealth and State legislation. However, 
the approved methods of WDMC remain far from uniform across Australia.
Progressively, from the 1960s storylines of ‘humaneness’ emerged which were 
accompanied by significant changes in the actual spatial geography of rural 
communities. In some parts of NSW, farmers owned or leased what became public land 
through a combination of the resumption of leasehold lands and the gazettal of National 
Parks, wilderness areas and/or reserves (Merritt 2007, Park 2010 July).
During this time, the knowledge and the experiences of farm families of the surrounding 
land and WDMC was often far more intimate that that of the public land managers. Yet, 
many farm families found that neighbouring lands were now administered and 
controlled by public land managers who were promoted as ‘experts’ by the State and 
who were often physically located far from the landscape they administered and whose 
contact with the local community was minimal. For example, at one aerial ‘bait drop’ 
day and after a visiting NSW DPI officer finished instructing the farmers present on the 
surrounding Bush, a farmer commented drily and quietly that his family had owned all 
the surrounding land prior to its gazettal as National Park.
During this time a storyline of ‘humaneness’ progressively emerged within the 
dominant administrative rationalist discourse of WDMC. This had its genesis in a very 
broad discourse of ‘animal welfare.’ This was endorsed by NSW Labor as part of its 
self-proclaimed ‘Green Legacy’ particularly through the rise of a ‘new’ 
environmentalist discourse to which the NSW Greens also broadly adhered.
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Codes of Practice and Standing Operating Procedures
In 2005, the then Minister for Natural Resources, Minister for Primary Industries and 
Minister for Mineral Resources, Mr Ian McDonald, MLC released a publication entitled 
‘Humane Pest Animal Control: Codes of Practice and Standing Operating Procedures,’ 
commonly referred to as ‘COPs’ and SOPs’ (NSW Department of Primary Industries 
2005). These COPs and SOPs, reportedly, were adopted immediately:
by the Commonwealth Government for lands under its control, particularly 
defence estate and national parks, and have been endorsed by NSW Pest Animal 
Council. They serve as a useful adjunct to the NSW Vertebrate Pest Control 
Manual, and have been written to be applicable across the whole of Australia 
(NSW Department of Primary Industries 2005: Foreword).
This storyline of ‘humaneness’ was widely promulgated in a model produced by the 
NSW DPI Vertebrate Pest Unit (Sharp and Saunders 2008) under a very broad discourse 
o f ‘animal welfare.’
This model of ‘humaneness’ in WDMC enshrined scientific rationalism, the ‘strategic 
approach’ and the concept of ‘best practice’ (NSW Department of Primary Industries 
2005). It resulted from a ‘desk top’ literature review and a review by a panel of 
scientific experts after which representatives of peak bodies were invited to comment. 
The ‘humaneness’ calculator -  a metric that increases to the colour ‘red’ the higher the 
‘inhumaneness’ score - that accompanied this model was subsequently publicised by 
NSW DPI as ‘raising the bar’ in WDMC (York 2009 21 January). Yet, the model was a 
guide only. Nevertheless, it recommended that:
An ideal vertebrate pest control method should be humane, target specific, 
efficient, cost-effective and safe for humans to use’ (Saunders 2004: np)
This became known as the ‘gold standard.’ However, against this backdrop, 
‘humaneness’ and, in particular, the use of 1080 and specifically the continued use of 
1080 in aerial baiting represents a battle writ large. The storylines that emerge from this 
draw on a variety of competing discourses and are bitterly contested. It is apparent from 
the literature that the definition o f ‘humaneness’ is also contested.
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The storylines of aerial baiting with 1080
In NSW, aerial baiting with 1080 generally occurs across rugged and inaccessible 
terrains on public lands using injected 1080 meat baits. This occurs at specific times of 
the year according to a prearranged and fixed schedule. The timing of aerial baiting is 
important to prevent wild dogs ‘breeding up.’ Wild dogs breed bi-annually, unlike 
dingoes which breed annually.
Aerial baiting with 1080 is considered a ‘risk’ management strategy by NSW NPWS 
intended to: ‘...to maintain effective dog-free buffer zones adjacent to livestock grazing 
areas’ (NSW Department of Primary Industries 2005: np). The storyline of ‘buffer 
zones’ is similarly contested. For example, farm families and trappers have always 
argued that wild dogs are not restricted to particular ‘home ranges’ and can travel vast 
distances at particular times of the year. This has been subsequently ‘validated’ as ‘fact’ 
by ecological studies.
Within WDMC in NSW 1080 is used as an approved method of control. Aerial baiting 
using 1080 occurs across NSW according to an approved and monitored mapped route. 
All helicopters and aircraft must be fitted with a Global Positioning System (GPS). 
Further:
In NSW, the approval of both the Director-General of the NSW Department of 
Primary Industries and the relevant Department of Environment and 
Conservation branch director is required before aerial baiting may occur on 
lands acquired or reserved under the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Act 
(NSW Department of Primary Industries 2005: np).
The amount of bait used and the frequency, which is referred to more commonly as ‘the 
bait rate’ was also reduced following the release of the APVMA Review into 1080. This 
decision was and, remains, controversial as many farm groups following the APVMA 
Review decision argued that the reduced bait rate was ‘...ineffective in controlling wild 
dogs in their area’ (Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority 2011 10 
November). The APVMA subsequently issued a temporary permit for the use of 1080 
in only three of fourteen LHP As with the ‘old’ bait rate on the condition that ecological
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studies proceeded (Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority 2011 10 
November) which farm families and/or their representative organisations would have to 
fund. This research was ultimately funded by AWI; an organisation funded by wool 
producers’ levies (National Farmers' Federation 2011 11 February: 9) Many farm 
families felt this was ecological science and public policy done at ‘the point of a gun.’
Annual public aerial baiting meetings occur prior to the scheduled ‘drop’ commencing. 
Public land managers and representatives of Wild Dog Associations as well as 
individual representatives of farm families attend these meetings. The routes may 
require a prior Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which may result in a refusal to 
proceed. Permission for the commencement of aerial baiting does not rest with farm 
families or with individual LHPA Boards.
For the Wild Dog Associations, farm families and the staff of RLPBs that coordinate the 
annual ‘drop’ this involves a great deal of work. Appropriate and documented public 
notice must be given of an intention to aerially bait. ‘Cut’ up and ‘bait days’ must be 
planned and coordinated.
In North East NSW meat is sourced by WDAs at their own expense (Barnard River 
Wild Dog Association 1956-1968). Annual fees levied on members contribute to 
offsetting this cost and meat is often donated by farm families. The meat is then literally 
‘cut up’ in to pieces of a certain size and ‘bagged’ or placed on the back of a ‘pick-up’ 
truck ready for the next day. Usually this task involves many of the family members of 
WDAs. These are not social occasions; those present are committed to the necessity of 
the task of ameliorating the ‘risk’ of wild dogs. The meat is subsequently injected with 
1080 poison by authorised LHPA Rangers on the second day in situ at the designated 
helicopter site.
On this day, an officer from NSW DPI who has responsibility for the overall 
coordination is charged with making sure all regulations are followed and that 
individual farmers have the necessary up-to-date licences, for example, a Chemical 
Certificate III. Contracted pilots, as well as designated navigators who assist on the day 
are required to strictly and only follow the approved route. A third person may despatch 
the meat from the helicopter.
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Signed indemnity forms are required from each landholder over the periphery of whose 
land aerial baits are to be dropped. These indemnity forms must be signed well in 
advance and submitted. This responsibility falls usually to Wild Dog Associations, 
individual farmers or LHPA Rangers. This is an onerous task. Signed indemnity forms 
are not always forthcoming and can result in a great deal of community dissention. This 
is especially the case when individual farm families or farming communities as a whole 
are experiencing continuous wild dog predation on agricultural stock. The storyline that 
emerge from this refusal is that these landholders are not meeting their obligations as 
‘good neighbours.’ The efficacy of the ‘drop’ reportedly can also be compromised if 
there are too many gaps in the ‘line’ -  caused by individual landholders or a 
Government Agency not agreeing to aerial baiting on the periphery of their land or 
because of a decision by an LHPA Board not to participate. Refusal to sign an 
indemnity form is more common in areas where there has been a significant change of 
land use over time. For example, this is most noticeable in areas around Kempsey in 
North East NSW and in the Hunter where land has been subdivided into smaller ‘hobby 
farm’ blocks. This is also the case when land declared as a National Park, State Forest, 
wilderness areas or reserve is subject to an unfavourable Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS).
Public land managers can and do veto particular routes. For example, in 1995, in his 
Annual Address, the President of the Barnard River Wild Dog Association wrote:
As a result of the determination of the EIS which covers the Kempsey area, the 
Kempsey Association is not baiting this year because, they are not allowed into 
State Forests. Remember the EIS for this area will be determined over the next 
12 months. A recommendation from State Forests to the last EIS consultation 
committee meeting was that Ben Halls Gap State Forest should be a flora 
reserve. The Heritage Commission is about to list Ben Halls Gap on the register 
of the National Estate, and to make sure he did not miss out on the act Bob Carr 
has made an election promise that Ben Hall Gap would be made a National park 
within 12 months of him being elected. So it is obvious that this year will be the 
last year that this Association will be allowed to bait Ben Halls Gap, thus 
ensuring that there will be a never ending supply of wild dogs for the Upper Peel 
Valley (Wiggan 1995: 2).
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The withholding of 1080 for use in WDMC and the ban on aerial baiting have been 
contentious for a number of reasons as has been explained previously. However, in a 
discursive sense, the storylines that are offered in support of the varied arguments for or 
against the use of 1080 invariably turn to storylines of ‘risk’ management and 
‘humaneness’ for support. Not surprisingly, there is considerable variance in the ways 
in which these storylines are presented.
The Commercial Partnerships
In a commercial context, the discourse of animal welfare pivoted on cost effectiveness. 
Lapidge et al (2006) reported:
proactive research and management strategies must balance the economic cost of 
developing and registering new control products with the benefits of control to 
maximize profitability for the industry (Choquenot and Hone 2002) To do this 
effectively, one must first know the economic impact of each species (Lapidge, 
Dali et al. 2006: 258-263).
However, as previously shown, the economic impact of WDMC was very much a 
guesstimate. Notwithstanding this, over this period commercial and scientific 
partnerships were forged in furtherance of the development of new products.
In 1999, Pestat Pty Ltd was first established as a company of the PACRC. It was 
instrumental in the development of the synthetic lure, the spray attractant product 
registered as ‘FeralMone’ “ FeralMone’ is a product of:
Pestat Pty Ltd and Australian Wool Innovation Ltd, developed with the 
assistance of NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service...FeralMone is 
distributed by the company, Animal Control Technologies Australia (ACTA) 
(Pestat Pty Ltd 2010: np).
Later in 2003, Lapidge et al (2006) reported that:
Australian Wool Innovation Ltd signed a contract with the Pest Animal Control 
Cooperative Research Centre (now Invasive Animals CRC) in June 2003 to
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evaluate and develop a new toxic agent for control of wild dogs and foxes 
(canids) (Lapidge, Dali et al. 2006: 259).
In turn, in 2004, ACTA reported:
The group is currently actively participating in the development of a new bait for 
control of feral pigs (project part supported by Meat & Livestock Commission 
and Feral Animal Program) and on the practical applications of a putative new 
target specific and humane toxin for wild dog and fox control (project with 
Pestat, the present Pest Animal CRC with support from Australian Wool 
Innovation). The company is the principal commercial partner in the new 
Australasian Invasive Animal (AIA) CRC proposal (Animal Control 
Technologies and Applied Biotechnologies Group 2004 August: 1-14).
Later, in 2007, ACTA reported:
The CRC catch cry of “together we achieve solutions” welds well with our own 
mission of “Excellence in Pest Animal Management Technology”. Apart from 
helping to establish the CRC itself, we have made a considerable commitment to 
the CRC program in a number of major projects that will bring new technology 
to pest animal management.
Chief amongst these are the effort, co-sponsored by the Australian Wool 
Innovation (AWI) and managed by Pestat Ltd, to explore the use of a possible 
new toxin for control of foxes, feral cats and wild dogs. The chemical given the 
common name of PAPP works in a similar way to carbon monoxide by 
preventing oxygen transport by red cells and thus is fast-acting and humane 
(Animal Control Technologies 2007 12 February: np).
However, the financial expenditure and the requirements of the registration process to 
develop a new toxin became all too apparent. In 2010, Eason et al reported:
The considerable expense of developing new products (a new predacide in 
Australia and New Zealand, para-aminopropiopheone (PAPP), will be in excess 
of AUS$5M; Lapidge et al. 2007), the challenging and onerous registration
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process for minor use vertebrate pesticides, and the lack of return on investment 
leading to market failure in the industry has meant that progress within the field 
of vertebrate pesticide product development can sometimes be stifled (Eason, 
Fagerstone et al. 2010: 111).
In 2010, the IACRC restated its position. The IACRC was designed to deliver:
new types of registered lethal baits with improved specificity and acceptability 
for use in control of canid pests (wild dogs and foxes) in Australia. The baits 
will utilise a new toxicant formulation; para-aminopropiophenone or PAPP. The 
project will also deliver an antidote to the toxicant for use in case of accidental 
poisoning of, eg, working and companion dogs(Invasive Animals Cooperative 
Research Centre 2010: np).
In 2010, the commercial partners in the development of PAPP were listed as:
IA CRC, Australian Wool Innovation, Animal Control Technologies Australia, 
University of Western Sydney, Connovation, Pestat, Industry and Innovation 
NSW, Queensland Department of Employment, Economic Development & 
Innovation, Victorian Department of Primary Industries, Victorian Department 
of Sustainability and Environment (Invasive Animals Cooperative Research 
Centre 2010).
However, the use of PAPP as chemical toxin was not new (Rose, Welles et al. 1946, 
October 14, Marrs, Inns et al. 1991, Eason, Fagerstone et al. 2010) and there appears to 
be some confusion within the literature as to its reported purpose. Eason et al (2010) 
report:
On the positive side, PAPP is being developed for the control of foxes and feral 
cats in Australia and stoats and feral cats in NZ. If the research and registration 
of PAPP baits are successfully completed it will be the first vertebrate toxicant 
developed for mammalian pest control since the 1980s (Murphy et al. 2007), and 
the only one developed with target specificity, humaneness and low residue risk 
as priority features (Eason, Fagerstone et al. 2010: 115)
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However, by 2010, the IACRC reported difficulties in bringing PAPP to fruition. It 
stated:
Balancing these difficult studies against the ambitious timeframes originally 
negotiated with the sponsor of the project; AWI have proven very challenging. 
However, in the last 12 months the project has crossed a critical threshold with 
the completion of a series of field trials for the 2 target species that demonstrated 
the necessary efficacy for submission of 2 product registration applications 
earlier this year.
The key outcomes of product registrations still hinge on a consultative process 
with the Office of chemical safety and environmental health (OCSEH). (stet) We 
expect a response to the new active and product applications acceptance for 
assessment from OCSEH during June 2010 (Invasive Animals Cooperative 
Research Centre 2010: np).
However, some ten years on from the signing of the first contract with AWI, the 
mandatory AVPMA registration review is not complete. Notwithstanding this, in 2012, 
the IACRC embarked on the ‘Pest Smart Roadshow’ across Australia wherein it 
claimed:
It will showcase best practice pest management incorporating currently used 
techniques and the latest innovations.
New products to be covered include the following:
For wild dogs and foxes: PAPP baits, Blue-Healer™ antidote (Invasive Animals 
Cooperative Research Centre 2012: np).
The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)
In marked contrast, to this cost benefit approach, the RSPCA’s storyline on 
‘humaneness’ pivots on the appropriate ‘justification’ for the selective killing of animals 
and on the method used being as ‘humane as possible’ (Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 2003: 5). It argues that these conditions apply equally 
to introduced, native or domestic animals. Integral to its understanding of ‘justification’ 
the RSPCA identified four areas where ‘an objective assessment’ may justify killing.
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The examples cited were: disease risk, agricultural impacts, environmental impacts and 
social impacts (Jones 2003 25 February).
Overall, the RSPCA was very familiar with killing dogs. In 2003, for example, it 
reported:
The RSPCA is itself responsible for killing tens of thousands of animals every 
year, in the name of animal welfare. Over the past 5 years over 700,000 animals 
have been received by the RSPCA across Australia...In this period the RSPCA 
has killed a total of 150,000 dogs and 180,000 cats (Jones 2003 25 February: 7).
However, the RSPCA was opposed to the continued use of 1080 on animals. It believed 
on ‘the available evidence’ that it was not humane and was ‘...opposed to its continued 
use for the control of populations of introduced or native species (Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 2003: 13). Drawing on the storyline of modernity, the 
RSPCA argued:
Where current killing methods do not result in a death free of pain and distress, 
every effort should be made to develop a method that does. We cannot go on 
accepting 19th century (stet) killing methods just because there is thought to be 
no alternative to their use (Jones 2003 25 February: 9).
It also noted that the BWJV Plan which was held by successive NSW Labor 
Governments as ‘the’ model of best practice made no provision for any animal welfare 
standards. In 2010, the RSPCA reaffirmed its opposition to the use of 1080 stating that 
it was: ‘closely monitoring the research into a new type of lethal bait containing para- 
aminopropiophenone’ (PAPP) (RSPCA 2011).
Further, that any baiting programs must be:
earned out in accordance with the codes of practice (COPs) and standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) produced by the NSW Department of Primary 
Industries and funded by the Australian Government Department of the 
Environment and Heritage (RSPCA 2011).
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However, in a stinging rebuke to Government, the RSPCA argued that:
In terms of the numbers of animals killed, and the cruelty of the methods used, 
the control of vertebrate pests is probably the biggest animal welfare issue in 
Australia (Jones 2003 25 February: 7).
Animals Australia
In 2004, the organisation, Animals Australia: the voice for animals, in a submission to 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry Inquiry, contested the nomenclature being used to describe animals as ‘pests.’ 
It complained that within the Terms of Reference there was no provision for any 
discussion of animal welfare. To this organisation, animals were ‘mislocated’ rather 
than ‘feral’ or pests. It argued that:
Privately and publicly owned land which is not being kept as a museum of 
native flora and fauna should be permitted to continue its evolution towards a 
natural balance incorporating both native and non-native plants and animals. In 
the absence of any will to restore these areas to their original condition, natural 
selection should be allowed to take its course. Attempting to hold back the tide 
of evolutionary process can only ensure that far more native and non-native 
animals suffer than would suffer in nature was permitted to do what nature does 
best. Species which cannot survive in the altered environment should be 
permitted to achieve the peace of extinction’ (Animals Australia 2004 14 May: 4 
-5).
Animals Australia, like the RSPCA, invoked the storyline of modernity, arguing that: 
‘No civilised society would deliberately inflict this array of appalling suffering on its 
animals.’ However, there was a diametrical departure between the two organisations in 
its attitudes to killing. The basic premise of the Animals Australia argument was that: 
‘no method of control which robs a healthy animal of its life can be considered humane, 
and all such measures should always be avoided’ (Animals Australia 2004 14 May: 1 - 
14).
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In contrast to the RSPCA, this storyline of ‘humaneness’ and its interpretation of ‘risk’ 
as it applied to the management of non-human animals, challenged the primacy of 
specific ‘ecological’ understandings, rejected technological ‘innovations’ as inhumane 
and rejected agrarian as well as scientific and economic rationalist ideas of stewardship 
and anthropocentrism (Oogjes G. 1999 26-27 May, Oogjes 2003 25 February, Paplia 
2009). However, it is also apparent that the implementation of any of its suggested 
‘solutions’ to the issue of ‘mislocated’ animals, like Purcell (2010), relied on a radical - 
and most improbable - restructuring of society.
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority
It juxtaposition to the Department of Industries and Investment ‘best practice’ 
Humaneness Model (Saunders and Sharp 2009) the APVMA in its Review did not 
consider ‘humaneness.’ It stated:
There is public concern about the humaneness of using 1080. The Preliminary 
Review Findings report provides an overview of available information of 1080 
and animal welfare. However the report has not formulated any conclusions on 
this matter. This is because animal humaneness is not a specific criterion in the 
Agvet Codes and because there are no well established scientific criteria for 
assessing or making decisions about animal humaneness. However the report 
notes that humaneness aspects in relation to the use of pesticides, is a broader 
government policy matter (Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines 
Authority 2007: np).
The National Farmers’ Federation and NSW Farmers Association
In contrast, the National Farmers’ Federation and the NSW Farmers Association 
endorsed the NSW DPI ‘humaneness model’ and the subsequent COPs and SOPs that 
emanated from this model. However, representatives of NSWFA publicly voiced 
significant misgivings regarding what it considered to be the Government’s selective 
interpretation of animal welfare and, in particular, ‘humaneness.’ They argued that 
within the storylines of humaneness particularly within the NSW model of 
‘humaneness’ itself there was a failure to acknowledge the appalling injuries inflicted 
on agricultural stock by wild dogs.
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The NFF’s argument was twofold. Firstly, it argued that: ‘there is an ongoing need to 
develop improved control techniques that address efficacy, specificity, safety and 
humaneness requirements,’ and, secondly, it recommended that: ‘Prior to the banning or 
removal of any pest animal control method, that Governments ensure viable and cost 
effective options are available’ (National Farmers' Federation 2011 11 February: 8).
However, NSWFA linked this model of ‘humaneness’ to the wider context of WDMC 
which it argued was a direct result of the policy failure of successive NSW Labor 
Governments to appropriately address the issue. NSW Farmers argued that:
The explosion of environmental legislation and regulation in the last 15 years 
has resulted in the practices and landscapes of farmers being changed - 
dramatically in some instances -  to the point that large tracts of land have been 
‘locked up’ and/or converted to national parks. Unfortunately, the day-to-day 
maintenance of these parcels of land can fall by the wayside, meaning that 
invasive pest animals such as wild dogs can breed uncontrollably. This spreads 
the problem onto productive farm land previously unaffected by wild dogs, as 
well as the fringes of towns and villages. (NSW Farmers Association 2010 25 
January: np).
However, it appears from the NFF submission that irrespective of any input from farm 
organisations, the Commonwealth Government had already implemented national bans 
on various control methods across the States using its legislative powers. Notably, the 
continued use of 1080 was not included in these bans.
NSW Farmers Association, in particular, noted that the adoption of the ‘humaneness 
model’ had clear ramifications and was directly linked to the funding of the 
implementation of WDMC across NSW which it argued was insufficient. These 
concerns were paramount. In direct response to the threats to remove 1080, NSW 
Fanners at its Annual Conference in 2011, passed the following motions:
AC 06 That the Association lobby to ensure delivery of 1080 aerial baiting for 
wild dogs at an application rate of 10kg/km (or 40 x 250g baits/km) by the 
Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) in national parks;
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and further that:
AC 08: That the Association lobby to ensure the procedures which govern aerial 
wild dog baiting are not applied in a manner which unreasonably restrict the 
implementation of effective wild dog control programs (NSW Farmers 
Association 2011: np).
Further, in 2011-2012 the Executive Council of NSW Farmers expressed in its Policy 
Statement that:
EC09 That the Association appeal to the NSW Government for total funding for 
the employment of contract dog trappers on land under the Wild Dog 
Association Program;
EC 09: That the Association continue to lobby Government for a fully integrated 
and coordinated approach to control wild dogs on private and public lands, 
providing more resources and supplying all the tools to bring these pest animals 
to a sustainable level (NSW Farmers Association 2011- 2012).
Overall, the debate over the management of ‘risk’ and ‘humaneness’ were ones that 
were formally ‘played out’ at the ‘top end of town’ from which grassroots farm families 
largely lacked input other than through largely the NFF and NSW Farmers Association. 
However, the storyline of ‘humaneness’ also signalled the involvement of the 
Commonwealth Government in WDMC in a more direct way, most noticeably through 
the promotion of ‘risk’ management within a discourse of biosecurity.
The discourse of biosecurity
The Commonwealth driven biosecurity discourse gained increased impetus following 
the public release of the 2008 Beale Report (Beale, Fairbrother et al. 2008 30 
September). The aim of the new ‘Australia’s biosecurity regime’ sought:
through careful management, to minimise the risk of the entry, establishment or 
spread of exotic pests and diseases that have the potential to cause significant
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harm to people, animals, plants and other aspects of Australia’s unique 
environment (Beale, Fairbrother et al. 2008 30 September: xiii).
Within this discourse the storyline of the ‘invasive’ was positioned by the 
Commonwealth Government as a threat to the ‘common good’ and as part of Australia’s 
responsibility as a ‘global citizen’ to eradicate (Beale, Fairbrother et al. 2008 30 
September).
In turn, the Beale Report recommended a comprehensive ‘risk-return’ approach to 
deciding where to direct resources across the spectrum. Moreover, it argued that:
The approach used to manage biosecurity risks to human health, food, 
safety and the environment (including aquatic environments) needs to be 
consistent with the approach used to address risks that primarily affect the 
agriculture sector (Beale, Fairbrother et al. 2008 30 September: XXVI).
To farm families, the risks were all too apparent. In WDMC, the risk to the agricultural 
sector was most noticeable in the spread of ‘zoonotic’ diseases. Zoonotic diseases are 
defined as: ‘...any disease or infection which is naturally transmissible from animals to 
humans’ (Beale, Fairbrother et al. 2008 30 September: LIII). For example, zoonotic 
diseases such as neospora caninum are spread through dog scats, hydatidosis is spread 
through wild dogs eating the offal (internal organs) of sheep, cattle, kangaroos and pigs, 
and, rabies is spread through saliva, most usually passed on through bites.
In 2004, AgForce Queensland reported:
...feral dogs are estimated to cost the cattle industry at least $9 million annually 
through the spread of disease such as neospora caninum and hydatidosis. 
Neospora caninum, a microscopic parasite, that has been shown to be a 
significant cause of bovine abortion, lower milk production and reduced weight 
gain in cattle throughout the world (AgForce Queensland 2004: 1 - 2).
These findings echoed the experiences of many farm families across Australia. For 
example, an abattoir in Western Australia reported:
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it was evident during processing that a large number of skin-on goats had serious 
dog bite injuries to the hindlegs. Of this line... approximately 25 % or about 100 
animals out of 400 killed were affected. The majority of bites were over a week 
old but needed aggressive trimming to remove the affected tissue which had 
either scaring or infected abscesses. Some animals had their hind quarters 
condemned due to severe bite marks (Kirkpatrick 2009 14 August: np).
During the time of successive NSW Labor Governments there was a heightened sense 
of awareness of the spread of zoonotic diseases. This was especially so after the 
outbreak of Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) commonly known as ‘mad cow’ 
disease in North America and Europe, the discovery of Hendra virus in Queensland, 
equine flu in NSW, H5NI in Asia, ‘foot and mouth’ disease in the United Kingdom and 
the presence of rabies in Bali, Indonesia. The cost of managing and containing the 
outbreak of equine flu alone was reportedly $110 million. However, as explained in 
Chapter Three there were serious concerns raised about the actual capacity of NSW 
Government Departments to effectively contain any major outbreak of zoonotic diseases 
in NSW (Audit Office of New South Wales 2002). In turn, Beale et al reported:
While some efficiencies will arise from amalgamating Biosecurity Australia, 
AQIS and elements of PIAPH, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that 
the agencies are significantly under-resourced. Without additional resources,
One Biosecurity: a working partnership the National Biosecurity Authority will 
not be capable of delivering the One Biosecurity: a working partnership model 
envisaged by the Panel (Beale, Fairbrother et al. 2008 30 September: xxvii - 
xxviii).
It is apparent that during this time, successive Commonwealth and State Government 
Departments and their Agents, were both underprepared and under resourced to combat 
any major outbreak of zoonotic diseases. Beale et al recommended an injection of $260 
million was needed to rectify this situation. In a discursive sense, this broadened the 
reach of the biosecurity discourse even further. Storylines pivoted most noticeably 
around Commonwealth State relations, the use of the External Affairs powers under the 
Australian Constitution; interstate, intrastate and international trade, and the use of the 
Corporations powers.
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However, in light of the findings of successive Government Reports, both State and 
Federal, and the deficiencies that each Report highlighted, it is difficult to see how the 
Commonwealth biosecurity storyline of a ‘working partnership model’ could fulfil this 
task. The storyline of biosecurity as a ‘risk’ management strategy is nonetheless 
important as this period saw a significant growth in the exercise of Commonwealth 
powers in both natural resource management and biosecurity. However, in light of this 
heightened awareness of the biosecurity discourse and the visual reminders to farm 
families of it - literally a ‘tagged’ animal in the ‘home paddock’ or at the saleyards -  
these storylines were subverted and instead pivoted around the ability of the 
Governments’ capacity to manage ‘risk’ and the accompanying financial expenditures 
especially after the global financial crisis (Dempster 2008 19 September)
However, wherever their origin and whatever the internal inconsistencies that existed 
within and between these storylines that emanated from the competing discourses of 
ecological science, agrarianism, animal welfare and biosecurity they were ultimately 
subverted in service of the dominant administrative rationalist discourse. 
Notwithstanding this, the legitimacy of the dominant discourse was strongly contested 
by farming families at the grassroots. It is to this contest that the next Chapter turns.
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Chapter Seven
Greasy Wool -  public consultation in wild dog management and control
This Chapter examines how the conundrum of WDMC, that is, the twin obligations of 
the management and control of wild dogs, and, the conservation of the dingo ‘plays out’ 
in the process of public consultation with farm families across NSW. It examines this 
declared NSW Government policy objective in light of the findings of extensive field 
work across NSW completed over the years 2007 -  2009. In all, sixty three public 
WDMC meetings were attended and all ‘signed off plans up to August 2009 were 
collected and examined. As a result of this examination, three key points emerge:
First, the public policy of WDMC is delivered ‘top down.’ The State, through its agents, 
exercised power relying on the ‘authority’ of ‘experts’ and public land managers to 
inform, shape and promulgate the dominant administrative rationalist discourse of 
WDMC to farm families in order to affect the conservation of the dingo in core areas. 
This exercise of power is further refined at the local level by a reliance on the 
interpretations of public land managers from a number of different Departments or 
Agencies. Representatives of local farm families were co-opted or driven into this 
process of consultation largely out of frustration and/or desperation arising from both an 
increase in the numbers of wild dogs and wild dog attacks on agricultural stock. Public 
land managers in turn were legislatively forced to consult.
Second, during the period of successive NSW Labor Governments the authority of 
‘experts’ and public land managers and the legitimacy of NSW WDMC policy was 
consistently and continuously challenged by farm families. Public WDMC meetings 
became the site of this struggle. At the same time, these public meetings were the site of 
determined attempts by farm families to subvert unsuccessfully the dominant discourse 
of administrative rationalism and the public policy of WDMC it espoused.
Third, this Chapter challenges the contention in WDMC policy that wild dog predation 
on agricultural stock has decreased as a result of State intervention. Instead, and
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specifically, it appears that the decline in wild dog attacks may well be more a function 
of the decline in the size of the national flock, the increase in ‘destocked’ land, and, the 
increase in the numbers of farm families exiting farming. Put simply: there are less 
sheep, less lands devoted to sheep and fewer farmers.
Overall, this research reveals that there is a significant disconnect between what is said 
in the Government policy literature about the success of WDMC policy as revealed 
through public WDMC meetings and WDMC plans across NSW and against what was 
reflected in the industry during this time. This disconnect is substantiated by a number 
of Government and industry Reports. This suggests in turn that farm families lacked the 
confidence to restock ‘destocked’ lands because of wild dogs especially on lands in the 
vicinity of Schedule Two lands. This raises serious doubts over whether it is possible 
for Schedule Two lands and sheep production to coexist, or, in fact, if they are mutually 
exclusive.
This Chapter outlines briefly the Commonwealth and State administrative structure of 
WDMC. It outlines the key elements of the Brindabella Plan model and the role of the 
State Council of the RLPB and the local Boards as segue to the introduction of the 
context of WDMC meetings. All identifying information concerning these public 
meetings has been removed. There is a notation only of the code given to this meeting. 
It then presents the empirical findings of both public WDMC meetings and WDMC 
plans. It compares these findings against recent Government and industry Reports 
regarding the sheep industry. It argues that the disconnect between the success of 
WDMC policy and the reality at the grassroots was further exacerbated by State driven 
changes to the ways in which the concerns of farm families over WDMC were 
represented and could be heard.
The Commonwealth Structure
The administrative structure of WDMC during this time clearly reflected the Federalist 
model of government in Australia. The overarching body responsible for formulating 
coordinated national policy on vertebrate pests was the Coalition of Australian 
Governments (COAG). Beneath this Commonwealth organisation were the respective 
Federal Ministers for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Minister for
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Environment, Heritage and the Arts. This Department underwent several name changes 
during this time.
The Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC) and the Natural 
Resource Management Standing Committee (NRMSC) advised the respective Ministers 
within the jurisdictions of their portfolios. Additionally, the national Vertebrate Pests 
Committee (VPC), the Primary Industries Ministerial Council (PIMC) and the Primary 
Industries Standing Committee (PISC) were advisory bodies reporting directly to the 
Commonwealth Minister. In 2011, the NRMMC and PIMC had their remits withdrawn 
when the Standing Council on Primary Industries (SCOPI) was established. SCOPI was 
appointed as the peak forum:
to pursue and monitor priority issues of national significance affecting 
Australia’s primary production sectors which require a sustained and 
collaborative effort across jurisdictions; and address key areas of shared 
Commonwealth, state and territory responsibility and funding for Australia’s 
primary production sectors (Council of Australian Governments' Standing 
Council on Primary Industries 2012: np)
The National Feral Animal Control Programme (NFACP) was later replaced by the 
Australian Pest Animal Strategy (APAS) (Natural Resource Management Ministerial 
Council 2007). The Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) -  which was later abolished - divided 
Australia into 56 regions and worked closely to implement natural resource 
management initiatives through DAFF, the DAFF Standing Committee on Pest Animals 
and the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA). This 
Department was subsequently renamed the Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Populations and Communities (SEWPC).
In 2008, the ‘Caring for Country’ strategy, later rebadged, ‘Caring For our Country,’ 
was implemented. This strategy was reported as: ‘Australian Government’s flagship 
natural resource management initiative to help Australians sustainably manage the 
environment and productive lands’ (Caring For Our Country Review Team 2012: 3).
Under this strategy, substantial funding was directed particularly to the IACRC to 
conduct research under the rubric of ‘wild dog’ research (Invasive Animals Cooperative
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Research Centre 2010, Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2011).
The NSW State administrative structure of wild dog management and control
In NSW, during this time, NSW DPI, NSW Agriculture and State Forests -  which was 
later renamed Forests NSW and then subsumed within NSW DPI - reported directly to 
the Minister for Primary Industries.
NSW DPI was a division within NSW Trade and Investment. Within this Department 
there were seven divisions: Agriculture NSW, Fisheries NSW, NSW Food Authority, 
Biosecurity NSW, NSW Office of Water, Catchment & Lands, and Business Services. 
NSW DPI was a core partner with the IACRC.
Advisory members of Biosecurity NSW were the IACRC, MLA, AWI, and the NSW 
Wild Dog Advisory Group (NWDAG).
In 1995, the goal of the NSW Pest Animal Council (NSW PAC) was described as:
The use of environmentally, economically and socially acceptable pest control 
through the adoption of well coordinated best practice programs. Inherent in this 
goal is that wherever possible, the animals causing the problem will be 
eradicated. Where eradication is not possible, control will be implemented to 
ensure that the pest animal causes minimal economic/ecological damage (Korn 
1995: np).
The NSW PAC was chaired by NSW Agriculture. Its membership included: NSW DPI, 
the Environmental Protection Office (EPA), the only remaining Wild Dog Destruction 
Board located in the Western Division of NSW, the LHPA, the Office of Environment 
and Heritage (OEH) NSW NPWS, NSWFA, RSPCA NSW, NSW Wildlife Preservation 
Society of Australia, Nature Conservation Council, RLPBs, the Commonwealth 
Scientific Industry and Research Organisation (CSIRO), Department of Land, Water 
and Conservation (LWC) and Game Council NSW. However, this organisation met 
irregularly.
Within WDMC, there is a clear separation of powers. The Commonwealth undertakes 
research and the State is responsible for the implementation of WDMC. However, the 
Commonwealth has the power to intervene if matters intersect with the provisions of the 
EPBC Act 1995. The Act was invoked typically over issues arising from various
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methods of WDMC; such as the ‘bait rate.’ The consistent argument of the States is that 
they lack sufficient funds to carry out the control required on public lands.
The State Council of the NSW Rural Lands Protection Board
The State Council of the NSW Rural Lands Protection Board was a statutory authority 
comprising of 47 autonomous boards throughout NSW which were legislatively 
charged with formulating WDMC plans. Its predecessor, the Pastures Protection Board, 
was created in 1903. These Boards were located across NSW in rural communities and 
were subsequently replaced by the RLPB system.
In 2009, the RLPB system was replaced by the LHPA system. The State Council of the 
LHPA is a Statutory Authority which reports to the Minister of Primary Industries. In 
2012, the Minister for Primary Industries announced the abolition of the LHPA system. 
This will take effect in January 2014. The new ‘Local Land Services’ (LLS) will 
amalgamate the functions of the LHPA system, CMAs, certain functions of NSW DPI 
and possibly Game Council NSW under the one umbrella.
As explained in Chapter Two, public land managers of Schedule 2 land are deemed to 
have fulfilled their general destruction obligation if they have entered into a WDMC 
plan with the local board and, crucially, the content has been agreed. This obligation 
and the implementation of the management plan were devolved in the Act from the 
State Council of the RLPB through the instrument of a Guideline to the local boards of 
the RLPB and its successor, the LHPA.
Under the RLPB Act, there is no legal requirement on individual farmers or farm 
families to participate in a WDMC plan. The legal remedy to any WDMC plan resides 
not in the plan but in any contracts for work that may result as a consequence of 
WDMC activities. However, individual farmers may be prosecuted if they are found to 
have known of the existence of declared pests on their property and have been found 
negligent in eradicating them. WDAs appear not to have legal indemnity in carrying out 
WDMC work unless they are incorporated bodies and carry public liability insurance.
The Cooperative Wild Dog/Fox Control Plan for the Brindabella & Wee Jasper 
Valleys
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From 1995, successive Commonwealth and NSW Governments were under intense 
political pressure to implement measures both to conserve the dingo and to curb 
escalating wild dog attacks on agricultural stock (General Purpose Standing Committee 
No. 5 2002, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and 
Forestry 2005, Anon 2007). The policy response was twofold:
The first, involved the advocacy and development of technologies and new 
‘innovations’ in WDMC principally from organisations which were ‘new players’ in 
WDMC; the PACCRC formed in 1996 and its successor, the AIACRC, rebadged as the 
IACRC, formed in 2004. The second response, in 2002, involved the public 
endorsement of a process of consultation initially trialled through the Cooperative Wild 
Dog/Fox Control Plan Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys -  the so-called ‘Brindabella 
Plan.’
The Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys cover an area of approximately 150,000 
hectares at the northern end of the Australian Alps and comprise a small area of land 
relative to the rest of NSW. Between 1996 and 2001, significant areas of bushland 
around the Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys were gazetted as National Park or 
Nature Reserve and were now managed by NSW NPWS (Cooperative Wild Dog/Fox 
Control Plan Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys 2002: 4).
The Brindabella Plan was then widely promulgated across NSW as the model of ‘best 
practice’ in WDMC by all Commonwealth and State Departments and Agencies 
charged with WDMC or with functions that overlapped it. The express intention of farm 
families in trialling this model was to halt spiralling wild dog predation on agricultural 
stock in the Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys. The cumulative ‘articulation’ of ‘nil 
tenure’ [see below] enunciated in the Brindabella Plan; the advocacy of the so-called, 
‘strategic approach’ promoted by NSW DPI; the ‘good neighbour policy’ as outlined in 
the 2005 NSW NPWS, ‘Neighbour Relations Policy;’ and the ‘Wild Dog Policy’ 
enunciated by DECC NSW in 2005 all contribute to the reification of this approach. 
Together, these policies map out through language a careful process of consultation 
with farm families that is then implemented at public WDMC meetings.
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The central features of the Brindabella Wee Jasper model are the creation of a written 
plan. The plan details: the recording of historical data about previous farming and wild 
dog activity; a commitment to a ‘nil tenure’ approach; the commitment of ‘resources 
necessary to effectively and equitably implement the plan;’ the adoption of the ‘strategic 
approach;’ descriptions of all methods of control; an outline and timeframe of all 
activities to be achieved and by whom; intense scientific monitoring and evaluation of 
native fauna and wild dogs; and, the incorporation of this data within the plan 
(Cooperative Wild Dog/Fox Control Plan Brindabella and Wee Jasper Valleys 2002).
The OEH later claimed probably accurately that ‘Under the initial plan (2002-05) 
attacks on stock decreased by an average of 75 per cent per year’(Office of Environment 
& Heritage 2012). However, this storyline misses the point. Most lands in the area had 
already been destocked and this meant there were fewer stock subject to predation. As 
well, relative to its size, this area received resources above that devoted to most other 
areas during this time.
Unequivocally, the adoption of ‘nil tenure’ and the commitment of ‘resources necessary 
to effectively and equitably implement the plan’ have proved problematic across other 
planning areas of NSW.
‘Nil tenure’
The ‘nil tenure’ approach first arose out of the ‘independent of tenures’ model first 
suggested by a local farmer, Noeline Franklin (Franklin nd). This was further refined to 
‘the tenure blind’ approach and then finally to what is now known as the ‘nil tenure’ 
approach. This approach is the benchmark of all management plans. The concept of ‘nil 
tenure’ relies on the understanding that wild dogs travel across different land tenures 
which has the effect of dissolving issues of dog ownership thus making the dog 
‘independent’ of categorisation; the wild dog is no longer the farmer’s dog; NSW 
NPWS’s dog or Forests NSW’s dog. This change was to enable the tracking and 
trapping of wild dogs across all landholdings as a coordinated response irrespective of 
who owns or controls the land. It was claimed that:
The nil tenure approach allows local communities, in collaboration with
government land managers, to cooperatively address wild dog/fox issues across
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all land tenures by collectively identifying the scope of the issue, the 
management technique required and the level of resources required (Hunt 2005:
i).
‘Resources necessary to effectively and equitably implement the plan’
Discounting the original amount of $345,000 given to NSW NPWS by the NSW Labor 
Government in 2001-2002 to develop WDMC plans across NSW, the amount allocated 
to the Brindabella Plan from 2001 until 2010 amounted to $814,563. The breakdown of 
this amount is as follows:
Table 7.1 2002- 2010 Expenditures on Wild Dog Management and Control in the
Brindabella & Wee Jasper Valleys *






Yass Board $28,896 $75,972 $126,741
State Forests $16,512 $89,550 $126,741
NSW NPWS $37,152 $102,798 $178,594
Total 114,167 268,320 $ 432,076
^Source: 2002-2005 &  2005 -  2010 Cooperative Wild Dog/Fox Plan Brindabella &
Wee Jasper Valleys
This total of $814,563 did not include an amount of $55,512.01 given to the Yass Board 
over the years 2004-2008 by NSW DPI. This figure also does not include any additional 
funding provided by the IACRC or the Commonwealth over this period. During this 
period, it appears from this analysis that per hectare few WDMC planning areas in 
NSW have received this level of funding. Yet, often the numbers of wild dog attacks 
and stock losses in other areas were significantly higher. In this regard, the Brindabella 
Plan as the example of ‘best practice’ and ‘the jewel in the crown’ of the NSW Labor 
Government WDMC policy appears to have benefitted continuously over and above 
that of other areas [See Chapter Two and Three].
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Moreover, farm families have progressively voiced their concerns at public WDMC 
meetings over the so-called success of the Brindabella Plan [1B01; 2B03; 01EK01; 
01NB01; 01001]. They argued that the first years of the Plan had been a successful in 
reducing wild dog attacks. This had resulted in the support of local farming 
communities. However, more recently, farmers claimed that the Plan was dominated by 
an Executive Committee comprising mostly public land managers; that public WDMC 
meetings were only held annually; and, that they were directed to ‘put all submissions to 
the Executive Committee on paper’ [2B03; 1AW02]. The general feeling was that the 
Brindabella Plan ‘may look good on paper’ but that in WDMC meetings ‘we’re told 
‘bloody nothing’ [01UA01].
Across NSW, criticisms of the model were widespread among other farm families. 
These criticisms centre on the disparities in the amount of assured funding that it 
receives, that geographically the two valleys constitute only a small area relative to the 
rest of NSW; that the voices of local farm families have become progressively 
disenfranchised over the passage of time; and, importantly, that they were not consulted 
about the appropriateness of the planning process for their local area. The oft-repeated 
claim was: ‘it was just dumped on us’ [1A03; 1IG03; 01T03; 01003; 01HG01; 01ET03; 
01ML02].
The Sites of Contestation
To convey the flavour of WDMC meetings this next section is written in a more stylistic 
way:
The sites of public consultation in WDMC occurs in meeting halls, Returned 
Servicemen’s League Clubs (RSL), Board rooms of RLPBs, Country Women’s 
Association (CWA) buildings, School of Arts buildings, Ex-Servicemen’s clubs, Town 
Halls and community halls spread across NSW. However, more often than not, in rural 
and remote locations of NSW, public WDMC meetings occur in CWA buildings, 
School of Arts, Town Halls and community halls. Often in autumn and winter these 
halls are cold, if not icy. Someone usually arrives early to pick up the key to the 
building in order to put the chairs out and to start either the large gas heater(s) or the 
wood fire in an attempt to take the chill out of the building.
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Often these meeting places have a framed photo on the wall of a youthful Queen of 
England wearing an evening gown, a tiara and a necklace with a dazzling blue diamond 
in the middle. Rolls of Honour from the First and Second World War inscribe in gold 
lettering on wooden plaques the names of the ‘Fallen.’ Often there are photos of 
community leaders alongside the latest crayon art work or painting of young children. 
Very occasionally, another group will meet at the same time in the side wings of the 
building.
Sometimes, the memorabilia on the walls reflects farming history: photos of prize 
winning merinos with ribbons draped over their backs positioned next to their smiling 
proud owners; bullock teams pulling enormous wagons loaded up to a dizzy height with 
bales of wool or timber logs along dusty tracks with young boys and men in the lead 
and working dogs hard at work: and, men and women in full Victorian dress; the 
women sheathed up to the neck in black taffeta with grim looks sweltering in the middle 
of an Australian summer. The names of these ‘locals’ and the years are etched beneath 
in the frame. The hard wooden floors of the hall appear to mirror this hard early life. 
Flyers advertising local community events are displayed on the walls as well. These 
buildings ooze a rich culture.
Meetings usually start at around 9.30am for a 10am start. Slowly, the ‘utes’ line up 
outside the hall and are parked on the grassy verges. Working dogs are chained on the 
back or wait patiently in cages. Their owners check all is well ‘on the back’ before 
leaving their prized working dogs. Groups assemble slowly, quiet conversations start 
outside invariably in the Australia way, about the weather, the drought; the saleyards, 
and, in summer, the direction of the wind and the latest fire. The trappers or PACs 
arrive and at that point the conversations turn to the ‘dog job.’ Farm families greet these 
men for a first hand report. Slowly the PACs and trappers talk among themselves. 
Rangers from respective RLPB’s usually arrive with the office manager and a Board 
member or two in tow.
Progressively the representatives of NSW NPWS, Forests NSW or occasionally NSW 
DPI arrive and almost palpably the mood changes. Their ‘utes’ are often near new and 
the uniforms of their respective departments or agency separate them from the ‘rest.’ 
Green for NSW NPWS and Forests NSW/DPI staff; and, blue for the Rangers of the 
respective RLPBs. Slowly people move inside the hall and careful ‘hellos’ are offered
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to the respective public land managers; sometimes not. NSW NPWS Rangers sit 
together. Rangers of the RLPBs move between the groups.
At these meetings, local CWA and Red Cross members invariably provide the morning 
tea, the cups of steaming hot black tea, milk and sugar. Some farmers arrive late, some 
straight from the paddock, and go into the halls to consume tea and cakes with gusto. At 
lunch depending on the season, soup and sandwiches are served and very occasionally 
sausages are grilled on a makeshift barbeque outside. The CWA and Red Cross 
members are thanked. The meeting ends. Afternoon tea with leftover cakes and slices 
from lunch will be offered before people depart for what is often a long drive home; 
sometimes up to four hours. Over the next days, farmers get on the ‘bush’ telegraph and 
dissect the meeting and work out their next move.
This is the site of the service delivery of WDMC public policy in NSW at the 
grassroots. This site invokes the ‘performance’ of WDMC as well as the rituals of 
WDMC public meetings which are observed at most meetings. To do otherwise is to 
court trouble; a lack of hospitality reinforces storylines of ignorance. However, WDMC 
meetings for all this apparent civility are anything but social occasions.
Public Wild Dog Management and Control Meetings
Public WDMC meetings are mandated under the RLPB Act 1998 as Amended. They 
are held ostensibly to create and review a WDMC plan in the public arena. They are 
frequently the site of significant and, on occasion, fiery contestation. They are also the 
site of meaning-making. It is the place where storylines are reproduced and reaffirmed 
at the grassroots and where WDMC policy and practice is played out.
Throwing dead mauled sheep at the four-wheel drive cars of NSW NPWS officers, 
dumping dead sheep at the doorway of the local RLPB or the offices of NSW NPWS 
(Bell 2012 8 May) or exasperated and desperate calls to ‘settle things outside’ a meeting 
shed or community hall does not appear to be a common practice of the farm families 
present [01CW02]. Yet, they are evident as social practices in WDMC and convey 
specific meanings.
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At one meeting, one farmer tried to describe the social impacts of wild dog predation. A 
public land manager in a throw-away line which it appears he mistakenly thought was 
not heard, said: ‘Yeah, yeah; we’ve heard it all before; we’re over that now’ [02B03]. 
The meeting hall erupted in arguments. One farmer called out: ‘We’re told to keep the 
emotions out of it, you can’t.’ [02B03].
Often in these WDMC meetings, farmers recall their horror at finding dead and mauled 
animals and then having to either shoot them or cut their throats. This was a visceral 
experience for many. One hardened farmer quietly remarked; ‘this was the hardest job 
of all’ [1DE01]. Added to this experience, Russell (2006) in a small phenomenological 
study reported one pastoralist family as saying: ...Really the dogs are no problem in 
comparison to the rubbish that you have to put up with in trying to find solutions to 
these problems’ (Russell 2006 26-27 July: 41).
Meetings were often ‘bloody.’ They have a history. Many farm families recall particular 
public WDMC meetings. One WDMC meeting is still recalled among local farm 
families [0EB02]. The storyline of this meeting was that the ‘violence’ reflected the 
degree of intransigence by NSW NPWS in refusing to acknowledge and respond to wild 
dog predation on agricultural stock and the effects this was having on farm families. 
This storyline of ‘bloody’ meetings appears a reflection on the passion and often poorly 
facilitated raw emotion at WDMC meetings that the material reality of wild dog 
predation on agricultural stock evokes in farm families. As one farmer recalled, ‘It was 
amazing someone wasn’t killed’ [1UN08; 01CW08]. To many farm families, ‘bloody’ 
meetings as a storyline reiterate publicly their losses and hardships and their distrust 
and, on occasion, even hatred of public land managers.
At one meeting large tables were prearranged in a circle. The meeting room was packed 
with at least sixty people in attendance; extra chairs were needed. Within a few minutes 
of the meeting starting, a farmer recounted a recent experience of reporting wild dog 
attacks to a public land manager. The public land manager had reportedly called the 
farmer’s ‘story’ a lie. At that point in the meeting, some enraged farmers stood up and 
their anger and hatred of NSW NPWS officers was visible. The public land manager 
denied calling the farmer a liar claiming the farmer had misrepresented the story. The 
enmity between the groups was almost palpable. At lunch time, those present went to 
lunch in separate groups; some were visibly affected, white or red faced with rage and
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shaken. After lunch, the meeting was emotionally charged with distrust and barely 
concealed anger. Public land managers and farm families determinedly and vocally 
disagreed over every agenda item. The atmosphere was vitriolic and the emotional toll 
on all was obvious [01GE01].
However, this storyline of ‘bloody’ meetings is also subverted within an administrative 
rationalist discourse. The subverted storyline focuses instead on the ‘violence’ 
expressed rather than on an analysis of the underlying systemic causes of the discontent. 
At the same time, institutional responses at public WDMC meetings often appear 
impervious to the material reality of the lives of farm families who are affected by wild 
dog predation on agricultural stock. At times, public lands staff appear to have been 
‘marshalled’ to remain wooden [02GE01; 01ES03].
While a history of WDMC is recorded in some plans this does not do justice to the 
emotional response to wild dogs. It misses the effect of WDMC; the more common, 
possibly, traditionally conservative, social and cultural responses of farmers at WDMC 
meetings, sitting with arms crossed and silent; occasionally with fists clenched under 
the table; farmers leaving to go outside and choosing not to participate or comment 
rather than ‘explode’ with frustration inside the meeting hall; farming families who 
attend only in the hope of achieving relief from wild dog predation on agricultural 
stock; on occasion, farmers breaking down emotionally which results in a shared 
‘silence of meaning’ among most farm families present; and, farmers leaving.
This storyline instead views the ‘violence’ as a defining characteristic of the farm 
families present rather than the desperation farm families feel when faced with 
unrelenting wild dog predation on agricultural stock (Jones 2002 31 October, House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005, 
Russell 2006 26-27 July, Kenny 2008). It is all too familiar to farm families as part of a 
wider storyline of ‘blame:’ farmers are simply ‘red necks,’ self-serving, profit 
maximisers and unconcerned with environmental issues (Brett 2011). Nevertheless, this 
positioning of farmers does not preclude their presence in Annual Reports being 
reported as a ‘proof of community ‘consultation’ and, incorrectly, as validation of the 
WDMC planning process.
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This fraught relationship between NSW NPWS, State Forests and farming families in 
South East Australia has a history stretching back for at least fifty years, sometimes 
longer. Very often, the same public land managers have remained in the job over 
considerable periods of time in the same regions. Almost all public land managers and 
officers are known personally to farming families; they have a history of personal 
interactions over WDMC over time. At a WDMC meeting a highly respected farmer in 
the community, publicly rebuked a public land manager over a report of the numbers of 
wild dog attacks in the local area ‘You know’ the farmer said, ‘we’re not making them 
up’ At this point another farmer called out bitterly: ‘the tale is hanging from the tree’ 
[02CSB08].
Wild dog predation on agricultural stock is strongly perceived by farming families as a 
consequence of the lack of ‘appropriate’ intervention by government, ineffective and 
poorly resourced WDMC programs, a rigid adherence to disputed and/or flawed 
ecological science, and a poorly conceived and funded natural resource management 
policy. As one farmer quipped, ‘If they’ve made a decision to keep the dogs; then they 
have to control them’ [01FS03].
These views are echoed by the NSWFA (NSW Farmers Association 2010 25 January) 
whose representatives are periodically called on to intervene with public land managers, 
and if not possible, to take the issue to the Minister and/or to call extraordinary WDMC 
meetings. These meetings may be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ wherein only members of NSWFA 
and invited guests may attend.
This ‘performance’ of farm families -  ‘all the activity of a given participant on a given 
occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants’ (Goffman 
1959: 15) -  and their ‘mere’ physical presence at WDMC meetings does not signify 
consent or agreement with current WDMC policy and practice; it often signifies the 
opposite. As one farmer dryly remarked looking at the number of farm ‘utes’ parked 
outside a community hall ‘...it’ll be on today’ [01CS09].
It is salutary that some public WDMC meetings are only held once a year and not all 
farm families attend. Farmers assemble only once to receive updates on wild dog 
activity; changes in legislative requirements; and, information about proposed aerial 
baiting routes [01WCT03], At one public WDMC meeting, a Ranger held up a Plan and
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announced: ‘This is your Plan.’ One farmer replied: ‘What’s in it?’ The seven 
assembled farmers looked unimpressed; one clenched his fists under the table and 
refused to pass on a pamphlet that a NSW NPWS Ranger was distributing. The meeting 
ended after less than forty minutes [01BEW01].
Sometimes a plan is completely prepared by RLPB Rangers. The Plan is a ‘rubber 
stamp’ affair that simply fulfils a legislative requirement. A WDMC meeting is called to 
ratify it and then it is simply ‘filed.’ In these cases, contracts for work are arranged by 
the Board, the Ranger and the relevant public land managers. Sometimes all necessary 
administrative work and operational work for aerial bait drops is completed by the one 
RLPB Ranger in advance of these meeting; this is a heavy load. However, it appears 
that the lack of commitment to the planning process is not apathy; it reflects a deep 
cynicism over the planning process; farmers often angrily state: ‘the planning process is 
a joke’ [01LEN02].
Conflicts over other ways of knowing and understanding WDMC are fiercely contested 
and in this sense are, to a large degree, predictable. ‘Consultation’ in WDMC is a 
misnomer. It represents a powerful ‘non sequitur’ within the internal logic of 
‘cooperation’ as it is enunciated in the Brindabella Plan. Public WDMC meetings were 
never intended to become sites of ‘empowerment’ as envisaged in one of the 
recommendations of the 2005 Taking Control Report. Rather, these sites represent 
spaces for the public performance and promulgation of the State’s interests in order to 
achieve its objectives and achieving the cooperation of farm families. Herein lays the 
irony.
The success of the administrative rationalist discourse is dependent on the continued 
cooperation of farm families in a public planning process which pivots on their 
acquiescence to a discourse that subordinates their concerns and at the same time 
privileges this model as ‘best practice.’ This is accompanied by the implicit suggestion 
in the policy literature that there was widespread adoption of this model by farm 
families across NSW. This is deeply problematic.
Overwhelmingly, at public WDMC meetings farm families reject the State’s reliance on 
administrative rationalism and a chorus of voices reflects the significant gap that exists 
between the political and policy rhetoric of WDMC and the lived reality. Ultimately, the
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extent to which the voices of farm families were ‘heard’ -  or not -  depends on the 
extent to which farm families engage with and ‘embraced’ the precepts and the primacy 
of scientific rationalism which renders their collective and individual experiences and 
knowledges as ‘anecdote’ and as lacking in both ‘rigor’ and ‘validity.’ On consistent 
occasions over a number of meetings farming families revealed areas known as wild 
dog habitats. Only when this was validated by ecological studies was this information 
accepted as ‘fact.’ Farmers also appear on occasion to be reluctant to reveal details of 
the native fauna and flora in their area because of what appears to be an uncertainty 
surrounding the consequences of any revelation.
In all, sixty three public WDMC meetings were attended from 2007 until late 2009. 
Public meetings were coded. Observations were then grouped under four main 
headings. These headings were derived directly from the data. These were: contending 
discourses; funding; perceptions of the consultation process; and, social impacts. As 
outlined previously the contending discourses of agrarianism; science and technology; 
animal welfare and biosecurity are central to understanding WDMC during this time. 
These were reproduced in storylines across all public WDMC meetings. Farm families 
consistently challenged the dominant discourse of administrative rationalism. However, 
ultimately these storylines in turn reflected the cumulative inability of farm families to 
materially alter the dominant discourse of WDMC. This in turn reflects on the fragility 
as well as the lack of legitimacy given to the planning process.
Contending discourses
The presence of contending discourses was played out in WDMC through the use of 
storylines. The following storylines of farm families were consistently reported across 
most WDMC meetings:
The storylines of agrarianism
The storylines of agrarianism included: the ‘destocking’ of land as a consequence of 
poor management of WDMC and the National Estate by public land managers; that 
‘farmers were defending lands all of the time’[01P103]; that subdivision of farming 
land and changes in land use resulted in a changed land ‘ethic’ which has severe 
impacts on effective WDMC; the ‘right’ of farmers to farm on private lands unhindered
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by wild dogs; concerns that farmers were always typecast as the ‘villain’ in any 
discussion about the environment; that public land managers were making decisions that 
materially impacted on the productivity of farms and on the wellbeing of farm families; 
real concerns over the rise in power of Game Council NSW and the IACRC; that 
WDMC was being promoted as a ‘growth industry’; that re-stocking land was the only 
true barometer of effective WDMC policy and this had not happened; that the numbers 
of wild dogs were increasing; real concerns about the sheep industry’s decline across 
Australia, that it was ‘gone;’ and, that crucially that ‘the increase in wild dogs precludes 
effective participation or return to the industry by producers.’
The storylines of animal welfare
The storylines of animal welfare drew strongly on notions of stewardship of animals. 
The storylines of animal welfare included: farmers’ concern for the health and welfare 
of their stock; concerns over the rise of Game Council NSW and its impact on the 
scheduled work programs of dog trappers and PACs; the failure of Government 
Departments to acknowledge that farmers have a deep compassion for their stock; that 
RLPB Rangers, PACs and trappers have to ‘clean up the mess’ caused by irresponsible 
hunters and yet often they carried the blame for the behaviour of others; that the 
integrity of WDMC rests with the trapper and that this is consistently ‘white-anted;’ that 
‘it is getting harder and harder to kill a dog’ [01WEM03]; the ‘arrogance and absurdity’ 
of NSW DPI in not factoring the impacts of wild dogs on agricultural stock into its 
humaneness model;
In contrast, the storylines of animal ‘rights’ were perceived as ill-informed and the 
cause of material harm to the lives of farming families through the depiction of farming 
families as uncaring; if not, cruel. These storylines included: the pervasive impact of 
‘faceless’ animal rights activists who never attended public WDMC meetings; the 
perceived close relationship between the RSPCA and Animals Australia; and the narrow 
and unrealistic position of animal rights groups such as Animals Australia.
The storylines of science and technology
In contrast to storylines of ‘experiments’ and ‘success’ that often emanate from 
particularly NSW DPI, NSW NPWS and the IACRC, the subverted storylines of farm
209
families reveal that they are often highly critical of the efficacy and cost effectiveness of 
the tools that are promoted by Departments and Agencies. Moreover, there appeared to 
be a distrust of science.
The storyline of ‘tools,’ pivots around effectiveness and, specifically, the retention of 
1080, trapping and aerial baiting. This storyline across all WDMC meetings reveals 
overwhelmingly that these three methods are preferred and ‘must be protected.’ The oft- 
repeated question of all tools is: ‘Does it kill a dog?’
The storylines of farming families of science and technology pivoted around criticisms 
of the application of questionable ecological science and the reliance on science and 
technology as the ‘solution’ to WDMC. These storylines included: the threat to the 
continued use of 1080; ‘a fundamental problem with overzealous scientists’; flawed 
ecological research that directs public policy; the lack of information from public land 
managers as to the location of ‘experiments’ on public lands; the release of ‘pure’ 
dingos in to some parts of NSW and the repatriation of captured ‘dingoes’ to licensed 
dingo breeders; the selective release, if at all, of information from the NSW NPWS 
‘Feralbase’ monitoring system; accusations of an apparent conflict of interest in the 
relationship between the IACRC and NSW DPI staff; the ‘waste of money’ directed to 
the development of PAPP; the loss of aerial baiting and concerns over the diminution in 
the bait rate; that new technologies did not work; that ecological science ‘never killed a 
dog’; and, that ‘research can wait until we get the dogs out of our paddocks.’ At one 
public WDMC meeting, a farmer drily remarked that ‘the dogs were walking over bait 
stations to get to sheep’ [02WME03].
Overall, farm families’ interest in ‘new’ technologies was marginal. They argued: ‘we 
know what works.’ Nonetheless, farm families asked where ‘new’ tools were being 
trialled, how much they cost, and often sought guarantees that the resources allocated to 
the trialling of ‘new’ technologies does not impact on agreed WDMC programs and/or 
budgets or result in a diminution in use and availability of 1080, trapping and aerial 
baiting. The answers to these questions were unclear.
There is consistent and widespread criticism of what are perceived to be the ‘toys’ of 
Agencies and Departments and ecological science: ‘sand plot monitoring’ ‘mound 
baiting;’ the changed ‘bait rate’ research; the capture, collaring and release of wild dogs;
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the genetic testing of captured ‘wild dogs;’ the exorbitant cost of infra-red cameras; the 
inconsistent and divisive allocation of electric fencing; and; the trialling of M44’s. 
Moreover, these tools are perceived as the tangible evidence of the power of 
administrative rationalism which they reject.
The storyline of mapping in WDMC is extremely controversial and remains a source of 
real angst among farm families. In 2007, at a WDMC meeting an elderly and highly 
respected farmer in the community, publicly rebuked a public land manager over 
recorded but disputed numbers of wild dog attacks in the local area ‘You know’ she 
said, ‘we’re not making them up.’ At this point another farmer called out bitterly: ‘the 
tale is hanging from the tree’ [01TW03].
Often maps that accompanied plans were out-of-date; the proffered statistics were 
contested; only reflected wild dog attacks or stock losses as recorded by one Agency or 
Department; and, yet were held to be indicative of losses in a particular area. The 
validity afforded to these figures by farm families is marginal yet farm families were 
also very aware that these maps and figures were then used as: ‘a stick to beat us with’ 
[01FS03].
Crucially, many maps do not reflect ‘destocked’ lands. The failure to map ‘destocked’ 
land is a recurrent and highly emotive storyline across all WDMC meetings. It is a 
major source of contention. Maps are powerful, emotional and visual reminders to farm 
families of the losses they have incurred, the loss of productive lands and visible ‘proof 
of the continuing social impacts of wild dogs. They are not viewed as benign [See Table 
7.3].
There are pervasive storylines across WDMC meetings that suggest that there is a lack 
of consultation over the allocation of doggers, a restriction on the numbers of dogs they 
are ‘allowed’ to catch and of the ‘retribution and white anting’ meted out to trappers by 
public lands staff. Trappers, PACs, doggers are highly prized by most farm families. 
The storylines that emerge suggests that there is little to no recognition of their skills, 
knowledges and experiences in ecological journals.
Moreover, farm families argue that these men were not labourers but highly skilled 
tradesmen. Farm families argue that PACs and trappers are rarely consulted. Across
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many WDMC meetings there was widespread criticism of the NSW DPI so-called 
‘humaneness model’ (Sharp and Saunders 2008). This appears to have arisen for three 
reasons: umbrage over the implicit suggestion that farmers were cruel; that trappers and 
PACs were not consulted in the development of this model, and, that the model does not 
take into account the effects of wild dog predation on agricultural stock.
The storylines of biodiversity
The storylines of biodiversity pivoted around; farmer’s love of wildlife and of their 
environment; their extensive involvement in other environmental programs such as 
Landcare; their concerns over the impact of wild dogs on native flora and fauna; 
biosecurity concerns over the health and wellbeing of their animals; particularly through 
the threats of neospora and hydatids; the lack of respect given by public land managers 
to the experience and generational knowledges of farm families of the environment 
accrued over a life time and in some cases, generations of fanning families.
The storylines of funding
In all but two public WDMC meetings attended there were concerns raised over the 
continuity of funding of WDMC programs beyond the financial year and/or the period 
of the contract for work as well as the provision of funding for reactive work. At two 
public meetings, public land managers repeated the claims of the NSW Labor 
Government’s largesse of $18 million and an additional amount of $6.7 million 
allocated to WDMC in NSW and the South East of NSW respectively. This claim was 
received with widespread disbelief and cynicism.
In one meeting, in a packed meeting hall, one farmer stood angrily and demanded of the 
seated public land manager: ‘What is it about our personalities that you have a problem 
with? What’s the issue you have with us?’ The dispute centred on the continued refusal 
by a public land manager to release funds for a dog trapper until the next financial year 
-  two months away. The Chair, another public land manager, tried to defuse the 
escalating situation and asked those present: ‘let’s not get personal.’ At this point 
another farmer stood up and angrily called out: ‘Sheep in our paddock -  it is very, very 
personal’ [03WCSB03].
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It was evident that in public WDMC meetings there was a lack of public accountability 
and transparency across all Agencies and Departments in the public reporting of the 
funding of WDMC programs at the grassroots. Moreover, decisions regarding 
additional funding appeared to often reside with NSW NPWS. At two meetings those 
present were informed that funding sources had ‘dried up’ and that they would ‘need to 
think outside the box’ or ‘source money through the Caring For our Country strategy.’ 
At one joint meeting, a Ranger from the ACT Parks Service advocated instead a ‘user 
pays’ system. At another, motions for the writing of ‘ministerials’ subsequent to the 
decisions of local or area public land managers were drafted and passed unanimously 
[01T03].
There was considerable dissatisfaction with what was perceived to be the attitude of the 
IACRC towards the allocation of the cumulative financial resources of farm 
organisations; that farm families’ mandatory levies had become the ‘cash cow’ for 
scientific research. At no public WDMC meeting was the National Wild Dog Facilitator 
present. At one meeting, a public land manager told those present: ‘To get off your arses 
and do something for yourselves’ [01BEW01] At this point a shouting match ensued 
and a number of farmers left the meeting.
However, it is apparent that farm families contribute to WDMC through mandatory 
levies and rates collected through the then respective RLPB system and through the 
imposition of mandatory levies raised by industry on the sale of stock. Additionally, it is 
apparent that farm families often act in voluntary capacities, that their commitment to 
WDMC are substantial within their own resources and that much WDMC relies on their 
good will and ‘in kind’ support. Across some WDMC meetings concerns were raised 
about the role of Game Council NSW and that it ‘should not have a voice in our plan’ 
[02WEM08].
Perceptions of the consultation process
There is widespread perception by farm families that they play a subordinate role in the 
WDMC planning process. This is the source of considerable resentment. Farm families 
consistently argue that there is a fundamental disagreement over the scope of the issue 
and that ultimate power rests with public land managers and, in turn, the Minister of the 
day. Farmers consistently argue that: ‘we are disempowered at every step’ [01AFT03].
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Perceptions of the consultation process revolve around the degree to which their 
concerns are heard. There is a real sense of decisions being made without consultation 
and that their voices are not heard, are misrepresented or are dismissed.
Farm families understand the process of consultation as the ‘regulation of the conflict’ 
that is presented in only: ‘the idiom of one of the parties.’ One farmer remarked at a 
public WDMC meeting: ‘what I resent most is science’s rejection of generational 
knowledge and all the bureaucratic bullshit’. Another stated that meetings were just: 
‘bureaucratic claptrap’ [01JW09].
Public WDMC meetings are the sites where farm families try to redress this imbalance. 
They argue strongly that current WDMC policy reflects a highly political agenda which 
has devastating impacts on farm families. There is a strong perception that: ‘each year 
we are further disenfranchised’ and that ‘we fight the same battles every year with fewer 
resources’ [01IW03]. In contrast, public land managers argue that the costs of WDMC 
each year have risen and that any reallocation of monies must be cost effective, directed 
to areas where the greatest benefit can occur and must marry with the objectives of the 
Department(s).
Over a period of three WDMC meetings of the one wild dog working group, continued 
reasons were given by a public land manager for the delay in the approval for an 
application for aerial baiting. Angered by the continual obfuscation, those farm families 
present argued: ‘that it was part of the WDMC plan and that the credibility of the plan 
was at stake’ [01ML03]. After continual goading by farm families, a public land 
manager retorted: ‘It’s not going to happen and it never was going to happen’ 
[01ML03]. NSWFA was contacted and intervened. This is not unusual.
Farm families often work outside of the WDMC planning process, returning when there 
is a ‘done deal’ negotiated often between the Directors of the relevant Board and/or 
NSWFA. These meetings are often held in private with public land managers. ‘Threats’ 
of holding government agents to account by going to the local Member of Parliament 
and/or the media, and/or of written ‘ministerial’ and/or or the intervention of NSWFA 
are common when an impasse is consistently reached.
Often, farm families argue that harmonisation between State boundaries is lacking, that 
significant cross-jurisdictional issues arise over the implementation of WDMC and
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there is an increasing dissatisfaction with the local LHPA and/or previously, with the 
State Council of the RLPB. This appears to undermine the ‘nil tenure’ approach 
advocated in the Brindabella Plan.
Moreover, this storyline reflects deep dissatisfaction with the ‘lack of dialogue’ with the 
State Council of the RLPB as well as Departments and Agencies. Farm families argue 
that over the years of WDMC in NSW that there has been a steady centralisation of 
power and that as a consequence Agencies and Departments and the State Council are: 
‘not answerable to anyone’ over the lack of implementation of WDMC.
At one meeting, a relief public lands manager who had been ‘two days in the job,’ gave 
an ill-informed presentation to a large and at times ‘fiery’ meeting to explain why the 
agency would not intervene to release additional funding to stop wild dog predation on 
sheep occurring around a State border. The audience was informed that officers were on 
annual leave. An officer from another public lands Department admitted to being ‘brand 
new in the job’ and having: ‘little to no knowledge of wild dogs.’ He suggested to the 
audience that: ‘you should all calm down and read Laurie Corbett’s book ‘The Dingo in 
Australia and Asia’ and held a copy in the air (Corbett 2001). He went on to say: 
‘...look, if we lit up the barbeque the men here today could probably sort this out 
overnight’ [01WFA03].
This lack of knowledge of the ‘historically specific systems of meaning that form the 
identities of subjects and objects’ (Howarth 2000: 9 citing Foucault 1972: 49) in 
WDMC together with the gendered reality of Australian farming and the contribution 
that women such as those present in the room that day make to it in turn reaffirmed to 
those farmers present the storyline of the contempt ‘bureaucrats,’ particularly public 
land managers from NSW NPWS, held for farmers. One farmer commented at the 
meeting that he found both presentations ‘deeply offensive’ and ‘a waste of his time’ 
[01WFA03].
On only one occasion, at a public WDMC meeting did farm families reflect positively 
on the planning process. Recalling previous WDMC meetings one farmer guardedly 
stated: ‘whoever would have thought we could have got to this point?’ The public land 
manager replied: ‘it’s interesting that science has caught up with the farmer’ 
[05CSB02]. It is salutary, that at this time, a local WDMC plan was not ‘signed off and 
only a contract for work existed. However, there was a strong sense engendered at the
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meeting that progress had occurred. Yet, at the same time, all parties to the plan 
recognised the fragility of the ‘plan.’ Particular farmers acting with the full support of 
other local farming families appeared to be the lynch-pin to achieving continuing 
success. Moreover, these social actors were perceived as ‘tough.’ Farming families were 
extremely candid about the failings of public land managers over time. Any wild dog 
attack which resulted in stock losses was ‘personal.’
Over the three years of field work, these particular meetings occurred haphazardly. At 
the beginning there was enormous amount of anger directed at all public land managers 
present. In turn, public land managers often appeared intractable if not, at times, 
belligerent and/or arrogant. Meetings were emotionally charged as the agenda 
proceeded item by item. Minutes taken by and distributed by public land managers were 
often not reflective of important key issues, motions passed at the meetings were not 
recorded or often minutes were not distributed in time for the meeting. Meetings times 
were often rescheduled at the last minute and then adjourned. GIS mapping was largely 
incorrect, did not reflect destocked lands and on one occasion equipment ran out of 
power. During this period additional funding sources were negotiated and/or reinstated 
after at times intervention by farmers with NSWFA and/or direct appeals to local 
members and/or Ministers. All public land managers were held to account for any 
omission. PACs and trappers at every meeting provided detailed reports of their 
activities to farm families. The historical enmity between farming families and public 
land managers in this location was pronounced and had developed over the previous 
forty years. All parties were known to each other. It was evident that there was a 
‘history’ and a lack of trust. Over time, farming families appeared fatigued but resolute. 
The emotional toll of attending WDMC meetings on all was obvious. Nevertheless, 
farming families continued to attend. One farmer described it as: ‘having your backs 
against the wall;’ attendance at WDMC meetings was the result of sustained wild dog 
predation and a personal determination to affect change. At the last meeting attended, 
the meeting progressed in a business-like fashion; it appeared that all present knew their 
respective roles. The consequences of any departure from what was agreed resulted in 
immediate calls for explanation [02CSB05]. These meetings were not ‘pleasant’ but 
effective. It is also completely apparent that this ‘plan’ was ultimately dependent on 
continued funding for the eradication of wild dogs and that none of the farming families 
who attended had forgotten the impacts of a lack of WDMC in their communities.
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Overwhelmingly, the bitter and historical enmity that has existed between NSW NPWS, 
State Forests and many farm families and the role Departmental and Agency staff 
played is a pervasive storyline across all WDMC meetings attended. Farming families 
who have attended WDMC meetings have argued that from their perspective, the 
objective of any WDMC meeting is: ‘to get the dogs off our land;’ absolute honesty and 
transparency across all areas of the plan; completed localised plans; and, a working 
relationship o f ‘sorts’ with Departmental and Agency public land managers. Moreover, 
they argued that: Department and Agencies ‘must be in it for the long haul’ and that this 
commitment can only be ‘proven’ by a minimum commitment of funding for at least 
five years in order to redress the issue and restore the necessary confidence to enable 
farming families to restock destocked lands.
Social impacts
The social impacts of wild dog predation on agricultural stock are felt keenly across 
NSW. As one farmer commented at an extraordinary WDMC public meeting convened 
with NSW NPWS public land managers: ‘It’s great if you come to meetings but it’s an 
insult if you’re only looking at numbers’ [01MA02].
The social impacts have been documented both in the 2002 ‘Feral Animals’ Report of 
the NSW Government and in the 2005 ‘Taking Control’ Report. The Report stated:
The committee notes with concern the terrible social impact that pest animals are 
having on rural families and communities. (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 2005: 35).
The social impacts reported across WDMC meetings were broadly grouped into four 
categories:
Personal
These include: Stress; continual anxiety over when and where the next ‘dog attack’ will 
occur; frustration; anger; fatigue; increased personal debt; increase in mental health 
illnesses; depression; insomnia; loss of self-esteem; a sense of personal failure; loss of 
status; marital discord; psychological trauma; health issues; loss of time spent with the
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family due to wild dog control work; loss of generational knowledge and experience; 
trauma associated with the discovery and killing of injured animals; loss of family pets; 
inability to participate in community activities due to wild dog work; increased 
workloads on family members; increased work hours; a loss of independence; an 
increased sense of personal fear; uncertainties about legal rights and remedies; intense 
feelings of personal isolation and separation from a wider community; hand rearing of 
sheep and ‘bobby calves;’ ongoing conflict between Departmental and Agency public 
land managers; and deep sense of resentment over a lack of understanding of the issue 
by others; feelings of sheer hopelessness and empathy for the injured animal in the face 
of what is perceived to be an uncaring wider community; and, time spent off-farm 
attending WDMC meetings which often reinforces the vicious cycle and further 
exacerbates stress.
Environmental
These include: Loss of amenity; loss of wildlife; concerns over physical safety; loss of 
sense of community; increased threat of zoonotic diseases; land returning to scrub; 
community discord caused by neighbours not agreeing to aerial baiting or baiting; and 
an overall reduction in social capital.
Infrastructure
These include: Loss of shearing teams; loss of farm hands due to lack of income; 
change-over costs from sheep to cattle; flow-on losses in community spending; loss of 
schools and teachers; loss of transport services; loss of jobs; loss of childcare services; 
falls in real estate prices; loss of local businesses; loss of community organisations; and 
loss of health care professionals.
Financial
These include: Loss of income; increased farm debt; loss of business confidence; loss of 
financial certainty; rejection or partial rejection of ‘lots’ at abattoirs; decreased farm 
production through destocked land; costs of restructuring to cattle; reductions in wool 
quality; loss of future earnings; lack of compensation; loss of future income derived 
from ‘stud’ animals; increased necessity for ‘off-farm’ income; inability to pay school
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fees; costs of different fencing; mismothering of sheep; late term abortions in cattle; 
‘working dog’ shy flocks; ‘forced’ sales of family farms; reduced purchasing power; 
loss of value in property because of ‘known’ wild dog problems; loss of forward 
planning; and, loss of certainty in the production of on-farm business plans.
There are also substantial bodies of literatures and correspondences from the 1950s held 
by WDAs, Dingo Destruction Boards, RLPBs and NSWFA reports that attest to the 
quantum and longevity of these effects on farm families. Farm families report these 
social impacts to varying degrees at each and every public WDMC meeting.
The real question is not: ‘Do they exist?’ because all parties to WDMC appear to agree 
publicly and finally to some degree that they do. Rather, the question has become: 
‘What is the State doing to ameliorate the root cause?’
This is not an easy question to answer because the answer lies in two parts: The first 
appears obvious: effective WDMC across all landscapes to the extent that farm families 
have the confidence to restock destocked lands. This is salutary as farm families 
consistently report the absence of political will to affect this outcome. Responsibility is 
held to be a State responsibility because the management of Schedule Two lands rests 
with the State. Farm families argue that they already contribute heavily through 
mandatory rates.
The second part of the answer lies in the degree to which the discursive shift in WDMC 
turns to reaccommodate the voices of farm families over WDMC and to give it 
legitimacy. At this time, both appear highly unlikely.
The silencing of farmers’ voices
The impact of the discursive shift in WDMC has resulted in large part in the silencing 
of farmers ‘voices’ over the material consequences of wild dog predation. This was 
exacerbated -  if not achieved - by the State driven abolition of most WDAs, the State 
enforced abolition of all Dingo or Wild Dog Destruction Boards except one in the 
Western Division, the abolition of the PP Board system, the RLPB system, followed 
quickly by the forthcoming abolition of the LHPA and merger into the Local Land 
Services (LLS) system.
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These institutions traditionally represented the voices of farm families at the grassroots 
on WDMC. The abolition of these organisations importantly, however, did not lessen 
the impact of wild dogs. It is also of note that the representatives of these Boards were 
publicly elected. In contrast, the National Wild Dog Advisory Group (NWDAG) was an 
unelected advisory group established by the IACRC, comprising until 2009 of mostly 
State Government representatives.
The cumulative effect of these changes further restricted the ways in which farm 
families’ concerns over WDMC were represented and heard. Farming organisations, 
particularly, NSWFA and AWI through its National Wild Dog Advisory Committee, in 
turn have tried to redress this imbalance.
In 2008, a NSW Wild Dog meeting was held. From this meeting, the NSW Wild Dog 
Steering Committee was formed. This later became the NSW Wild Dog Advisory 
Group. However, from the outset its powers were severely circumscribed. NSW DPI set 
the Terms of Reference for what was an Advisory Committee and its very existence is 
subject to the continuing approval of the NSW PAC. The numbers of Government 
officials on this Committee with ‘voting’ rights outnumber the representatives of farm 
families and farm organisations. Yet, farm families are those most affected by wild dog 
predation on agricultural stock.
Farmers report that wild dog predation on agricultural stock has a direct correlation to 
farming families exiting the sheep meat, wool and/or cattle industries, and, sometimes 
from agricultural production altogether. This is a powerful storyline across all WDMC 
public meetings. Wild dog predation on agricultural stock while not the only factor in 
the decision of farm families to exit sheep production is nevertheless considered by 
many to be ‘the’ factor or the ‘tipping point’ that contributes most to this decision.
At one public WDMC meeting every farmer in attendance revealed that they had either 
left the sheep industry completely or were in the process of changing over to cattle. All 
members present cited the continual predation of wild dogs on agricultural stock 
coupled with the intransigence and ‘bloody-mindedness’ of government agencies as the 
major cause o f ‘destocking’ [01T03].
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Moreover, there appears to be a consistent pattern of farming behaviour that eventually 
leads to this decision. First, farming families consciously decide to remove or ‘destock’ 
paddocks in an attempt to reduce wild dog predation. Second, farm families will bring 
flocks or mobs into the ‘home’ paddock. Third, they ‘turn over’ to cattle production.
To farming families who worked extremely hard to have the legitimacy of the social 
impacts recognised by Departments and Agencies and reflected in the public policy 
literature this is a bitter pill. They believed that if the social impacts were realised 
change would occur; ‘that someone would care.’ Yet, while the social impacts are 
publicly acknowledged, the root cause of the problem is still not adequately addressed. 
They are still occurring.
Wild dog management and control plans
Wild dog management and control plans were collected and examined from across 
NSW up to August 2009 to allow for any delays that may have occurred in the ‘signing 
off of WDMC plans as a result of the abolition of the RLPB system and the 
introduction of the LHPA system in 2009. The results of this empirical research are 
revealing. [See over page].
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Table 7.2: ‘Signed O ff Wild Dog Management and Control Plans as at 1 August 
2009 *
RLPB Area Number of WDMC Plans ‘Signed o ff Status
Based on Schedule 2 
lands
as at 1 August 2009
North Coast 5 3
Mid Coast 12 1
Cumberland 4 1
South East 8 4
Hume 6 1
Tablelands 5 3
Central North 2 0
New England 23 12
Western 5 0
Total 70 25
^Source: This information was confirmed as correct by the then Pest 
Animal Manager of the State Council of the RLPB and the LHPA in 2009 
and 2013 respectively.
As at 1 August 2009, twenty five out of a possible seventy WDMC plans (less than 
thirty six per cent) were ‘signed off across NSW. Yet, a wild dog management plan 
was mandated under Schedule 2 of the Pest Control Order of the RLPB Board Act 1998 
as Amended for lands abutting or adjacent to Schedule 2 public lands. This is salutary 
for a number of reasons:
First, unless as a result of a publicly advertised meeting it is agreed not to proceed with 
a WDMC plan - and this is minuted - the completion of a WDMC plan by public land 
managers is mandated by law. Clearly, the State Council of the RLPB as the Agency 
tasked with the legal responsibility for affecting these plans did not fulfil its mandate.
Second, of those ‘signed off plans, the overwhelming majority of WDMC did not 
include details of the ‘resources necessary to effectively and equitably implement the 
plan’ as outlined in the Brindabella model. Work appeared to be negotiated with public 
land managers and completed under ‘contracts for work’ only; the detail of which was 
not publicly available. However, it appeared that at public WDMC meetings these 
‘contracts for work’ were tied closely to regional financial year budgets of public land
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managers and adjusted for changes in the financial year. There appeared to be a fragility 
and uncertainty regarding these amounts.
Nevertheless, in 2012, the year after the NSW Labor Government lost power, the OEH 
released information for the financial year 2010-2011 of the areas across NSW where 
WDMC work had occurred. There was no accompanying financial information 
provided. It stated:
NPWS works closely with the Livestock Health and Pest Authorities, wild dog 
associations, other public-land managers and park neighbours to deliver 
cooperative control programs across tenure. This includes the development and 
implementation of wild dog management plans for reserves listed under 
Schedule 2 (such as the Brindabella Wild Dog Management Plan) (Office of 
Environment and Heritage 2012: 2).
NSW NPWS may have worked ‘closely with the Livestock Health and Pest Authorities’ 
but equally clearly they may have delivered ‘cooperative control programs across 
tenure’ clearly. However, this was not as a consequence of a ‘signed off plan.
Third, WDMC plans were frequently ‘signed off by only one or two of a number of 
relevant public land managers; if at all. There was no collection or publicly available 
audit of these WDMC plans, what auditing occurred appears to have been of ‘contracts 
for work.’ Some plans appeared to be ‘carbon copies’ of each other with only names 
and locations changed.
Four, WDMC work by public land managers -  the RLPB; NSW NPWS; Forests NSW 
WDAs - and farm families - continued over this period, irrespective, of any WDMC 
plan in place.
Fifth, it was apparent that a WDMC plan had been ‘signed off even though there was 
no evidence of involvement by farm families or WDAs through public WDMC 
meetings, or, conversely, it was apparent that while a WDMC was in place even when 
the community had ‘walked away’ and no longer participated.
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Overwhelmingly, this empirical research puts the lie to the success of the model of the 
Brindabella Plan and of the ‘strategic approach’ across NSW. Yet, these two central 
tenets of the WDMC policy approach were promulgated across all Departments and 
Agencies. There is a significant disconnect between the public policy literature and 
what actually happens in WDMC.
In 1996, and again in 2002, NSW NPWS released its ‘Neighbour Relations Policy.’ The 
stated intention of this Policy appeared to reflect the public pressure NSW NPWS was 
experiencing from farming families. This policy stated: ‘We recognise the right of 
neighbours to undertake their activities without undue impact from our activities (NSW 
National Parks and Wildlife Service 2002: 3). However, by 2005, NSW NPWS ‘Wild 
Dog Policy’ backgrounded a larger discourse of ‘land management’ and subsumed 
WDMC plans as an administrative task:
Wild dog management plans will be prepared for Schedule 2 areas. Wherever 
possible, the plans should be part of a regional wild dog management plan or 
strategy covering all land tenures’ (NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service 
2005 May: 4)
In 2008, the then Minister for Primary Industries, the Hon. Ian MacDonald, and the 
Minister for Climate Change and the Environment, the Hon. Verity Firth - the fourth 
Minister in less than five years - released ‘The New South Wales Invasive Species Plan 
2008-2015. It stated its vision as: ‘The environment, economy and community of NSW 
are protected from the adverse impacts of invasive species’ (NSW Department of 
Primary Industries 2008: 3). However, between the years 2007-2009, across all of the 
WDMC meetings attended farming families expressly challenged the basis and the 
voracity of the claims articulated in each of these policies.
Industry and Government Reports
In 2008, the ABS reported that:
the number of farming families in Australia decreased by 22% between 1986 
and 2001’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008).
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In 2009, the Western Australia Department of Agriculture and Food reported:
• the number of sheep in Australia has fallen and continues to fall;
• the number of sheep producers across Australia has also fallen (Curtis 
2009: 15).
Moreover, the total number of sheep in Australia had dropped to the lowest level since 
1915. Even allowing for a fall in commodity prices and the extended drought, this 
means that the effects on farming families of any wild dog predation on sheep has a far 
greater impact as there are fewer farmers and fewer sheep. It also gives an indication of 
the scale of the increase in destocked lands.
From 1997 until 2011, the ABS reported yearly on the decline in the national sheep 
flock and disaggregates this information by State. In NSW, the total number of sheep 
for this period was as follows:
Table 7.3: Total Number of Sheep in NSW 1997-2011 *

















^Source: Figures Compiled from ABS Agricultural Commodities 7121.0 1997-2011 
Conclusion
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This empirical research reveals that WDMC policy is delivered ‘top down;’ the reliance 
on scientific ‘experts’ had increased rather than decreased and that the implementation 
of local WDMC ultimately rested with public land managers from a number of 
Departments and Agencies. In doing so, the NSW policy approach in WDMC mirrors 
the central tenets of the discourse of administrative rationalism.
Overwhelmingly, the legitimacy of this discourse was challenged by farming families 
who attended WDMC meetings. Additionally, this empirical research reveals that 
farming families rejected both the Brindabella Plan model and the ‘strategic approach;’ 
This puts the lie to the so-called ‘success’ of both in WDMC across NSW.
It is apparent that there is a significant disconnect between what is said to happen in 
WDMC and what happens at the grassroots. During this time there were also enforced 
changes in the organisations that traditionally had represented farming families on 
WDMC; the cumulative effect of which was to attempt to sublimate the voices of 
fanning families within the dominant discourse.
Further, it is clear that just under two thirds of all potential plans had not been ‘signed 
off and of these many revealed significant omissions -  not least, necessary signatures 
to the agreement, commitments to funding and authorship by local farming families. By 
the admission of farming families themselves across many WDMC meetings in NSW 
many ‘signed off plans were ‘a joke.’
Overall, it is also clear that the environment, economy and communities of farm 
families across NSW were not protected from the adverse impacts of wild dogs. Wild 
dogs continued to severely impact on the daily lives and material wellbeing of farm 
families across NSW. This left the remaining farming families engaged in sheep 
production in a parlous position: either to suffer the consequences of increasing wild 
dog predation on fewer sheep on less lands or exit sheep production.
Compounded by drought and falling commodity prices, wild dog predation on 
agricultural stock was often sighted as ‘the’ reason or ‘the’ tipping point in the decision 
to exit sheep production. It was clear that wild dogs continued to severely impact on the 
daily lives and material wellbeing of farm families and that the effects of this broader 
rural community were significant. Wild dog management and control was not done ‘to
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the extent necessary’ to ameliorate wild dog predation on agricultural stock to the extent 
necessary to restore the necessary confidence needed to restock destocked lands with 
sheep. From the point of view of farming families this was the central purpose of 
WDMC, WDMC meetings and WDMC plans: ‘to get the dogs off our lands.’
In the light of this empirical research the conundrum in NSW WDMC policy of 




‘It all went to hell in a hand basket’
With the impending abolition of the LHPA system across NSW at the end of 2013 by 
Ministerial fiat and the ‘forced’ creation of an administratively centralised organisation 
called the Local Land Services (LLS) that will come into being in 2014 - this time at the 
behest of the NSW Liberal and National Coalition - it is difficult to see how the voice of 
farming families regarding issues surrounding WDMC across NSW will be heard.
This is not least because the three targeted organisations - Landcare NSW, the CM As 
and the LHPAs - have very different reasons for existence as well as potentially 
conflicting visions for the future. Of these organisations it appears that the LHPA 
system - the descendent of the RLPB system and the PP system -  is the only 
organisation which appears to be both ‘cashed up’ financially and asset ‘rich’ -  a direct 
consequence of mandatory contributions by farming families over one hundred years. It 
is equally concerning that the LHPA is currently the only organisation of the three that 
can lay claim to legitimacy as it is the only organisation that holds democratically and 
transparently contested elections at the grassroots.
In contrast, the newly envisaged LLS will be majorly controlled through Ministerial 
appointments and seemingly administratively controlled by DII. This will strengthen not 
lessen the grip of the administrative rationalist discourse. The creation of the LLS may 
well have arisen out of concerns over wider government budgetary shortfalls; 
particularly in regard to DII. However, notwithstanding this, local existing Boards will 
be subsumed into ‘super’ Boards that will encompass vast tracks of both public and 
private lands across NSW. To the dismay of many farming families governance 
arrangements have been poorly developed and what policies have emerged lack detail 
and appear to have been made ‘on the run.’
Crucially for WMDC across NSW, the future employment of existing staff and in 
particular, pest animal controllers and ‘trappers’ currently contracted or appointed to the 
various local Boards, government departments and agencies for the specific purpose of 
WDMC, appears uncertain if not completely tenuous. How WDMC funding is to be 
allocated to these new ‘super’ boards and what say, and to what degree, local farming
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families will have that say is equally uncertain as only a minority of LLS positions will 
come from direct election. It is difficult therefore to be positive about the future 
involvement of NSW farming families in an organisation in which farming families are 
further disenfranchised yet to which they remain financially liable and from which they 
may well be even further geographically distant. It is near on impossible, if not 
foolhardy, to make NSW WDMC policy recommendations in light of this uncertainty. 
Literally, the lay of the land of the LLS, the governance arrangements, the financial 
allocations to NSW WDMC and even the continued commitment to the necessity of 
WDMC are lacking certainty. It is clear, however, that as it is currently envisaged the 
future organisation lacks legitimacy.
Equally, it is important to reiterate that the purpose of this thesis has not been to resolve 
the issue of WDMC. This is beyond the scope of this thesis and the purpose of 
interpretative research. The research question of this thesis: ‘To what extent can 
conflicts over wild dog management and control in New South Wales be understood in 
terms of contending discourses and what does that imply for policy legitimacy?’ has 
been comprehensively answered.
The purpose of the thesis has been to locate, identify and analyse the dominant 
discourse in WDMC during the period of successive NSW Labor Governments from 
1995-2011 and, in doing so, to locate, identify, and analyse the marginalised discourses. 
It has done this. This thesis presents the issue of WDMC as an empirical case study in 
contending discourses, primarily between the discourses of agrarianism and ‘new’ 
environmentalism. It presents the findings of this case study through an examination of 
the actual policy practices of WDMC in NSW and presents ‘what actually happens’ at 
the grassroots.
In adopting this approach, this thesis addresses the significant gap that exists in the 
existing academic literature about the issue of WDMC and the public policy of WDMC 
in NSW. It provides insights into the implications, the groups of concerns and the 
internal contradictions that are evident within the storylines of the contending 
discourses of WDMC in NSW. This is a significant contribution. Overall, this thesis 
demonstrates that legitimacy seemingly was achieved by the domination of one 
discourse over others. The empirical research of this thesis shows that this is morally
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problematic because it hurts the material interests of farming families and involved 
marginalising and suppressing particular voices. In our democracy this is indefensible.
The empirical research of this thesis was driven by three aims: to locate and analyse the 
historical context of WDMC; to discern if a discursive shift had occurred; and to 
identify and analyse how storylines contributed to or were subverted in support of the 
dominant discourse. It did this by drawing on substantial but disparate bodies of 
literatures in the public domain; through attendance at sixty three public WDMC 
meetings and through the analysis of all ‘signed off WDMC plans. The premise of this 
thesis is that the issue of WDMC is a social construct which was framed as a ‘problem’ 
in contending discourses over time; but for very different reasons.
The thesis openly acknowledges the limitations of this research. It did not provide a 
critique of NSW WDMC policy from an institutional point of view or from the 
viewpoint of other marginalised discourse coalitions. Instead it approached the actual 
policy and practice of WDMC from the viewpoint of grassroots farming families. It did 
not provide, as was stated in the delimitations, any analysis of NSW WDMC policy 
from the traditional owners of the land, the Aboriginal people of NSW. It did not seek 
further clarification through semi-structured interviews from either fanning families or 
farming families who did not hold the views of farming families who attended WDMC 
meetings. These areas of empirical research will provide very fruitful and useful 
critiques into the future. These areas of academic inquiry are sorely needed. However, 
they were simply beyond the scope and financial resources of this thesis.
In defence of the approach taken, as explained in the Introduction to this thesis, 
interpretive researchers reject the idea that the goal of policy analysis is to settle debates 
by conducting a value-free, objective assessment of the policy situation. In contrast, 
they seek to appreciate and improve policy practice by studying its paradoxes and 
ambiguities (Stone, 2002), and exploring various meanings embedded in language, 
action and artefacts. It is clear that any analysis from the view point of the marginalised 
discourse coalition of farming families currently represents an omission in the academic 
literature. This thesis redresses this omission. It is a first step in what hopefully will 
become a productive area for further empirical work. It is as yet an understudied and 
little understood area of Australian life.
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The literature review revealed that a significant discursive turn had occurred in the 
framing of the ‘problem’ of wild dogs and that this ‘turn’ was vigorously contested by 
farming families. Based on this empirical research, this thesis identifies the dominant 
discourse as administrative rationalism. It is a discourse which seeks to: ‘organise 
scientific and technical expertise into bureaucratic hierarchy in the service of the state’ 
(Dryzek 1997: 73). It identifies the contending discourses as agrarianism; ‘new’ 
environmentalism; animal welfare; and, biosecurity.
In furtherance of the dominant discourse, a legislative meaning was afforded to wild 
dogs through language. In this way, the ‘language’ of wild dogs lost its neutral status. 
Who was responsible, what could be done about wild dogs and the language of WDMC 
and wild dogs was highly politicised. The increase in public lands and the creation of 
Schedule Two land in NSW furthered this delineation. Over time, this resulted in what 
Hajer (1993) refers to as the ‘mobilisation of bias’ (Hajer 1993: 45). Schisms appeared 
between the storylines of the administrative rationalist discourse and the agrarian 
discourse; storylines were subsequently subverted to serve the dominant discourse no 
matter what the internal inconsistency.
This discursive contestation resulted in a consultation process which, despite political 
and institutional rhetoric to the contrary, institutionalised inequalities in power relations 
and negated the local knowledges and experiences of farming families. The public 
consultation, through the processes of WDMC meetings and the creation of a WDMC 
plan, was enshrined by legislative fiat. These became the sites of contestation and the 
rejection of the dominant discourse. Not surprisingly, during this time the consultation 
process was at very best, fragile, often deeply antagonistic and vitriolic and, at worst, 
and, often, completely irrelevant.
Farm families were increasingly alienated from the State. The planning process was 
held to be the discursive instrument of the State directed from ‘top down’ because it 
was. Public land managers were ‘forced’ to consult; farming families through 
desperation and frustration were ‘forced’ to participate. Notably, each discourse 
coalition mobilised around different meanings of wild dogs.
In Chapter Two, the historical context of wild dog policy in NSW revealed that from 
White colonialisation of Australia, the agrarian discourse coalition was dominant.
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Farming families worked with the full imprimatur of the State on WDMC. They 
constituted the T  of the dominant discourse. However, from the 1960s, the rise of the 
discourse of ‘new’ environmentalism challenged the dominance of the agrarian 
discourse. Progressively, the State abolished the traditional forums in which the voices 
of farm families were heard. It then attempted to sublimate these concerns in to forums 
of the dominant discourse. This again was contested. The State however achieved this 
through a series of administrative and legislative changes; most notably the abolition of 
WDAs and the Dingo Destruction Boards across NSW and through increased 
prohibitions on methods of WDMC. This was contested by the marginalised discourse 
coalition.
At the same time, this period heralded the entry of powerful new State actors who 
further reified the dominant administrative rationalist discourse through a reliance on 
science and technology and particularly through the storylines of ecological science. 
During this period of successive NSW Labor Governments the legitimacy of the 
dominant discourse was continually contested. This was largely achieved through the 
storylines of the agrarian discourse, most notably the crisis in the ‘Bush’ and by 
alarming reports of unchecked wild dog predation on agricultural stock. However, 
rather than reverse the dominance of the administrative rationalist discourse the 
cumulative actions of State actors reinforced it.
Political parties exploited the issue of WDMC as a way of securing political capital. The 
representation of WDMC as a political issue served three functions: First, it enhanced 
the political capital of NSW parliamentary parties -  especially Country Labor; second, 
it further reinforced the administrative control of WDMC; and, third, it secured the 
scientific and technological voice as the ‘expert’ voice on WDMC. The dominant 
administrative discourse positioned the alternative ‘voices’ of farm families as self- 
serving and subordinate. In this way, the dominant discourse predetermined how NSW 
WDMC was both conceptualised and implemented at the grassroots.
This dominance was compounded by what Hajer (1993) refers to in discourse coalitions 
as the ‘aura of responsible bookkeeper’ (Hajer 1993: 55). This ‘aura’ in WDMC was 
affected by instrumental use of the Annual Reports, Financial Statements and Allied 
Reports of six State actors charged with implementing WDMC at the grassroots. As 
Chapter Four argues these literatures are not best understood as ‘fact.’ The paucity of
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information regarding financial expenditures on WDMC in real terms during this period 
is apparent and salutary. Over the period of successive NSW Labor Governments, the 
storylines of these Reports reveal more about the production of ‘knowledge’ and ‘taken 
for granted’ assumptions, the networks, and, relations of power inherent in WDMC than 
they do about financial expenditures on WDMC across NSW in real terms.
At the same time, these storylines reveal compelling internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies when compared to the storylines of financial expenditures promulgated 
by the dominant discourse. These inconsistencies in turn were compounded by the 
storylines that emanated from the Audit Reports of the NSW Auditor General during 
this time. Game Council NSW is notable in this regard. These Reports tempered the 
storylines of Government largesse in WDMC by pointing increasingly to disparities 
between the dominant storylines and the material reality of WDMC as reported. 
However, and importantly, they did not prove sufficient to unseat the administrative 
rationalist discourse. To the contrary, the process of the Audit Reports re-embedded 
WDMC within the dominant discourse.
In contrast, the storylines of an increasingly disenfranchised agrarian discourse centred 
on two questions: ‘How much money was spent on WDMC in real terms?’ and, ‘Where 
did the money go?’ These storylines in turn revolved around claims of financial 
mismanagement and a lack of transparency and accountability in WDMC. The 
storylines challenged but did not undermine the dominant discourse.
However, the administrative rationalist discourse also sought legitimacy through the 
reliance on ‘experts.’ Chapter Five argued that within the dominant discourse of 
WDMC there was a dependence on scientific rationalism. In the policy of WDMC this 
dependence manifested itself in storylines of ‘good science,’ the adoption of the ‘the 
strategic approach,’ and the development of technologies and ‘new’ innovations. This 
in turn facilitated the entry of new commercial actors in WDMC and the rise of the self- 
proclaimed ‘growth industry’ in WDMC. These storylines of a ‘growth industry’ 
viewed WDMC differently to those that emanated from an agrarian discourse. These 
storylines evidenced a sense of increasing desperation and frustration and a loss of 
discursive power. The storylines of these new social actors re-presented WDMC as an 
area of expanding employment and the necessity of further ecological research in 
WDMC. This reliance further marginalised the storylines of the agrarian discourse 
coalition which pivoted around the ‘anecdotal’, the lived experiences and ‘situated
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knowledges’ of farm families. Within the dominant discourse these storylines were held 
to be subordinate to ‘fact’ and ‘truth.’
Notwithstanding this, the dominant discourse was increasingly challenged by the 
storylines of other discourses, namely ‘new’ environmentalism; animal welfare and 
biosecurity. As argued in Chapter Six the function of storylines within competing 
discourses was threefold: to create meaning and validate action, to mobilise action, and 
to define alternatives (Hannigan 2006: citing Gelcich et al. 2005: 379). The storyline of 
humaneness that emanated from an animal welfare discourse and the storyline of 
biosecurity collectively resonated across all discourses but for different reasons. 
Individually they drew on contending discourses. However, each storyline was 
subverted to serve the dominant discourse.
Overall, the Chapter reveals that while the NSW Labor Government privileged 
scientific rationalism as the authorial voice in WDMC, the legitimacy of this authority 
was strongly contested by the rise of contending discourses. This added further 
complexity to the understanding of the issue of WDMC and, in turn, impacted 
dramatically on its implementation in NSW. However, the policy conundrum of 
WDMC remained. The State was legislatively committed to fulfilling the twin 
obligations of the management and control of wild dogs, and, the conservation of the 
dingo -  at the same time.
Chapter Seven examined this declared NSW Labor Government policy objective in 
light of the findings of extensive field work across NSW completed over the years 2007 
-  2009. Two observations were made before the penultimate conclusion was derived: 
First, that the public policy of WDMC was delivered ‘top down;’ Second, that during 
the period of successive NSW Labor Governments, farming families consistently 
challenged both the legitimacy of ‘experts,’ public land managers and NSW WDMC 
policy. This was done through storylines. Public WDMC meetings and the lack of 
‘signed off plans became the site and the point of rejection of the legitimacy of the 
dominant discourse respectively.
The penultimate conclusion that this thesis makes challenges the explicit claim of the 
storylines in NSW WDMC policy; that it was a success and that wild dog predation on 
agricultural stock had decreased through State intervention. The findings of this
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empirical research are at odds with the storylines promulgated in the dominant 
administrative rationalist discourse.
Wild dog policy in NSW reveres the Brindabella Plan and the ‘strategic approach’ as 
not only ‘best practice’ but as a measure of the success of WDMC policy and as 
validation of the administrative rationalist discourse. However, the findings of this 
empirical research suggest that neither has travelled far. Just a little more than one third 
of NSW designated Schedule Two lands as at August 2009 were covered by a plan. 
Moreover, the ‘strategic approach’ which is the model on which the Brindabella Plan 
was based was overwhelmingly rejected at the grassroots. Farming families did not 
adopt the ways of reasoning advocated in the dominant discourse; rather they 
emphatically rejected them.
In contrast, Chapter Seven revealed that the findings of Industry and Government 
Reports reported both the increased impacts of wild dog predation on agricultural stock 
on farming families and, at the same time, the parlous state of the sheep industry across 
NSW. In contrast to the administrative rationalist discourse, the empirical research of 
this thesis suggests there were fewer sheep, fewer lands and fewer fanners. This ever 
declining pool made the impacts of wild dog predation felt even more keenly.
Overwhelmingly, farming families repeated the same storyline at WDMC meetings: 
wild dog predation on sheep was held to be ‘the’ reason and ‘the’ tipping point for 
sheep producers exiting the industry and, conversely, the reason why they lacked the 
confidence to restock destocked lands. These storylines were not discounting the 
storylines of the impact of an extended drought or the fall in commodity prices that was 
experienced during this time.
In this light, claims in the storylines of the administrative rationalist discourse that wild 
dog predation has declined as a result of the adoption of the strategic approach as 
enshrined in the Brindabella Plan or through the development of technologies and new 
innovations in WDMC appear specious. Overwhelmingly, the empirical research of this 
thesis reveals the contrary to be the case: Over the period of successive NSW Labor 
Governments from 1995-2011, the sheep industry in NSW, and farming families in 
NSW were facing a crisis unparalleled since Federation.
235
Collectively, the empirical findings of this thesis challenge the veracity of the claim of 
‘best practice’ in WDMC policy literatures which is publicly disseminated through the 
storylines of the dominant discourse. It reveals that during this period farming families 
who attended WDMC meetings rejected overwhelmingly the legitimacy of the 
dominant discourse. However, the bitter irony within the public policy of WDMC is that 
the success of WDMC policy was dependent on the continued involvement of farm 
families as an indicator of the success of the public planning process. This success 
relied on the acquiescence of farming families to a discourse that subordinated their 
concerns. As such the public policy of WDMC represented an exercise in the ‘forced’ 
recognition of the dominant discourse coalition. However, its lack of legitimacy among 
farming families was clear in the widespread contestation at public WDMC meetings 
and the lack of ‘signed off plans across NSW during this period.
On only two occasions did farming families legitimise WDMC ‘plans.’ The first was 
reportedly at the inception of Brindabella Plan. Farming families validated this during 
meetings attended during the course of the empirical research. This plan was written 
reportedly by farming families for farming families. However, increasingly farming 
families reported: ‘that the wheels had fallen off.’ The second occasion was one in 
which legitimacy was given only conditionally on the proviso that ‘agreed’ caveats to 
the unsigned plan were honoured into the future. Thus, the future of this ‘plan’ remains 
uncertain. Nevertheless, on both occasions the plans were written from the ‘grassroots’ 
by fanning families whose involvement was motivated by desperation, that they had 
‘their backs against the wall.’ Their collective involvement was ‘forced’ by the 
overwhelming desire to get ‘the dogs off our lands.’ However, these instances were by 
far the exception rather than the rule.
In this sense, the storylines of the administrative rationalist discourse reveal a 
significant disconnect between what is said to happen in WDMC in NSW and what 
happens. Overwhelmingly the policy of WDMC in NSW lacked legitimacy within the 
marginalised discourse coalition of farming families because the State had not managed 
wild dogs ‘to the extent necessary’ that allowed sheep producers to restock destocked 
land.
It is apparent that over this period farming families were indeed ‘Playing for sheep 
stations.’ The storylines that emerged from the public consultation process represented
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instead not the acquiescence to the dominant discourse coalition but rather the very real 
struggle for the survival of the sheep industry across NSW and, ipso facto, the survival 
of farming families and the family farm. Thus, the ‘dog tree’ as a sign of the rejection of 
the dominant discourse continues to function to this day as a public rebuke and a 
powerful statement of protest to public land managers who are perceived to have failed 
in their responsibilities as a ‘good neighbour’ in controlling wild dogs on public lands.
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